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ABSTRACT 
REPRESENTATIONS OF THE OTHER IN SELECTED WORKS OF JOSEPH 
CONRAD 
This thesis examines how Otherness/ alterity is represented in Joseph Conrad’s writing through an 
exploration of a selection of three of his works, namely The Nigger of the ‘Narcissus’, Lord Jim, 
and Under Western Eyes. Drawing on notions of alterity and the Other as espoused in postcolonial 
discourse (which is subsumed under poststructuralism and postmodernism), it sets out to 
demonstrate that, in his writing, Joseph Conrad deploys of a formulaic technique of Othering that 
could be traced, to a greater of lesser degree, across all his writing. 
It proceeds from the premise that Conrad’s writing engages with an abiding concern with 
the individual’s construction of an identity in relation to his society. From this perspective, it 
investigates issues of race and culture as they relate to identity within the contested terrain of social 
space. Drawing on theories of identity and representation propounded by Edward Said, Homi 
Bhabha, and Stuart Hall, and reading these in tandem with Edward Soja’s theories of space and 
place, this study proposes an identification of Otherness through an examination of intra-colonial 
relations and/or encounters that help to reveal how the Othered characters are constructed within 
the structures of their own social systems. 
In addition to demonstrating how the Other is revealed through the selected texts, this study 
also yields insights into the possibility of perceiving the Other through a ‘thirdsight’ perspective. 
Having developed this concept of ‘thirdsight’, I theorise it as a possibility of perception 
triangulated through the various narrative perspectives that are presented, either subtly or overtly, 
in the texts. Through thirdsight, it then becomes possible for the reader to arrive at alternative and 
plausible meanings that sustain my overall argument that Conrad demonstrates an abiding interest 
in representing varying forms of Otherness in his writing. 
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REPRESENTATIONS OF THE OTHER IN SELECTED WORKS OF JOSEPH CONRAD 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Joseph Conrad’s writing has persistently featured in critical literary studies, especially of the sort 
related to the phenomenology and the hermeneutics of the subject. As a result, the budding Conrad 
scholar is often tempted to wonder what more one can say about him that has not already been 
said. To partly deal with this anxiety of influence, I begin my study by attempting to respond to D. 
C. R. A. Goonetilleke’s question: “In what respects does he matter to us?” (11). To this, I venture 
the argument that due to Conrad’s compelling style and the intriguing perspective from which he 
presents different facets of his narrative with an unrelenting focus on the constitution of the human 
subject as a social being, his works remain relevant for studies that aim to examine the identity of 
individuals or groups of persons as they relate to others within a social order. Since this statement 
seems to posture towards a more sociological or anthropological enquiry, a more precise question 
would be: how is Conrad relevant to today’s discussions in the humanities or in literary and cultural 
studies? In this regard, I invoke F. R. Leavis’ conceptualisation of canonical writings making up 
The Great Tradition (1948) of English Literature in which he includes Conrad as a core member. 
Besides, Conrad’s writings, that essentially treat and depict the human subject as influenced in 
various ways by social, political, cultural and economic factors, often serve as a point of reference 
for sustained contemporary debates about the representation of race and difference in literature. 
For a close reading of his texts reveals an overall scepticism regarding the accepted principles 
upon which the universe, constructed primarily on polarity, is organised. In such a universe heavily 
impacted by what Edward Said has identified as a “mixture of cultures and identities” consolidated 
by imperialism (Culture and Imperialism 407), there are indeed no pure forms of identity as the 
subject, impacted by various experiences, emerges as bearing a very complex nature. 
Consequently, texts like Conrad’s that provoke an interrogation of what it means to be one subject 
or another earn a claim to lasting relevance. If such an argument for Conrad’s hermeneutics of the 
subject does not sufficiently answer Goonetilleke’s query, I add that, from a global historico-
political context, Conrad’s writing reflects a dialectical convergence of colonial, modernist and 
postcolonial discourses, that remain pertinent to our times. While this perspective may connote the 
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idea that Conrad demonstrates a sense of astuteness in his writing that causes his works to 
transcend his time, it also impresses upon us the fact that it is in placing Conrad within his historical 
and literary-historical context that we may be able to essentially grasp his meaning. Thus, it is 
from the convergence of historical and political manifestations upon his writing that we may 
perceive him as speaking to the present through a critique of the accepted myths of the colonial 
rhetoric of his time. Among such myths is the sustained notion of a social hierarchy which 
predicates the prevalence of one human subject over another, constituting the subordinate subject 
as inferior to the presumed superior. In the dynamics of social relations and of the positioning of 
the subject within a social order, the formation of such social hierarchies, based on race, class or 
gender, casts inferiority as aberrant, and even potentially jeopardising to the presumed standard. 
In being thus considered as an alteration of the standard, the inferior subject is essentially 
constituted as an Other. 
Determining the specificity of this Other in Conrad’s writing is the focus of my study. To 
do this, I draw generally on notions of alterity, concepts of Othering, and on studies about the 
construction of the Other to identify and examine characters that may be inadvertently Othered in 
the selected texts. For instance, Rachel Hollander, in her analysis of Under Western Eyes from  
Emmanuel Levinas’ perspective of ethics and politics towards the Other, asserts that Conrad, in 
that novel, “establishes Russia as an abyssal space of otherness” (1) in which Razumov, “(the 
embodiment of that abyss)” (9), faces the challenge of defining his identity and purpose within 
ethical limits of an otherwise dysfunctional system. Also in a Levinasian reading of Lord Jim, 
Agata Kowol observes that Jim’s persistent failure resulting from his lack of alertness and 
preparedness for life’s contingencies “renders him an other not only to his comrades, or the 
external world, but also to himself” (145). Such epigrammatic conceptualisations of alterity 
derived from perspectival readings of Conrad’s texts provide the theoretical foundation for my 
own analysis as I work out how Otherness is represented in Conrad’s writing. 
In a further exploration of how Conrad constructs his Othered characters, I turn my lens on 
intra-colonial relations/ encounters depicted between characters within the texts. This focus 
enables me to demonstrate how the characters that I identify as Othered are impacted in their 
Otherness by such encounters. In many colonial/ postcolonial analyses, the major debates on 
encounters that engender alterity are often centred on colonial-metropolitan, or master-subject 
relations that are characteristic of imperial endeavours. Therefore, my shift in focus to interrogate 
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these intra-colonial relations and encounters in Conrad’s writing will contribute to highlighting the 
latent functions of such encounters which have been much understudied. In effect, the surplus 
value of examining these relations and encounters is that such an analysis consolidates the fact that 
Otherness in Conrad’s writing is not only constructed through the master narrative of imperialist 
discourse which depicts Otherness primarily through economic and political relations of power, 
but that it is also indicated and reinforced through everyday social relations and a failure to comply 
to standardising notions implied within an ostensibly analogous universe. 
 
OTHERNESS / ALTERITY 
In debates within literary and cultural studies, the notion of the Other has been employed in various 
ways. It is used to define the quality of being different from an established social norm or standard. 
It also indicates the distinction that people make between themselves and others in terms of a 
difference that may be sexual (Irigaray 1977), ethnic (Said 1978; Spivak 1985, 1987, 2000; Hall 
1997), or relational: phenomenological (Waldenfels 1997), ethical (Levinas 1994), (post-)colonial 
(Bhabha 1997, 2005). The term has had an impressive career within the humanities and the social 
sciences as Bernhard Waldenfels (1997; 2011), for example, examines it as a response to the Other 
that pre-exists the subject. In his conception of human existence in terms of a social order, he 
distinguishes three intersecting levels, namely, “the order of selfhood, the order of social 
collectivity, and the order of reason” (Waldenfels 2011, 14-15). These three levels place the subject 
in a relation with the Other through a demand to respond, or interact, with that Other at every level 
of its existence. A related, but earlier exploration of the term from such a relational perspective 
can be attributed to Emmanuel Levinas (1969, 1994) whose examination of the ethical relation 
between the self and the Other emphasises the responsibility toward the Other embedded within 
this relationship. In his theorisation of the concept he states: “I am defined as a subjectivity, as a 
singular person, as an ‘I’, precisely because I am exposed to the other. it is my inescapable and 
incontrovertible answerability to the other that make me an individual ‘I’” (Levinas 62). In this 
conceptualisation of the ‘I’ as contingent on the Other, Levinas demonstrates that the self or the 
ego cannot exist without the Other, the ethical implication being, therefore, that a devaluation of 
the Other constitutes a devaluation of the self. In relation to this, he asserts that “[i]n ethics, the 
other’s right to exist has primacy over my own” (Levinas 60). In effect, Levinas’ ethical dimension 
sets the Other as superior to the self in a relationship of intersubjectivity. This notion of the place 
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and the role of the Other in terms of intersubjectivity is neither new nor radical as it persists also 
in the area of existential philosophy where the term is employed to define the intersubjective 
relations between persons that result in the creation of self-awareness and in the production of 
ideas of identity. 
Although I often allude to these notions of intersubjectivity with and responsibility toward 
the Other, for the purposes of my study, I defer to the general use of the term as it is employed in 
postcolonial theory where its definition is rooted in the psychoanalytic tradition of a Freudian and 
post-Freudian analysis of the construction of subjectivity (Ashcroft et al 186). Drawing on this 
tradition, the term, as conceptualized by Jacques Lacan (1966; 1968), exists in two distinct forms: 
the other with a small ‘o’ and the Other with a capital ‘O’. In Lacan’s distinction, the other (small 
‘o’) is a reflection and a projection of the ego, or the self. It resembles the self and thereby fosters 
a recognition or an identification through which it becomes aware of itself as a separate being. 
This results in its aspiration to selfhood through the formation of an identity, based on its 
recognition and awareness of existence as a social being within a symbolic order. In Lacan’s 
notion, such a self-recognition and awareness is facilitated as the emerging subject passes through 
the mirror stage which serves as the primal scene of the construction of the other who identifies 
his autonomy from the self. In postcolonial theory, “this other is important in defining the identity 
of the subject”, who could be the colonised subject “marginalized by imperial discourse” (Ashcroft 
et al 187). The Other (capital ‘O’) refers to a radical alterity to which the ‘standard’ subject denies 
any form of identification (Wolfreys 62). In postcolonial criticism, this struggle for identification 
often presupposes a “primitive and degraded subject of imperial discourse” in need of validation 
from the Symbolic Other or the Imperial Other through the nurturing (maternal) and regulatory 
(patriarchal) functions of the colonising power (Ashcroft, Griffiths and Tiffin 188). As Ashcroft, 
Griffiths and Tiffin observe, “both these processes of ‘othering’ occur at the same time” resulting 
simultaneously in the creation of the dominant imperial Other and the subordinate colonial other 
(188). In my conceptualisation of the term for my study, I subscribe to all of these notions of 
alterity which serve as viable points of departure for analysing the Others that emerge from the 
selected texts. However, throughout the study, I use the term ‘Other’ (with a capital ‘O’) for two 
main reasons. The first of these is to refer to radical alterity as indicated by Levinas and 
Waldenfels; and the second is to pinpoint the constructedness of the ‘Other’. In effect, my use of 
the term ‘Other’ implies that subject, or entity, that is indicated for difference, marginality and 
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exclusion from an imagined centre based on its non-conformity to a standard. I, therefore, 
implicitly demonstrate in my study that Conrad’s Othered subject is not always (or essentially) 
primitive or degraded but is Othered within the context of his social relations.  From this notion, I 
examine such subjects as bearing a condition or quality of Otherness, or alterity (used 
interchangeably with Otherness), which manifests as difference from an accepted social identity. 
Besides, I use the action term ‘to Other’ to indicate the reductive labelling of a person as deviating 
from an accepted norm, resulting in exclusion from the centre that represents the standard. Coined 
by Gayatri Spivak (1985a) to refer to the social and / or psychological methods by which one group 
of people excludes or marginalizes another group, the term Othering indicates the processes 
deployed by imperial discourse to assert its superiority and create its ‘others’ (Spivak 251-270). 
As I examine the Conrad texts selected for this study, these terms and notions of alterity and 
Othering come in handy, as they help me to investigate the modes of Othering used in the texts 
and how, through a typology of such Othering modes, certain characters can be considered Others. 
To explore these issues in Conrad’s works, I begin from the premise that Otherness is not 
necessarily strangeness. It has, however, been used to characterise the Othered subject as different, 
definitely different from the Self. This difference could be interpreted in terms of religion, sexual 
identity/orientation, and ethnicity. In an earlier study on the subject of Otherness, Osei-Bonsu, 
(2008) demonstrates that in 16th century English literature the other is captured as so different from 
the norm that it is presented as strange and even monstrous (21). Further showing that this 
strangeness was often linked to evil or to a tendency to cause harm, she cites Caliban from 
Shakespeare’s The Tempest as an example of this type of monstrous or potentially dangerous other 
(21). However, as she further traces the representation of othering in literature, she indicates that 
by the late 18th century, the other is portrayed as simply different in the sense that it lacks some 
natural attribute or condition that makes it deviate from the norm without necessarily being 
frightful or strange. As she shows with examples from a selection of English texts - including 
Ozymandias, The Little Black Boy, and The Indian Girl’s Song – the newly emerged other of this 
period bears a sort of exotic nature and may be excluded from what is considered normal society 
merely because of its difference (22). However, by the early 20th century – which marks Conrad’s 
era – the identity of the other is no longer as homogenous as it seems to have remained until this 
time and it becomes possible to detect a differentiation, initially subtle but progressively more 
pronounced, between different kinds of others. There remains the exotic other simply marked by 
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difference as is represented in the dark-skinned stranger/outsider of the 19th century exemplified 
by such a character as Heathcliff in Emily Bronte’s Wuthering Heights. This other emerges as the 
oriental other who is fascinating for its exotic nature and who is “considered potentially equal to 
the European self” (23).  This other is, however, differentiated from the African other, who is 
depicted as “frightfully brutish and savage” and “must be permanently excluded from the imperial 
self” (22).  
For my approach to Conrad, I extend these processes of differentiation to further a 
conceptualization of Otherness in which the other that is ‘monstrous’ is captured as an ‘Other’ 
(with a capital ‘O’), whereas that which is merely ‘strange’ is an ‘other’ (with a small letter ‘o’). I 
further argue that this conceptualization may form the basis for imagining a continuum of 
Otherness which sets the ‘strange/ other’ on a lower end of gravity against the ‘monstrous/ Other’ 
which would be considered a grimmer form of Otherness. On the premise of such a scale, it is 
possible for an individual to transform from a mere strangeness which may be disregarded for its 
inoffensiveness to a monstrosity which transgresses recognition and defies any identification with 
a norm. This theorisation of the Other, that approximates the African Other in its need to be 
permanently excluded from the ‘standard’ self, is at the core of my examination of alterity in The 
Nigger of the ‘Narcissus’, Lord Jim, and Under Western Eyes. 
In addition to my own theorisation of Otherness as occurring on a continuum, I also draw 
heavily on the postcolonial theorisation of alterity in which the Other can be conceptualised in a 
variety of terms such as the Oriental Other (Said) and the African Other (Mudimbe), the racial 
Other (Fanon; Spivak; Memmi; Mbembe; Appiah and Gutman; Aidoo; Arendt), and even the 
sexual Other (feminist discourse including Kristeva; Scott; Bradford; Hawkesworth; Narayan; 
Pelikan Strauss; Das). Most of these different others are often cast in what can generally be referred 
to as the oppressed or victimised Other. While Said discusses how the oriental Other is constructed 
to satisfy the need of the West to assert itself with inferior regard to an Other, Mudimbe takes this 
discussion further with respect to the African and shows how the ‘otherization’ of Africa has gone 
through various stages to create the ultimate Other. In this thesis I take the position that not all 
European Others are created equal, and that Joseph Conrad’s works permit us to elicit a typology 
of western Othering in which Africa/ the African is the ultimate Other. 
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CONRAD AND THE POSTCOLONIAL  
Many colonial and post-colonial writings demonstrate how the African or Africa itself is 
constituted as an Other to Europe/ the West. Often, the critical debates that generate around such 
representations promptly cite Joseph Conrad’s Heart of Darkness as the primary example of such 
a text. However, other less cited texts such as The Ambiguous Adventure by Cheikh Hamidou 
Kane, Mister Johnson by Joyce Cary and even, to a certain extent, Things Fall Apart by Chinua 
Achebe convey similar depictions of Otherness. As is evident in Joseph Conrad’s works, very 
often this conception of the African Other is reinforced and endorsed through the discourse of 
economic/political control and racial superiority over that Other. However, a consideration of the 
fact that Conrad’s writing also depicts European/Western Others prompts us to revisit charges that 
Conrad is guilty of racialised or racist otherings of African subjects. How do the representations 
of these other Others compare with the representation of the standardized African Other? These 
enquiries will serve to initiate an analysis of various Others represented in Conrad’s works. A 
related key question is: Why does Conrad choose the Congo to portray his African Other, and what 
informs/ influences his geographical choice of other Others? Answering such questions will help 
us dispel notions of a malicious ‘racist’ intent in Conrad’s portrayal of Africa/ns. 
Many arguments have been made for Conrad’s racist attitudes towards Africa/ns by 
focusing on his descriptions of Africans as inferior, particularly in his novella Heart of Darkness. 
Chief among them is Chinua Achebe’s influential criticism of Conrad as racist (Achebe 935). 
Stating that Conrad’s writing reflects a Eurocentric way of thinking about Africa/ns, Achebe 
asserts that Conrad’s “preposterous and perverse arrogance in […] reducing Africa to the role of 
props for the break-up of one petty European mind” results in the “dehumanisation of Africa and 
Africans” and “depersonalises a portion of the human race” (935-36). Achebe further states that 
Africa is Othered through representations such as that of Kurtz’s African mistress who is depicted 
as savage and whose vacant stare is compared to the wilderness while his European intended is a 
fully developed human being whose humanity is expressed in the emotional expressiveness of her 
pain, sorrow and loss. Moreover, whereas the Europeans in the narrative are articulate subjects, 
the Africans are denied this ability and are depicted as ‘howling’ and ‘shrieking’ in a “wild and 
passionate uproar” (Heart of Darkness 37). This damning assessment in which Achebe calls 
Conrad “a bloody racist” (936) has engendered a wide range of reactions. While other postcolonial 
literary scholars like Niyi Osundare, Eugene B. Redmond, and Terry Eagleton have reiterated 
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Achebe’s sentiments, counter arguments have been staged by critics such as Cedric Watts and J. 
Hillis Miller who allege that Achebe’s charge results from a misplaced analysis, or from what 
Terry Collits, in reference to such counter arguments, sums up as a “passionate misreading” 
(Collits 96) of the novella. Countering this suggestion of a possible misreading, Osundare contests 
that critics who fail to acknowledge Conrad’s racism in Heart of Darkness contribute to “a 
complex series of evasions, open-eyed blindness, wilful forgetfulness, or simply, an intellectual 
and racial connivance with the European novelist” (947). To these debates, I contend that while 
these pro-racist readings may be a viable way to look at the novella, they do not represent the only 
way that the text can and should be read and must, therefore, not be allowed to eclipse other 
acceptable readings of the novella. In this vein, I agree with J. Hillis Miller who contends that there 
are “ways to read ‘Heart of Darkness’ that might do harm, for example if it is read as 
straightforwardly endorsing Eurocentric, racist and sexist ideologies” (474). He, however, points 
out that a more rewarding reading of the novella will be to evaluate it for its artistic and stylistic 
techniques that contribute to making it a great piece of literature. In line with this view, he posits 
that the text is a “masterwork of irony” (476) in which “Conrad’s radical irony” (476) subtly 
addresses sensitive issues related to the negativity of imperialism. Besides its irony, he outlines 
three other salient features that establish the text as a literary masterpiece that demands to be read 
just for the merit of its literariness. Thus, Hillis Miller states that it would be heretic to read the 
text simply as an endorsement of Eurocentrism and proposes how it “should be read” instead. In 
his opinion, the reader should approach the novella as “a powerful exemplary revelation of the 
ideology of capitalist imperialism, including its racism and sexism” (474) while paying close 
attention to its stylistic narration and its “descriptive vividness” (452). Given the fact that such a 
reading does not completely dismiss the excesses of ideological representations, it is unavoidable 
that the conscientious reader, influenced by their own ideological leanings, will be struck by the 
stark representations of one race of people against another. What ideological perspective such a 
reader chooses to focus on remains, I believe, a matter that one really has no business adjudicating. 
Such debates about Conrad’s xenophobia persist unabatedly almost half a century after 
they were sparked by Achebe in 1975, and they show little signs of going away any time soon. 
However, while this judgement of Conrad as racist has been based on his single text, Heart of 
Darkness, out of his very productive writing career, rather little has been done by way of checking 
this charge of racism against his depiction of the subjects of other geographical regions, either in 
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the same novel or in his other works. It is this kind of analysis that I propose to conduct in my 
study of the Other through a selection of Conrad’s works. While I do not aim to absolve Conrad 
of the charge of racism, I hope that my study will help to situate Conrad’s works in the confluence 
of these earlier, and other contemporary, debates on the Other, and to demonstrate that the author’s 
agenda is hardly racist in essence. 
Far from recommending that Conrad’s works be read in any particular way, I rather propose 
a reading that will focus on two main aspects. First, my reading of Conrad should help us think 
about the political situatedness of his texts. As Collits asserts, Conrad’s writings “coincided with 
an epistemological crisis as well as a crisis of empire” (24) in that the spread of empire, resulting 
also in a loss of direct regulatory oversight and control in its farthest reaches, also gave rise to an 
anthropological desire to ‘know’ – describe and understand – Europe’s Other/s in a bid to assert 
the imperial self. However, as Collits observes, such a quest, like earlier classical quests for the 
unknown or the forbidden, results in a “futility” that proves, in the face of resounding imperial 
conquest, a “human limitation more suggestive of tragedy than of militant enlightenment” (Collits 
23). Such a desperate lack of knowledge of the empire’s Other/s is reflected in Conrad’s writing 
as a groping for a determinate description of subjectivity which, remaining slippery at best, 
invariably eludes him. This elusion, manifested in Conrad’s indeterminacy of description of his 
subjects, anticipates the human subject’s resistance to being politically defined or categorised 
under the force of conquest, a resistance that is at the heart of postcolonial theoretical discourse 
and analysis. Thus, Conrad’s works, laying bare the atrocities of empire upon territories and 
subjects, provides the frame of reference for a radical resistance against the violence of (mis/) 
representation while he writes against colonial conquest. In effect, the representation of Otherness 
in his works, depicted even at the height of imperial assertiveness, proleptically situates his texts 
within the theoretical framework of postcolonial discourse which is much concerned with the 
power relations embedded in the dynamics of representation. 
Secondly, I propose a reading that pays more attention to the author’s great narrative skill, 
especially his layered use of point of view and its consequences for the charge of racism. This 
focus on the formal features of Conrad’s texts prompts an interrogation into how his narrative 
choices relate to the politics of his texts: Does his writing, especially depicting other peoples and 
cultures as less civilised than Europe, reinforce ethnocentric ideas about these people and cultures? 
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Does the complexity of his style, including his excessive use of adjectives and fractured sentences, 
and his combination of framed narratives with narrative distancing through the layering of point 
of view, insinuate him against the indictment of racism? In Hunt Hawkins’ consideration of Heart 
of Darkness as Conrad’s advocacy against imperial expansion and its evils, he does not fail to point 
out the notions of Social Darwinism and its resulting racism that are subtly camouflaged in the text 
(370-74). In effect, it is evident that in Conrad’s efforts to expose and condemn the atrocities of 
European colonial expansion, he inadvertently reiterates the racist ideologies about Africa/ns that 
prevailed in his time. Unintentional as that might be, his reproduction of these already existing 
ideologies does not lessen the effect of their offense. And the notion that he was in fact sensitive 
to racism as a result of “being subject to it himself” (Hawkins 373) did not seem to make him any 
less vivid in his racist depictions of others. However, as Abdul JanMohamed observes, despite 
what critics like Achebe may say about Conrad’s graphic treatment of Africa/ns in Heart of 
Darkness, “Africans are an incidental part, and not the main objects of representation, in the 
novella” (90). Therefore, it is worth making a focal shift from the incidental to the main so as to 
compare his treatment of Africans with his treatment of other characters of different ethnic origins. 
Even in relation to Conrad’s treatment of his European characters, Hawkins asserts that 
racist attitudes were “endemic” in Conrad’s era, and that while he may have demonstrated such 
attitudes himself, “he acidly attacked white racism in his works,” depicting “nothing but contempt 
for white men who claim superiority solely on the basis of their skin color” (373). This is 
evidenced, for instance, in his treatment of Peter Willems in An Outcast of the Islands, whose plea 
to Lingard to save him from the consequences of his mindless actions is based on his claim to 
whiteness: “I don’t want to die here. […]. Take me away! I am white! All white!” (209). Right 
from his “Author’s Note” that introduces the novel to the reader, Conrad ridicules such a claim to 
racial superiority by denigrating Willems as being “almost as dumb as an animal and apparently 
much more homeless” (282). In similar fashion, Donkin in The Nigger of the Narcissus who insists 
on his rights because he is “an Englishman” (6) is also referred to as “a dirty white cockatoo” (68), 
and is introduced into the narrative looking like a broken-winged bird who “had been cuffed, 
kicked, rolled in the mud” and “pelted with unmentionable filth” (5). These Othering depictions 
of Europeans are replicated in much of his writing, including even in Heart of Darkness where 
Kurtz is equally depicted as an Other who succumbs to his “primitive emotion” and is reduced in 
his fatal sickness to a “hollow sham” (73). For my analysis of Otherness in this study, I proceed 
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from the premise that, throughout his writing, Conrad stages a politics of resistance to imperialism 
and its wide-reaching effects on both the colonised and the coloniser, both of whom he depicts as 
victims of imperial expansion. In support of this proposition, I point out that Conrad’s only other 
text that is set in Africa, An Outpost of Progress, was originally titled “A Victim of Progress” 
(Sewlall 38). That his notion of ‘victim’ should be replaced by a place – ‘outpost’ – which brings 
together the European colonial agents and the African people and setting calls for a close scrutiny 
of Conrad’s staging of ‘victimhood’ in the short story. Consequently, a close reading of the text, 
generally considered “a scathing satire of empire” (Sewlall 39), will reveal that the ‘victims’ 
implied are indeed Kayerts and Carlier, representatives of the civilising mission in the African 
setting of the narrative, rather than Makola, the “Sierra Leone nigger” who works as their clerk. 
The European pair exhibit a crippling ignorance and a lack of originality or critical assessment and 
thus become puppets of the imperial apparatus and also of Makola, who demonstrates an astuteness 
for imperial and capitalist industry. Besides, it is worth noting that in this text, which precedes 
Heart of Darkness, the African characters, including Gobila (the chief of the villages close to the 
trading post) and Makola, are accorded the quality of speech, the ability to engage in deep thought, 
and a sense of appropriate conduct over the European agents. In effect, they are generally depicted 
in more positive terms than the two white men who are described as “incapable of independent 
thought” in their joint “fellowship” of “stupidity and laziness” (86). Left by themselves over a long 
period of eight months and absorbed by their individual whims, they end up delirious, resulting in 
Kayerts unintentionally shooting and killing Carlier, and then later hanging himself. 
Given that much of Conrad’s writing depicts the dire fate of the individual manipulated by 
an oppressive and de-individualising system, it is apposite to categorise his works as a collective 
indictment of imperialism as it provides a contrapuntal appraisal to the discourse of empire. Based 
on this premise, my overall argument in this study is that it is through his concern with identity, 
and through the Othering of his characters that Conrad interrogates the extremes of Western 
hegemony as it comes into contact with (other) peoples and cultures. In setting up his characters 
in counterpoint to such hegemony, and in deploying them as the subtle tool for a deconstructive 
examination of imperialism, Conrad’s writing, far from actively reinforcing racist ideologies, may, 
in fact, be perceived as an ideological criticism of the very imperialist discourse that engenders 
racism. From this perspective, my study of The Nigger of the Narcissus, Lord Jim, and Under 
Western Eyes posits that a careful analysis of Conrad’s writing reveals that he develops a formulaic 
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pattern of Othering which he deploys, to a lesser or greater degree, through all his texts. In effect, 
I demonstrate that this formulaic pattern of Othering works against racist stereotyping as it reveals 
that Conrad represents all his Others in, basically, the same manner, be they of African, Western, 
Eastern, or any other ethnic origin. 
 
CONRAD’S OTHERING 
For my analysis of Conrad’s Others, I draw on critical debates by scholars such as Said and 
Mudimbe who discuss racial stereotyping as represented in the use of binary terms such as “us” 
and “them”. I further draw on scholars such as Homi Bhabha, whose re-reading of Said results in 
the introduction of the notions of fetishism and ambivalence into postcolonial theoretical 
discourse. These notions are important to my discussion as they underpin much of Conrad’s 
representational practice. Drawing on Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalysis, Bhabha explains 
that stereotyping results in the construction of an identity that is caught between mastery and 
pleasure, and anxiety and defence as it at once recognises difference and simultaneously disavows 
it (75). In this construct of the stereotype, that follows after a fetishist logic, is implied an 
ambivalence that casts the subject in a position of in-betweenness of identity – of being and 
becoming. Thus, if Conrad does appear to, sometimes, promote racial and cultural differences, it 
may be argued that the portrayal of his characters harbours the kind of ambivalence described by 
Bhabha, thus undermining any notion that the author holds a strong conviction in the pure existence 
of such differences. While my study may indicate certain assumptions of what ideological notions 
are created in Conrad’s works, my main aim will be to move beyond that in order to show how the 
portrayal of Otherness in his texts conforms to or departs from the production of a stereotyped 
Other. To make my argument, I conduct a close reading of the selected Conradian texts towards 
two purposes. First of all, from my close reading of The Nigger of the Narcissus, Lord Jim, and 
Under Western Eyes, I will elicit the instances of complexity, the indications of ambiguity, the 
ambivalences, and ironies associated with Conrad’s depictions of Othering. Secondly, I will use 
the insights of those close readings to challenge the existing scholarship on Conrad’s 
representations. I also seek to make a contribution to more general discussions of Otherness, 
(post)colonialism, and Conrad, inquiring how his works fit into the larger context of pro-
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colonial/imperial literary writing or what it means for the reading of modern and postcolonial 
literature. 
As a major part of my analysis, I explore the connections between othering discourses and 
constructs and intra-colonial relations and encounters. This exploration focuses on encounters and 
relations such as those between James Wait and Donkin or between Wait and the ship and its crew 
in The Nigger of the Narcissus; the relations between Marlow and Jim, as well as Jim’s encounter 
with other characters and places in Lord Jim; and the encounters between Razumov and the 
revolutionaries in Under Western Eyes. In recent times, debates in postcolonial studies have started 
to gradually focus on such intra-colonial connections and their implications for the overall 
significance of the text. 
Examples of such efforts are present in works like Elleke Boehmer’s Empire, the National 
and the Postcolonial, 1890-1920 (2002) which examines the inter-relationship between different 
anti-colonial agents within different colonial sites and explores how the mutual influences and 
interdiscursivity of these agents may have affected, in any significant way, the political and even 
cultural postcolonial re-shaping of these colonial regions. Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds’ book 
Drawing the Global Colour Line: White Men’s Countries and the International Challenge of 
Racial Equality (2008) also makes a strong case for this kind of research. A more recent example 
of such new trends in postcolonial studies is Drabinski’s book, Levinas and the Postcolonial: Race, 
Nation and Other (2011), which explores how the language of Otherness changes with trans-
national and trans-cultural contact through a comparative re-reading of Levinas’ works alongside 
parallel theories of alterity. Although my research is, in some ways, similar to this latter, it differs 
from it in that I reflect on the specificity of the different (European, African, colonial) Others 
represented in Conrad’s works, examining how the representation of these Others may differ with 
respect to the geographical setting including the perceived political and economic standing, social 
context and, possibly, historical background of his narratives. 
Reading Conrad, one is struck, not by his Othering of African subjects (which is well-
known), but by the crucial roles that racial, gendered, and classed Others of various kinds play in 
his work. Thus, for my analysis, I have selected three of Conrad’s texts. These are The Nigger of 
the Narcissus, Under Western Eyes and Lord Jim. My selection is informed by the observation 
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that the major characters in these texts are described in terms that allow them to be readily 
identified as Others. Informed by the depictions of Africans in Heart of Darkness and drawing on 
these descriptions as my point of departure, I delineate various techniques that Conrad uses to 
Other his characters. In my assessment, I certainly find that Conrad’s depiction of the African 
Other differs significantly from his depiction of the European Other in that he focuses more on the 
skin colour of the African and links this to varying notions of blackness and gloom. This fact 
notwithstanding, I posit that, to a large extent, Conrad’s underlying technique of Othering is 
fundamentally the same as, in all instances, he ‘strips away’ the humanity of his subjects in order 
to Other them. 
 In this study, I demonstrate that a typology of Othering in Conrad needs to distinguish 
between at least four distinct techniques of Othering. These techniques include the use of 
denigrating or demeaning terms, the use of animal metaphors, the use of adjectives of contrast, 
and disembodiment. Generally, these techniques of Othering ultimately culminate in the gradual 
dehumanisation of the characters thereby depicting them as Others who even lose their humanity 
as they go through the process of Othering. 
The first technique is that of using demeaning or denigrating terms to describe his 
characters. Instances of this can be found in Heart of Darkness where Conrad projects Africans in 
demeaning terms. He refers to them as “a camp of natives” (3) or “criminals” (3) to whom the 
outraged law had come; or he describes them as rebellious “savages” or “niggers” whose heads 
had been chopped off to adorn the stakes around Kurtz’s compound (71). In this technique of 
denigration, the Othered characters are depicted as so low that they are dispensable. Their 
demeaned status seems to justify the treatment they get: they face the ‘outraged law’, or they are 
killed unceremoniously and even in their death their corpses can be further desecrated.  
The second technique Conrad employs is the use of animal metaphors through which he 
animalises his Others. This technique represents a further step in the debasement of the Othered 
character who is in this instance compared to an animal and so treated also like one. In an example 
of this technique, Conrad extends on the description of the Africans as savages and depicts them 
as bearing “black rags [that] were wound round their loins, and the short ends behind waggled to 
and fro like tails” (9). He also identifies the fireman on the boat as “an improved specimen” who 
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looks like “a dog in a parody of breeches and a feather hat, walking on its hind legs” (45). The 
irony of this last description is that even though the character is referred to as an ‘improvement’ 
over his kind, he is not spared the animalistic descriptions. While these descriptions of the Africans 
in Conrad’s text may appear outrageously racist, they differ only in degree from his description of 
Peter Willems, who is cast as an European Other in An Outcast of the Islands. In the same manner 
of stripping away the character’s humanity, Conrad depicts Willems as “not particularly interesting 
in himself,” bearing a “dependent [dis]position, [and the] strange, dubious status of a mistrusted, 
disliked, worn-out European” (282). In addition to his dubious nature, his gaunt physical 
appearance makes him all the more suspicious as he is presented as having “hollow […] cheeks, a 
heavy grey moustache and eyes without any expression whatever” (282). As the reader’s attention 
is drawn to his “lean neck wholly uncovered” and his “bare feet in a pair of straw slippers” (282), 
the indication that parts of his body are bare and uncovered evokes the mental image of an act of 
stripping away or denuding which anticipates the animalising descriptions that dehumanise him. 
These animalising references are then presented in the description of his aimless loitering: “he 
wandered silently amongst the houses in daylight, almost as dumb as an animal and apparently 
much more homeless” (282). This suggestion of aimlessness, connected to the comparison to an 
animal, casts Willems in the light of a stray and homeless animal wandering about in the open.   
Reinforcing this comparison of Willems to an aimless and even stray animal, Conrad adds that at 
night he “must have had a place, a hut, a palm-leaf shed, some sort of hovel” (282) to retire to. He 
concludes this animalistic description with the suggestion that “an air of futile mystery hung over 
him, something not exactly dark but obviously ugly” (282). This suggestion that he had an air of 
‘futile mystery’ evokes also the notion of a vain or wasted existence, a life without purpose, that 
makes the character despicable,  
The third technique of Othering that I identify in Conrad’s writing is the use of adjectives 
of contrast to define his characters. Often, through this method, the character is cast in gloom 
(connoting negativity or darkness) as opposed to light (which bears a positive connotation and 
alludes to the notion of enlightenment). An extension of these contrasts will also evoke the ability 
to ‘see’ or to discern things better as opposed to an obtuseness often resulting in destruction. In 
Conrad’s use of this technique, the mere contrast of colours such as “black” versus “white” or the 
indication of darker shades as opposed to lighter ones would often allude to a racial or social 
differentiation of the character, producing the Othering effect of subordination. I draw an example 
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of this from The Nigger of the Narcissus, where James Wait, referred to as the “nigger” on the ship 
is captured in a contrast which plays on the colour of his skin, extending the suggestion of 
blackness to the atmosphere of the narrative: 
In the blackness of the doorway a pair of eyes glimmered white […] Then James 
Wait’s head protruding, became visible, as if suspended between the two hands that 
grasped a doorpost on each side of the face. […] He seemed to hasten the retreat 
of departing light by his very presence; the setting sun dipped sharply, as 
though fleeing before our nigger; a black mist emanated from him (45, 
emphasis mine). 
This description of Wait employs the use of contrast to draw attention to his skin colour. Besides, 
the added suggestion of the morbid effect that his presence appears to have on nature combine to 
depict the character as the dreaded Other who is at once feared and yet desired as his presence 
assures the self of its supremacy. Established as the ultimate Other on the ship, Wait is portrayed 
as a corrupting influence on the ship's company who are described as resembling “criminals 
conscious of misdeeds more than honest men distracted by doubt” (63) and as “a crowd of abject 
but untrustworthy slaves” (63). In this description, the men, who have been manipulated by Wait 
to show more allegiance to him than to their masters on the ship, are caught between a sense of 
guilt and a feeling of doubt as to the appropriateness of their actions. In the ambivalence of their 
sentiments, their depiction as ‘a crowd of abject but untrustworthy slaves’ evokes Kristeva’s notion 
of abjection as that which disturbs identity due to its ambiguity or in-betweenness. The suggestion 
of their untrustworthiness even in their submission hints at the ambivalent or indeterminate nature 
of their submission. Besides, Conrad’s use of ‘slaves’ here in reference to Wait’s shipmates evokes 
the Hegelian master/ slave dialectic in which the relationship of bondage and lordship that 
develops between two conscious beings results in a struggle to the death. Through Conrad’s use 
of contrast, he sets Wait up as the embodiment of darkness and negativity that obscures truth and 
morality from both himself and his shipmates. The only way the rest of the men are able to emerge 
from this dark influence is upon Wait’s death. 
The fourth technique of Othering that I identify in Conrad’s writing is that of 
disembodiment which normally takes the form of the subject being described in spectral terms. I 
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refer to this as ‘Othering through spectrality.’ This method is extensively used in Lord Jim where 
the eponymous character, Jim, is often compared to a ghost or a disembodied soul: “He had passed 
[the] days on the verandah, buried in a long chair, […] irresolute and silent, like a ghost without 
a home to haunt” (51, emphasis mine). Such spectral references to Jim gradually increase 
throughout the narrative, creating the effect that he becomes mystified by the end of the narrative. 
 
STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
In my analysis of The Nigger of the Narcissus, Lord Jim, and Under Western Eyes, I examine how 
Conrad’s (narrative or linguistic) process of Othering stylistically deploys four techniques to 
explore the subjectivity of his characters. I also try to work out how his process of Othering may 
change from one type of Other to another type of Other. Since it is not my aim to simply catalogue 
imagery and diction to sustain the traditional argument of Conrad’s racism, I avoid the much-
analysed work Heart of Darkness and only allude to it for purposes of reference when necessary. 
Besides, since the Othering of Africa/ns in that work has been much debated, I feel the need to 
circumvent it in favour of other works of Conrad which will constitute, in some ways, a more 
representative idea of his style of Othering in his writing. 
My selection of the three texts that I focus on for my study is informed more by an 
inquisitive urge to discover how the Other is generally represented in Conrad’s writing, rather than 
by the need to prove any ideological bias on his part. Thus, my analyses of racial representations 
are incidental to my study, resulting only as a consequence of my reading and critical analysis of 
texts that mostly do not revolve around racial others. I take the view that it would be perverse for 
such a great writer as Conrad to simply depict difference and, thereby, create notions of alterity in 
his writing for the mere gratification of the imperial sensitivities of his Victorian public. 
Consequently, I assert that being himself positioned in the conflux of an indeterminate identity, 
Conrad’s writing represented a personal effort to make sense of his own subjectivity within the 
diverse social and political frameworks of his varied spatial existence. Living as a Polish exile in 
England, writing in his adopted and self-taught English language, taking on a career in writing, 
bearing his previous experience as a seaman who fluently spoke French, having lived under 
Russian occupation in his very early days, Conrad himself carried with him both socially and 
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psychologically an endless string of identities which contributed to his self-construction. This 
concern with the individual’s construction of self in different circumstances strongly undergirds 
his writing. It is this focus that I bring to my analysis as I examine how Conrad demonstrates that 
his characters, influenced by their social and political perspectives, contribute to their own 
subjectivity through their actions and choices. 
My study is structured into five parts made up of three analytical chapters framed by the 
introduction and the conclusion. For each of my analytical chapters, I focus on a single novel in 
order to conduct as in-depth an examination as possible. For my textual analysis, I start with The 
Nigger of the ‘Narcissus’ because the N-word in its title invariably evokes a level of engagement 
with the racial debate that allows me to tackle, to whatever minor extent, the racial question. I then 
examine Lord Jim to explore how Conrad represents a Western European Other, and then I lastly 
look at Under Western Eyes for its representation of an Eastern European Other. 
Chapter One is titled “Signifying Otherness: Race and Colour in The Nigger of the 
Narcissus”. In this chapter, I focus on the title text and demonstrate how Conrad signifies 
Otherness in his characters through the use of race and colour. Drawing heavily on the concept of 
signifying from the post-structuralist use of the term as well as from its use in African-American 
discourse, I identify two main characters in the narrative who embody Otherness. These characters 
are Donkin, who is captured as a dirty European tainted in his whiteness by his association to filth, 
and James Wait represented as an eloquent, well-dressed and evidently refined ‘black man’ whose 
sophisticated appearance is, however, undermined by his dubious nature. In a narrative that is 
many ways reminiscent of T. S. Coleridge’s ballad, “the Rime of the Ancient Mariner”, the tropes 
of goodwill, good fortune and camaraderie are used to throw more light on the representation of 
alterity in the two Othered characters. Further evoking the old mariner’s tale, the mood of the ship 
at the beginning of the narrative is essentially a happy and buoyant one. However, this mood takes 
on a morbid aspect with the appearance of James Wait, upon whom lies the commission of sin that 
purportedly tosses the microcosmic universe of the Narcissus into a series of upheavals which set 
the stage for an assessment of the fortitude of men in the face of turbulent circumstances. 
Chapter Two focuses on Lord Jim under the title “Si(gh)ting the Other: Space and Time in 
Lord Jim”. Here, I develop the concept of thirdsight as a mode of identifying the protagonist, Jim, 
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as Othered through different levels of perception. My development of this concept constitutes the 
other major contribution of my research. Drawing extensively on the notions of third space from 
Edward Soja’s spatial dialectics and Homi Bhabha’s discourse on cultural liminality, I explore 
how, through thirdsight, the reader may transgress the limits of narrativity and reach beyond 
Marlow’s surface narrative to discern Jim’s Otherness through a transpositional, juxtapositional 
and contrapuntal reading of the text. To achieve this, I propose a reading of the text that brings 
together different levels of observation – Marlow’s, the reader’s and that of third parties; and an 
interpretation of the knowledge (of Jim and of other characters) formed through such a reading 
through perceptions on multiple levels. In effect, my analysis concludes that Jim’s representation 
as “an anguished and divided anti-hero” (John Batchelor 109), results from the fact that the subject, 
in a constant state of self-construction, is never completely formed as it evolves, through ideas of 
itself, from one permutation of identity to another. 
In Chapter Three titled “Contesting Otherness: Under Western Eyes”, I focus on Razumov, 
the protagonist of the title text, as the Other. My choice of this text is informed by an interest to 
view how Conrad represents an European Other located primarily within the cultural boundaries 
of an European territory polarised as Eastern and, therefore, different from Western Europe. In my 
examination of this text, I explore how Conrad’s use of the trope of doubling indicates an attempt 
by the character to elude and resist his identification as an Other. Besides, I demonstrate how the 
presentation of the character’s split ideological perspective reveals a collision between a social 
identity and a national identity, resulting in an in-betweenness that sabotages his resistance efforts. 
In the end, his confession aligns him with the revolutionary ideas that he has originally claimed to 
resent and his final condition of being neither dead and silenced nor actively alive and functional 
casts him in a permanent state of Otherness from which he can no longer escape. 
My conclusion is titled “The Other, the Alien, The Exiled”. In this chapter, I link the three 
texts analysed in my research to demonstrate how the motif of Othering extends beyond the trope 
of difference to encompass alienation and exile. Starting from an assessment of Conrad’s personal 
life as a major influence on his writing, I posit that these works, representative in some way of the 
writer’s oeuvre, provide a viable point of departure for an analysis of his abiding occupation with 
questions of imperialist/ power discourses, interpersonal and intercultural contact, and the 
construction of identity in relation to the self and the Other. 
20 
 
  
21 
 
CHAPTER ONE 
SIGNIFYING OTHERNESS: 
RACE AND COLOUR IN THE NIGGER OF THE NARCISSUS 
On men reprieved by its disdainful mercy, the 
immortal sea confers in its justice the full privilege 
of desired unrest. Through the perfect wisdom of its 
grace they are not permitted to meditate at ease upon 
the complicated and acrid savour of existence. They 
must without pause justify their life to the eternal pity 
that commands toil to be hard and unceasing…; till 
the weary succession of nights and days tainted by 
the obstinate clamour of sages, demanding bliss and 
an empty heaven, is redeemed at last by the vast 
silence of pain and labour, by the dumb fear and 
dumb courage of men obscure, forgetful and 
enduring. (The Nigger of the Narcissus 55). 
 
This chapter focuses on The Nigger of the Narcissus and examines how Conrad’s novella discloses 
a representation of Otherness of its main character through a process of signifying. Set upon the 
oceans of the South Pacific, the novella reflects the writer’s abiding concern to explore the 
motivations of men and to examine what drives the passions of the majority of humanity. In 
embarking on such a probe so as to make others ‘see’ what he believes to have discovered about 
the very soul of mankind, the writer casts his characters upon the backdrop of a portentously 
capricious universe solely made up of sea and sky. It is the effect of this capriciousness upon 
human nature that is captured in the epigraph to this chapter. In Conrad’s portrayal of the sea as 
merciless and capricious, he also stages it as the exacting universe of ‘toil’, ‘pain’ and ‘labour’ in 
which men must ‘justify their life’. It is in the vastness of this universe that Conrad depicts the 
Narcissus as “a fragment detached from the earth” sailing on “lonely and swift like a small planet” 
(18). To complete the planet imagery that he ascribes to the ship, he further states:  
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Round her the abysses of sky and sea met in an unattainable frontier. A great 
circular solitude moved with her, ever changing and ever the same, always 
monotonous and always imposing. Now and then another wandering white speck, 
burdened with life, appeared far-off—disappeared; intent on its own destiny. The 
sun looked upon her all day, and every morning rose with a burning, round stare… 
(Narcissus 18). 
In this description, Conrad draws the sky and the sea together into a globular unity that depicts a 
microcosmic earth. He further neatly circumscribes this microcosm by defining its orbit implied 
by the ‘great circular solitude [that] moved with her’. To additionally consolidate this imagery, he 
alludes to other distant ships as though they were other planets within the galaxy of his created 
universe; and he also locates the essential presence of the sun over this miniature earth. On this 
‘small planet’, Conrad marks life as ‘ever changing and ever the same, always monotonous and 
always imposing’. In line with these contradictory ideas, Conrad further portrays that his fictional 
universe is anything but homogenous; for it depicts an admixture of natures and cultures, a 
characteristic which is typical of most of his stories. Having established this image of a miniature 
earth fraught with its own inconsistencies, Conrad prepares the reader’s mind to already imagine 
the ship crew as representative of humanity with all its variety and in all its forms. Thus, in the 
cosmological setting of the Narcissus, Conrad’s heterogeneous humanity constitutes a variety of 
men of Finnish, Dutch, English, Irish, Scottish, Norwegian, and West Indian backgrounds. It is 
from this motley crowd that the author marks his central character whom he inadvertently 
represents in ways that depict him as an Other. 
In his fondness for the use of the adventure narrative, Conrad creates an interstitial space 
between sky and sea – a space far removed from the presumed stability of land – which offers a 
good opportunity for the creation of diverse identities through the fertile imagination of the writer.  
Drawing on his own seafaring experiences of being tossed into a world of alterities and 
uncertainties far from the metropolitan centre of imperial certitude and homogenisation, Conrad’s 
fictional universe depicts a volatility that harbours an inclination to devastation. It is in this hostile 
setting, fraught with such stark heterogeneity that threatens the fragile stability of a universe which 
is already all astir, that we are presented with characters representing a diverse humanity, including 
the worst possible elements of humankind. Among this representative group are characters such 
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as the resolute and indefatigable Captain Allistoun, the sage and calm Singleton, the cocky and 
cowardly Donkin and the eponymous “nigger” of Conrad’s title, James Wait. Although my main 
discussion focuses on how the narrative exposes James Wait as the ultimate Other identifiable in 
the text through signification, I will also demonstrate that Donkin, positioned as an Other of a 
lesser order, underscores Wait’s Othering by his own enabling signifying schemes. 
Through the narrative of this novella, Conrad describes the arduous homeward journey of 
the ship Narcissus from India round The Cape in the Southern Seas in winter. Being the author’s 
third piece of writing and his first major experiment with what Dan Lui has termed “methods of 
descriptive rendering” (2), the story also captures and explores the characters’ troubled inter-
personal relationships, as well as their internal struggles with compulsion, obsession and neurosis. 
According to Edward Said, Conrad’s characters are threatened “with darkness, disorder, and 
formlessness” (112) – a situation that “leads to an anarchic enlargement of the self” (113). In Said’s 
analysis, Conrad’s attempts to deal with this nervous condition reflects the author’s personal 
struggle with “the egoistic assertion of [his] existence so that others will feel it” (112). It is perhaps 
from this foreboding sense of a restive soul aiming at forging a more unified and recognised self 
that Conrad develops what Haripersad Sewlall refers to as an “obsession with otherness” (29). A 
scrutiny of such an ‘obsession’ makes it possible to catalogue imagery and diction related to a 
racialized regime of alterity in Conrad’s work. As Sewlall further notes, “it would be a relatively 
simple matter to find evidence of Conrad’s ‘racism’ as alleged by Chinua Achebe in his famous, 
if not notorious utterances [about] Conrad as a “thoroughgoing racist” (Achebe 1988[1977], 257) 
[or as a] “bloody racist” (Achebe 1990[1978], 124)” (Sewlall 29). However, the argument in this 
chapter upholds the notion that such a reductionist assessment of Conrad and his works “routinely 
ignore and minimize the complexities of Conrad’s experience and how those (at times outright 
contradictory) complexities are negotiated in his work” (Ross 4). My argument is furthermore 
underpinned by Sewlall’s assertion that “[v]iewed from the theoretical space afforded by 
postcoloniality, [the] constructions of the other in Conrad’s [works] are not as clear-cut and 
unproblematized as [critics such as Achebe] might suggest” (30). He further points out that in 
actual fact, the writer is rather “ironic” and “most certainly ambiguous and even subversive” in his 
overall portrayal of subjectivity through his treatment of Otherness (30). Thus, the debate about 
whether Conrad is racist or not remains unresolved, probably because it is unresolvable depending 
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on the critical angle from which it may be approached. For, in whichever way it is analysed, this 
argument about racism is bound to provoke intricate and rather biased opinions that distract from 
a comprehensive analysis of the author’s masterful literary style. 
Since the notion of signifying the Other is central to my discussion of Conrad’s mode of 
representation in the Narcissus, I will examine what the term means and how it functions. For this 
examination, I draw heavily on Stuart Hall’s (1997) extensive discussion of the subject in his work, 
Representation. I defer to Hall’s analysis because he summarises the major theories of 
representation from its early structuralist conceptions through to its contemporary applications. In 
my analysis of this narrative, I use the notion of signifying in two ways. First, I draw on the 
linguistic notion of signification which is predicated on the existence of the sign consisting of two 
inseparable aspects: the signifier (the material form of the sign, e.g., sounds in the air, letters on a 
page that refer to the sign) and the signified (the concept evoked by these words which gives 
meaning to the sign) (Hall 16-17). This idea of signification, which extends to the larger field of 
semiotics in its application, is mostly associated with the linguist Ferdinand de Saussure, although 
it also derives from the earlier, but much lesser known philosopher, Charles Sanders Peirce 
(Abrams & Harpham 356-357). In my use of the concept of signification from this angle, I combine 
Saussure’s predominantly linguistic, or verbal, analysis with Peirce’s symbolic, iconic and 
indexical perspective of the concept. Secondly, I also use the concept of signification as it has been 
explored in Henry Louis Gates, Jr’s The Signifying Monkey. According to Gates’ analysis, the 
concept of signifyin(g) “is a trope that subsumes other rhetorical tropes, including metaphor, 
metonymy, synecdoche, and irony (the ‘master’ tropes), and also hyperbole, litotes, and 
metalepsis” (686). In the sense in which Gates uses it, the term is employed to describe a variety 
of African-American verbal rituals, including “‘trop[ing]-a-dope,’[…] ‘marking,’ ‘loud-talking,’ 
‘specifying,’ ‘testifying,’ ‘calling out’ (of one’s name), ‘sounding,’ ‘rapping,’ and ‘playing the 
dozens’” (687). Through a critical assessment of texts within the African-American tradition, 
Gates examines how this concept is manifested; and drawing on Ralph Ellison, he points out that 
within their specific cultural context the rhetorical negotiations of signifyin(g) enable “complicated 
assertions and denials of identity” (117) and even of universal belonging (175). For my analysis 
of Conrad’s narrative, the first meaning of the concept of signifying, from its use in linguistics, 
enables an examination of the text from the author’s stylistic and figurative use of signs and 
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symbols which combine to create certain impressions on the reader, thus conveying meaning from 
the text through these impressions. The second meaning of the concept, deeply rooted in African 
and African-American culture and history, extends the stylistic implications of signification in the 
narrative so that it does not only facilitate an understanding of the text, but it also marks the text 
as indicative of much more than can be implied through a random selection of the signs and 
symbols that combine to create meaning. The ‘more’ that I focus on in this examination of the 
novella is the indication of Otherness that is underscored in the presentation of its main character 
through the combination of these two meanings of signification. 
Right from the very title of the novella, these notions of signification are subtly implied. 
The term ‘Narcissus’, which, in the narrative, refers to the name of the ship, evokes the 
mythological connotations associated with that name. In Greek mythology, Narcissus, the son of 
the river god Cephissus and the nymph Liriope, is a hunter who is noted for his extreme beauty. 
This makes him arrogant and scornful towards all who love him. Lured by the goddess Nemesis 
to a pool, he sees his reflection in the water and falls in love with his own image. Having become 
obsessed with this image of himself, he loses his will to live and dies as a result. In its evocation 
of this mythology and its allusion to the sin of self-love, along with its self-deluding and fatal 
consequences, the ship Narcissus can be read, in Saussurean terms, as a sign which, drawing on 
all its connotative references, already imposes a certain ineluctable meaning on the text. Besides, 
taken from Peirce’s perspective, the name of the ship serves as an index foretokening the eventual 
demise of the character associated with its inferences. Lastly, from the African-American notion 
of signifyin(g), the ship is ingeniously disguised in Conrad’s narrative as a quasi-character that, 
again through its classical connotations, signifies upon its crew, especially upon the main character 
around whom the narrative evolves. Thus, even though the narrative is centred around this main 
character, James Wait, every sign, including even the most camouflaged allusions, provides 
information that contributes to the overall significance of the text. In a preface addressed to his 
‘Readers in America’, Conrad, in reference to James Wait, states that “in the book he is nothing; 
he is merely the centre of the ship's collective psychology and the pivot of the action” (Narcissus 
168). From this reference to his main character, it is obvious that Conrad uses his protagonist, 
Wait, in two main ways. On one hand, he embodies the ‘collective’ consciousness of the ship, and 
on the other hand, he represents the conflict that drives the plot. In being depicted in these ways, 
Wait signifies both in the semiotic sense of the word and in the sense in which it is used in African-
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American discourse. Symbolised as the Devil (11; 71) who epitomises all things evil, it is no 
wonder that he should signify the consciousness of the ship manned by a crew who are described 
variously as “a wicked lot, […] about as wicked as any ship’s company in this sinful world!” (49), 
and as “[w]orse than devils too sometimes—downright, horned devils” (77). Besides, in being 
characterised as representing evil and as embodying the conflict that moves the plot, Wait is shown 
to portray a feature that characterises the concept of signifyin(g) as it pertains to Gates’ analysis 
of the Signifying Monkey. This is evidenced in the fact that like Gates’ Signifying Monkey, Wait 
is presented “not primarily as a character in the narrative but rather as a vehicle for narration itself” 
(Gates 688). In this function, he signifies, as the term is implied in African-American discourse, 
by the fact that he “wreaks havoc upon ‘the signified’” (Gates 689). Looking, therefore, at the 
extent to which the narrative depends so heavily on James Wait’s characterisation, it may then be 
argued that Conrad, in the actual manoeuvring of his narrative style, contradicts himself in the fact 
that in his book, James Wait is far from being ‘nothing’ and his presence and significance is in no 
way ‘merely’ arbitrary. For without him and all the signification that his person cumulatively 
suggests, Conrad’s novella and all the meaning it holds would probably never have existed. As I 
further examine the text, I will demonstrate how Wait’s characterisation inadvertently signifies 
Otherness in ways that bind the narrative together. 
Although Wait is depicted as the principal Other in this narrative, my discussion will reveal 
that he is enabled by a minor Other in the character of Donkin, as I have earlier mentioned. To 
explore the ways in which these two characters, that I identify as Othered in the Narcissus, are 
depicted, I indicate that, while reading the text, it is possible to distinguish between the ‘proper’ 
characters, who have certain standard qualities attributed to them by the author, and the ‘improper’ 
characters, who are markedly different and represented as ‘Other’ to the norm. As I identify these 
Others in the Narcissus, it is important to point out that while the ways in which their difference 
is represented can indeed be problematic, difference, in itself, is not negative. In fact, in accordance 
with all identity politics premised on such an affirmative take on difference, I posit that it is 
arguably necessary and important to the establishment of meaning. Drawing on de Saussure 
(1960), Stuart Hall (1997) points out that there is nothing wrong with indicating difference, as this 
is “essential to meaning; without it meaning could not exist” (224). Reading Conrad through this 
notion of indicating difference, I point out that in his characteristic effort to establish meaning on 
a broad existentialist level, Conrad, through his writing, uses methods of differentiation to examine 
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ways in which individuals are connected to and relate to each other in a “latent feeling of 
fellowship with all creation” (Narcissus 145). This inconspicuous ‘fellowship’ creates a “subtle 
but invincible conviction of solidarity that knits [and]… binds men to each other,” thus binding 
them together with “all humanity” (146). From this conviction of a universal bond, it is little 
wonder then that Conrad unites in his representation of Otherness, the two characters, Donkin and 
James Wait, who would have ordinarily been set against each other within an imperialist discourse 
of binary structures. In such a unified depiction of Otherness which combines the European 
(Donkin) and the West Indian (Wait) subjects, Conrad challenges and subverts the conventional 
binaries of superior versus inferior subjectivities that predicate a distinction between that which is 
considered the norm or the standard and its deviation or Other. However, inadvertent, perhaps, as 
such a subversive effort of characterisation might be, Conrad’s style of representation hardly 
escapes the binary descriptions of the imperial master narrative associated with his time. This 
observation is based on the fact that, while the two characters, together and yet still separately, 
embody representations of Otherness in the narrative, their depiction as Others is primarily cast 
through contrasting terms of binary oppositions which refer specifically to their colour and race. 
To begin with, both characters are first introduced into the narrative by being signified as 
different through colour. Donkin is described as “a man with shifty eyes and a yellow hatchet face” 
(Narcissus 29), and James Wait is captured simply as the “Nigger” (Narcissus 34), a term loaded 
with ambivalent racial, political, and social connotations. With regard to Donkin, the description 
of him as having ‘shifty eyes’ already suggests that he cannot be trusted as it implies that he is a 
dishonest person who avoids direct eye contact with others. Moreover, the description of him as 
having a ‘yellow hatchet face’ compounds his characterisation as untrustworthy through the added 
implications drawn from this description. First of all, the colour yellow evokes the notion of 
cowardice and fear, and also of sickness (such as hepatitis or jaundice), while the word hatchet 
connotes a small axe, a tool employed for chopping things, often through violent and destructive 
action. Related to the imagery of the tool, the ‘hatchet’ also evokes the notion of a ‘hatchet man’ 
who is employed to carry out unpleasant tasks on others or who constantly carries out vilifying 
attacks on others. Following from these ideas, it is little wonder that Donkin, who is as much a 
scoundrel as Wait, is used to expose the latter for his pretences and, in the end, to mercilessly snuff 
out the life from him as he verbally abuses him and shamelessly steals his money while Wait lies 
helplessly ill in his bunk, unable to defend himself. In effect, considered from Peirce’s semiotic 
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approach, the hatchet metaphor serves as an index to Donkin’s disagreeable character and the 
ruthless role that he plays in Wait’s death which is already foreshadowed through his physical 
description. Wait, whose first appearance is heavily impacted by the pun on his last name ‘Wait’, 
(which I will discuss later) is referred to in that initial appearance, and several times afterwards, as 
‘Nigger’. Being a term that is historically loaded with political and cultural racial and pejorative 
connotations (Fanon, Black Skins, 165), the N-word used in reference to Wait in Conrad’s narrative 
evokes all the historical implications that it alludes to. Among the meanings associated with the 
word are slavery, inferiority, dehumanisation, and animalisation (Fanon, Wretched, 7). Thus, even 
though the character is portrayed as bearing certain traits that attempt to subvert the obnoxious 
inferences of the term “nigger”, its persistent use in reference to him forces its essence upon him. 
Consequently, he is gradually Othered as the narrative unfolds to the point of assuming a 
monstrosity that dehumanises him. In this respect, it may be argued that this first reference to Wait 
as a ‘nigger’ right at the onset of the narrative also foreshadows his Otherness which develops 
through the plot. 
In relation to the foregoing about the relevance of these initial descriptions of Donkin and 
James Wait, I agree with Stuart Hall’s assertion that once an image is created, it “carries many 
meanings” (219). To quote him at length, Hall points out that: 
[The] image both shows an event (denotation) and carries a ‘message’ or meaning 
(connotation) […] about ‘race’, colour and ‘otherness’. We can’t help reading 
images of this kind as ‘saying something’, not just about the people or the occasion, 
but about their ‘otherness’, their ‘difference’. ‘Difference’ has been marked. How 
it is then interpreted is a constant and recurring preoccupation in the representation 
of people who are racially and ethnically different from the majority population. 
Difference signifies. It ‘speaks’. (219) 
In this assertion, Hall points out that once an image is evoked, it signifies by drawing attention to 
itself and registering an impression, a presence (an event). Besides, it also triggers a range of 
meanings, implied by any inferences that may be associated with it. Thus, the image makes 
meaning by being ‘marked’, set apart or differentiated from other images. In this way, it signifies 
or ‘speaks’. It is from such a perspective about how differentiating images signify, or ‘speak’, that 
I posit that the images created by the introductory descriptions of the afore-mentioned characters 
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enable the construction of the characters’ Otherness. In other words, Conrad, through his stylistic 
mode of representation, marks difference upon these two characters with the images that are 
evoked by the description of their features. From a Saussurean point of view, I argue that, 
functioning as signs, these images carry meanings of inferiority and even of negativity that reveal 
the Otherness of the characters. Additionally, from Peirce’s indexical perspective, I proffer that 
these images that are used to describe the characters also anticipate events that are to occur later 
in the plot which validate the identification of these characters as Others. In effect, they serve as 
pointers to, or signals of their Otherness.  
Besides, in what has been described as his propensity for detailed ‘visual presentations” 
(Watt 94), Conrad does not only present the event or the exhibit but he also fully expands its 
message with all the plausible connotations he would like the reader to attach to it. Of course, this 
in no way limits the reader’s range of connotative allusion; rather, from a post-structuralist 
perspective, it expands it even further as meaning is not fixed and is constantly in a flux. No doubt, 
the writer fully intends this; and right from his title, in connecting the referent term for Wait – 
‘nigger’ – to the ship – Narcissus, with all the historical and classical symbolism that these terms 
evoke, Conrad inadvertently constructs a sort of doubly crossed symbolism in which each term – 
nigger and Narcissus – signifies in its own way, even while they simultaneously signify upon each 
other. To expand on the relation between the two Ns – to wit the racial epithet and the Greek 
mythological figure – I postulate, from the African-American notion of signifyin(g), that by yoking 
the two terms, the writer achieves “a rhetorical indirection” which is “‘almost purely stylistic’” 
(Gates 693). Exploring this rhetorical style of indirection from Claudia Mitchell-Kernan’s 
perspective, Gates indicates that this is the “key aspect of signifying” as it directly implies meaning 
through “‘its indirect intent or metaphorical reference’” (Gates 693). In effect, signifyin(g) entails 
“direction through indirection” (Gates 689), the implication of meaning through the use of 
rhetorical elements such as “figuration, troping, and parody […] or pastiche” (Gates 693). From 
this perspective, Conrad’s text may be, arguably, read as a pastiche of the Greek mythology in 
which Wait assumes the character, (and the fate), of the mythological figure. Used in this way, 
Wait signifies through the trope of blackness and its associated connotations of evil and death as 
he projects (read reflects) onto the ship the plethora of meanings that his persona implies. 
Conversely, the Narcissus animated by its crew casts (read reflects back) upon Wait its 
shortcomings, of which it divests itself by achieving through Wait’s eventual death its own moral 
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cleansing. Referred to in various instances as a “black fraud” (25), a “bloody black beast (42), and 
a “black phantom” (93), Wait, in his blackness, progresses through the narrative in the sequence 
of these metaphors that are used to describe him. He thus transforms from a fraud, is captured in 
the monstrosity of a beast, and finally lends closure to the narrative as a phantom by implication 
of his death. These metaphorical representations signify the negative notions implied by his race, 
which include the dark history of slavery and the enduring politics of racial inferiority. In effect, 
while Wait signifies racially and historically as an individual, he also signifies upon the ship 
(troubled and mostly described in sombre terms due to being caught in horrible storms), and upon 
its crew, often described as a “dark group” of men (9; 74; 107). In a similar vein, the ship, with its 
classical allusions, draws attention to the significance of narcissistic tendencies while it also 
signifies upon Wait through whom these tendencies are staged. In an obvious pun on his name, the 
character then becomes the weight (or burden) that persistently draws the ship into storms and 
towards near damnation until he is cast off (in his death), resulting in the redemption of the ship 
and its men. With regard to the foregoing, I suggest that in his stylistic manipulations of and 
connections between Wait and the Narcissus, Conrad subconsciously achieves the effect of 
demonstrating a subtle wordplay on the notions of racism and narcissism in which the two terms 
signify upon each other. This may be perceived in the extent to which narcissism may be deemed 
as racist in that it prioritises the standardisation and preservation of a certain notion of the Self to 
the exclusion of Others, while racism may equally be deemed narcissistic in its egocentric 
differentiation of Others through an over-inflated sense of Self-worth. 
Through his sustained stylistic technique of visual depiction, Conrad describes Wait by 
focusing on his colour – he is different because he is dark-skinned, a “nigger.” In what Fanon 
refers to as the racial epidermal schema (2008, 84), the “nigger,” Wait, is defined throughout by 
the fact of his blackness. Associated with this fact of his physical appearance are many more 
attributive connotations, which are distributed across the entire narrative. However, before we even 
enter the text and encounter the ways in which Wait’s blackness signifies in the narrative, Conrad 
already indicates what our “nigger” should, first and foremost, signify among other significations 
that will undoubtedly follow. In a preface that he writes to his “Readers in America”, Conrad 
states: 
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A negro in a British forecastle is a lonely being. He has no chums. Yet James Wait, 
afraid of death and making her his accomplice was an impostor of some character—
mastering our compassion, scornful of our sentimentalism, triumphing over our 
suspicions. (Narcissus 168). 
From Conrad’s declaration, the reader is already prompted to consider Wait as a loner who ‘has 
no chums’. He further states that Wait, fearful of death and yet making it his ‘accomplice’, 
simultaneously appeals to and scorns our sympathy. On the one hand, the indication of his 
loneliness alludes to him being an outsider of some sort in the sense that he derives no sense of 
belonging from among the crew members on the ship; and this arouses our sympathy for him. On 
the other hand, however, his association with death and, as we later discover, the way he capitalises 
on this ominous association to sabotage the courage and faith of his fellow shipmates, estranges 
him even more. Ultimately, his mockery of the shipmates’ sympathy for him, and the readers 
empathy, due to the fact of his malingering at the beginning of the narrative, culminates in a 
disaffection towards him even after his pretence actually gives way to true indisposition and to 
imminent death. Through this rendering of the character of James Wait, Conrad at once plays on 
our sentiments while he uses the character himself to overturn any sentimentalism that we may 
have developed towards him at the onset of the narrative. Countless theorists of sentimentalism, 
such as Jane Tompkins and Joanne Dobson, have argued that one of the main aims of sentimental 
literature is to make readers empathise with the suffering of others. A classic example of this occurs 
in Uncle Tom’s Cabin by Harriet Beecher Stowe which depicts the suffering of slaves in nineteenth 
century America. In this novel, the readers’ sentiments for the black slaves are sustained, and even 
intensified, as the narrative unfolds. In her book Sensational Designs, Jane Tompkins argues for 
the inclusion in the canon of Stowe’s novel, (which has often been excluded because it is 
sentimental and also because it is considered racist) (140). Tompkins’ claim is made on the 
evidence that Uncle Tom’s Cabin, in causing its readers to empathise with the plight of its enslaved 
characters, was “spectacularly persuasive” in its ability to “convince a [whole] nation to go to war 
and to free its slaves” (141). Thus, in its sentimental quality, Uncle Tom’s Cabin arouses a sense 
of fellow-feeling in the reader, a sentiment which is also depicted in the narrative itself through 
characters such as George Shelby, the son of Tom’s first master and upon whom Tom has had a 
great and positive influence; and Eva, the daughter of Tom’s second master and whose close 
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friendship with Tom is undergirded by their shared religion. In Conrad’s Narcissus, however, the 
consequence of Wait’s abuse of sentimentalism is that any tendency to fellow-feeling from his 
shipmates “takes a diabolical turn as the ship’s crew, with a mutinous single-mindedness, heap 
moral responsibility” onto [Wait], dehumanizing him in the process” (Rae Greiner 13-14). Thus, 
in his demonstration of the detrimental effects of an exaggerated and over-indulgent appeal to 
sentimentalism, resulting in its abuse, Conrad, through his Narcissus, stages a critique of the 
aesthetics and politics of sentimentalism, especially of its function, as captured in 19th century 
writing, as a subconscious appeal to what may be deemed as acceptable moral action. 
At the very onset of the narrative, Wait’s introduction as character is dramatically staged 
as he literally barges onto the ship. After Mr. Baker, the shipmate, has mustered the men, he 
observes that he is “one hand short” but is unable to make out on his list the name of that last man, 
as it is “all a smudge” (10). However, just as he dismisses the men, instructing them to go below, 
and he also starts to turn away, a “deep, ringing voice” cries out “‘Wait!’” (10). Occurring right 
after the shipmate’s instruction for the men to go, this pronouncement clearly causes the men, as 
well as the shipmate himself, to halt and turn around as it contradicts his instruction. Furious that 
anyone would dare to contradict him, Mr. Baker asks who called out, and the caller repeats with 
insistence “‘Wait!’” (10). To this, the shipmate retorts: “‘Who are you! How dare you…’” (10), 
only to realise later that the caller, Wait, meant simply to identify himself. This initial confusion 
that characterises Wait’s appearance is significant for the effect that it has on the crew right from 
the start. The obvious puzzlement resulting from Wait’s declaration of his name is symptomatic 
of the influence that he will continue to exert on the men who, frozen, in this instance, into inaction 
or, perhaps, delayed action, persistently display a vacillation in duty or allegiance throughout the 
rest of the narrative. Thus, in a sense, this early attention drawn to the pun on Wait’s name shows 
him up as a device used by the author to create as well as indicate the major conflict in the narrative, 
which is a conflict of duty, marked by the constant ambivalence personified in the character’s 
name and appearance. Additionally, the framing of Wait’s appearance with the shipmate’s 
indication of being ‘one hand short’ and unable to clearly see the last name on his list because it is 
‘all a smudge’, already foreshadows events that are yet to unfold in the rest of the narrative. First, 
even though Wait does show up, despite the shipmate’s scepticism that “he may not” (10), the ship 
remains one hand short till the end of the journey, thus justifying Mr. Baker’s scepticism. Besides, 
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embodying the manner in which his name appears on the list, Wait, throughout the rest of the 
narrative, is cast as a ‘smudge’ on the existence of the ship and on the conscience of its men. 
A further examination of this incident reveals that Wait’s dramatic entry onto the deck of 
the forecastle is captured through the stark contrasts of light and darkness, black and white, distinct 
and shadowy features; and it is in that static moment that he is identified as “nigger”: 
The lamplight lit up the man's body. He was tall. His head was away up in the 
shadows of lifeboats that stood on skids above the deck. The whites of his eyes and 
his teeth gleamed distinctly, but the face was indistinguishable. His hands were big 
and seemed gloved. 
[…] 
The boy, amazed like the rest, raised the light to the man's face. It was black. A 
surprised hum—a faint hum that sounded like the suppressed mutter of the word 
"Nigger"—ran along the deck and escaped out into the night. The nigger seemed 
not to hear. He balanced himself where he stood in a swagger that marked time. 
After a moment he said calmly: —"My name is Wait—James Wait." (Narcissus 
10) 
 
In this metaphorical representation of Wait, Conrad deploys the use of contrast to stage a theatrical 
image of the character. Through the description, the readers gaze literally follows the lamplight in 
its gradual revelation of the character, as it travels up his tall frame. Directed by this light, the 
reader perceives parts of the character’s body that already drop hints of a difference based on 
contrast, that is prefigured by the very light facilitating his revelation. Thus, in line with this 
technique of contrast, the character’s head, which is ‘away up in the shadows’, only presents a 
vivid image of the ‘whites of his eyes and his teeth’ which ‘gleamed distinctly’ while his face 
remains ‘indistinguishable’. When the lamp is finally raised to his face, it reveals that his face is 
‘black’, in sharp contrast to the white teeth and eyes already perceived. In relation to this use of 
contrast to depict Wait as different, I draw again on Stuart Hall’s analysis of difference in which 
he argues that meaning is relational and that it depends on the difference between opposites (242). 
In connection to this, Hall further points out that it is possible to know what a term means by 
thinking about what it is not: therefore, we know what “black” means because we can contrast it 
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with “white”, which it is not. Thus, it is in relation to the one term that the other derives or draws 
meaning. This constructs a binary formation which post-structuralism, however, deconstructs 
precisely because it always harbours a hierarchy where the one term – white – is valued over and 
above the other – black. The counterpoint to thinking about difference in this way is that although 
it helps us to appreciate the diversity of the world from the perspective of opposites, it is also 
reductionist in the sense that values or ideas really exist in varying degrees of nuanced double-
binds rather than in pure either/or extremes. So, there is no pure form of “black” or “white” as 
there is no pure form, for instance, of “day” or “night”, thus subverting the rigidity of the two-term 
structure of binary oppositions. Nevertheless, when the structure of binary oppositions enabled by 
such differentiation is sustained as it is in Conrad’s text, it subtly begets the uncomfortable 
predication of power relations. As Jacques Derrida observes, meaning, often derived through the 
creation of binary oppositions, privileges one half of the two-part structure as always the dominant 
form while the completing half remains inferior: “man/woman”, “upper class/ lower class”. This 
forms a “violent hierarchy [in which] one of the terms governs the other” (Derrida 41). In the 
depiction of Conrad’s main character, such a two-part structure is compellingly revealed in the 
persistent reference to Wait’s skin colour in contrast to his surroundings, or even to other physical 
features of his own body, such as the whiteness of his teeth and his eyes. However, despite these 
sharp contrasts between light and darkness, black and white, the suggestion of shadows and, 
initially, indistinguishable features indicate the subversion of the tendency to wholly define the 
character as representing one thing or another by pinning onto him pure notions of subjectivity, 
which is presumed complete only based on the dominant idea of an assumption of what the 
character must look like. This disruption of the presumed notion of a complete subject is marked 
by the murmur of surprise that accompanies the revelation of Wait’s face as ‘black’, and the 
ensuing description of him as a ‘nigger’. In a further subversion of their presumptions, we observe, 
through the narrator’s account, that the character defies this description by seeming ‘not to hear’ 
the use of the N-word in reference to him. Besides, upon the mention of this word, the character’s 
posture of balancing himself as he ‘stood in a swagger that marked time’ reflects a confident and 
self-important attitude that reinforces his defiance. Additionally, the character overturns the 
stereotyping associated with the fact of being identified by the N-word by asserting his 
individuality through the mention of his name: ‘James Wait’. In this self-assertion lies evidence of 
a clear attempt to redefine the power relations between the describer and the described. This 
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indicates the character’s dismantling of a presumed order and, to pun on his name, a weighting 
against an established system of representation through his insistence on representing himself.  
While in this case the character’s defiance of stereotyping clearly has the positive effect of 
affirming his personality – confident and dignified, much later in the narrative, his indulgent, and 
rather condescending, attitude to arrogate to himself the favours of his shipmates while all along 
pretending to be ill rebounds on him with the effect that, throughout the narration, he is persistently 
referenced and signified by the N-word, which, occurring forty-five times in the text, is used ten 
times more than his actual name. This frequency is only outmatched by the use of the diminutive 
form of his name – Jimmy – which itself plays down his over-valued self through the false 
endearment expressed by his shipmates: “we all lovingly called him Jimmy, to conceal our hate…” 
(Narcissus 22). 
While Wait is primarily marked by his skin colour, which invariably signifies his race with 
the historical inferiority and negative qualities attached to it, in the depiction of Donkin, Conrad 
stacks the cards so high up against him that the character is irretrievably ‘seen’ as despicably 
different – and so, Other, even though he is white and so originally belongs to the presumed 
standard group. As this depiction is crucial to the point that I am making, it is worth quoting at 
length Conrad’s detailed description of Donkin: 
He stood with arms akimbo, a little fellow with white eyelashes. He looked as if he 
had known all the degradations and all the furies. He looked as if he had been 
cuffed, kicked, rolled in the mud; he looked as if he had been scratched, spat upon, 
pelted with unmentionable filth... and he smiled with a sense of security at the faces 
around. His ears were bending down under the weight of his battered felt hat. The 
torn tails of his black coat flapped in fringes about the calves of his legs. He 
unbuttoned the only two buttons that remained and every one saw that he had no 
shirt under it. It was his deserved misfortune that those rags which nobody could 
possibly be supposed to own looked on him as if they had been stolen. His neck 
was long and thin; his eyelids were red; rare hairs hung about his jaws; his shoulders 
were peaked and drooped like the broken wings of a bird; all his left side was caked 
with mud which showed that he had lately slept in a wet ditch. He had saved his 
inefficient carcass from violent destruction by running away from an American ship 
where, in a moment of forgetful folly, he had dared to engage himself; and he had 
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knocked about for a fortnight ashore in the native quarter, cadging for drinks, 
starving, sleeping on rubbish-heaps, wandering in sunshine: a startling visitor from 
a world of nightmares. He stood repulsive and smiling in the sudden silence. This 
clean white forecastle was his refuge; the place where he could be lazy; where he 
could wallow, and lie and eat—and curse the food he ate; where he could display 
his talents for shirking work, for cheating, for cadging; where he could find surely 
some one to wheedle and some one to bully—and where he would be paid for doing 
all this. (Narcissus 5-6). 
In the first sentence of this description, the reference to Donkin as a ‘little fellow with white 
eyelashes’ prepares the reader for the belittling of his character which follows soon after. The 
description of his eyelashes as white may be indicative of albinism, which also ties in with the 
earlier reference to him as having ‘shifty eyes’ and a ‘yellow’ face. This allusion to albinism points 
to an inescapable difference that marks the character out for social discrimination in relation to the 
image that it evokes. Possibly because of his clearly visible difference in appearance from the vast 
majority, Donkin becomes an easy target for ridicule on the ship. However, even though he is 
consistently disparaged in this description and throughout the rest of the narrative, his posture 
when we encounter him – standing ‘with arms akimbo’ –  drops hints of a nonchalant individual 
who is very much aware of his despicability but who is nonetheless unruffled by such opinions 
that others may have of him. In fact, just as I have indicated above in relation to Wait’s posture, 
Donkin’s posture may equally be suggestive of defiance in the face of scorn. This hint at a sense 
of defiance also depicts the self-assuredness of a person who is accustomed to being the recipient 
of abuse and scorn, and who is confident in his ability to pull through such degrading treatment. 
Endorsing this idea, the narrator extends this hint of the character’s indifference to abuse by 
immediately following that first line with three parallel phrases that consolidate the image of 
defiance and doggedness in the character of Donkin: “He looked as if he had known all the 
degradations and all the furies. He looked as if he had been cuffed, kicked, rolled in the mud; he 
looked as if he had been scratched, spat upon, pelted with unmentionable filth….” The ellipses 
that follow these parallel lines suggest the further possibility of citing an endless list of 
degradations that Donkin may have been subject to. Then, the capping phrase, “and he smiled with 
a sense of security at the faces around”, combine with the parallel structure to reinforce the 
suggestion of his defiant and dogged nature. In a sustained depiction of Donkin as an awful looking 
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character, the narrator turns his focus onto his attire. He first begins with his ‘battered felt heart’, 
then draws attention to his tattered black coat and then directs the readers gaze to Donkin’s, 
perhaps casual, action of unbuttoning the ‘only two buttons’ left on his coat to reveal that he wore 
no shirt underneath his coat. After directing the reader to mentally size up the character in this 
manner, the narrator provides a further critique of Donkin based on his poorly attired appearance 
as he states: “It was his deserved misfortune that those rags which nobody could possibly be 
supposed to own looked on him as if they had been stolen”. By qualifying Donkin’s hapless 
character profiling as a possible thief with the term ‘deserved’, the narrator suggests that Donkin 
has rightly earned himself that opinion because of the negative qualities that he has so far shown. 
So, through his choice of words, it is obvious that the narrator at once tries to counter any sympathy 
that one might possibly feel for Donkin while he also attempts to justify his negative assessment 
of the character. Thus, in the suggestion that he could also be a thief, Donkin is once again depicted 
as a despicable character, and as someone of whom others would want to be wary. Besides, the 
stark contrast drawn between the notions of property and theft in relation to this suggestion presage 
Donkin’s actual barefaced theft of James Wait’s money towards the end of the narrative. 
The portrayal of Donkin as a loathsome character is further reinforced as the narrator 
consistently draws the reader’s attention to other physical features that consolidate the fact. 
Described as having a ‘long and thin’ neck, red eyelids, rare hairs around his jaws, and shoulders 
that ‘were peaked and drooped like the broken wings of a bird’, Donkin is portrayed as gaunt and 
cadaverous. Through the metaphor of a bird with broken wings, he is depicted as being in a 
completely fallen state that could imply a shortfall from an expected standard. Besides, the fact 
that the whole of his left side was ‘caked with mud which showed that he had lately slept in a wet 
ditch’, presents Donkin as repulsive and dirty. In this depiction, the character is cast as bearing a 
tainted or dirty whiteness that does not conform to the standard. This characterisation of Donkin 
evokes Mary Douglas’s notion of dirt or uncleanliness considered as “matter out of place” which 
needs to be excluded (Douglas 41). Influenced by the extensive analysis of pollution and taboo by 
Douglas, Julia Kristeva, in her discourse on subjectivity and difference, asserts that such concepts 
which legitimise exclusion, or even expulsion of that which is considered unclean, result in the 
identification of an Other who deviates from the standard because it represents a disruption of 
order or propriety (Kristeva 4). In her analysis, Kristeva emphasises that this Other is qualified as 
such not primarily because it is unclean, but because it represents an abjection that “disturbs 
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identity, system and order” (4). In an extended clarification, she indicates that the abject signifies 
a relationship to a boundary marking a society or a subject. Thus, it represents that which is 
“jettisoned out of that boundary” as it poses a threat to the unity and identity of the boundary (69). 
As we connect the metaphor of a broken-winged or paralysed bird to the mental image of a 
muddied Donkin, the reader is presented with the imagery of a floundering individual who exists 
on the margins of society, and whose presence and attitude calls into question the boundaries upon 
which that society is constructed. The intimation that he had freely, without compulsion, slept in 
a wet ditch points to the fact that Donkin’s abject depiction as a riff-raff is not only suggested by 
the narrator, but is also actively performed by the character himself. In such a performance of his 
abjection, he proves to be only minimally functional in his undignified condition that typically 
places him among the dregs of society. This performance of his identity as a societal scum is 
further exemplified in the extra details that the narrator reveals of him ‘running away from an 
American ship’ which he found perilous to his existence because, there, he could not shirk work 
and get away with laziness (as American ships were notorious for the harsh treatment of their 
crew). After he absconds, Donkin continues to prove himself a scoundrel as he knocks about 
ashore, “cadging for drinks, starving, sleeping on rubbish-heaps” and just loitering about. 
Referring thus to him as ‘a startling visitor from a world of nightmares’, the narrator’s overall 
description of Donkin stereotypes him as a lowlife, who sees the ‘clean white forecastle’ as the 
place where he can live out all his lousy attributes without fear of a harsh reprimand. This is partly 
due to the fact that most of the crew members had been newly recruited onto the ship and were 
only coming together for the first time (Narcissus 1-2). So, since the individual members, both old 
and new, were now warming up to each other, there could hardly be any alliance against him. 
However, there were still expected, though tacit, standards to meet, and the fact that Donkin’s 
chosen place of refuge is described as ‘clean and white’ symbolises such an expected standard, 
which even he, who falls abysmally short of such a description, may aspire to. 
In these references to Donkin, it is evident that he has been cast as representative of a 
certain class of people – loafers. Thus, he is different but in the sense that he can be identified as 
conforming to a certain class. Through this manner of differentiation, the narrator further extends 
the description of his character to depict him as the quintessential model of a particular type that, 
in being universal, can be identified in every corner of the earth: 
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They all knew him. Is there a spot on earth where such a man is unknown, an 
ominous survival testifying to the eternal fitness of lies and impudence? […] They 
all knew him! He was the man that cannot steer, that cannot splice, that dodges the 
work on dark nights; that, aloft, holds on frantically with both arms and legs, and 
swears at the wind, the sleet, the darkness; the man who curses the sea while others 
work. The man who is the last out and the first in when all hands are called. The 
man who can't do most things and won't do the rest. The pet of philanthropists and 
self-seeking landlubbers. The sympathetic and deserving creature that knows all 
about his rights, but knows nothing of courage, of endurance, and of the 
unexpressed faith, of the unspoken loyalty that knits together a ship's company. The 
independent offspring of the ignoble freedom of the slums full of disdain and hate 
for the austere servitude of the sea. (Narcissus 6). 
Here, Conrad moves from the particular to the universal in his classification of Donkin. In this 
shift, Conrad symbolises the character as ‘an ominous survival testifying to the eternal fitness of 
lies and impudence’. This grim description that casts the character in the nature of falsehood and 
shamelessness recalls the allusion to Donkin as a ‘startling visitor from the world of nightmares’. 
Thus, through a representational inauspicious familiarity with the kind of person Donkin is, the 
crew members, even though they were seeing Donkin, for the first time, could already claim to 
know him because they associate with his appearance and personality certain traits that are 
characteristic of the loutish image that he evokes. According to Sander Gilman, people 
characteristically, make sense of the world by categorizing things into ‘types’ (17). We do this by 
placing things into broad categories based on the fact that these things share similar characteristics. 
In this way, we are able to classify things more meaningfully, and also use them as points or frame 
of references to make inferences about other things that bear a similarity to the classified type. 
Stating that this is a common practice among humans, Sanders asserts that it is another method 
through which difference is marked in order to establish meaning (17). So, for instance, it is normal 
to ascribe certain qualities to people based on depictions of them as pilots, students, or farmers. 
Invariably, this sort of classification of people typically leads to stereotyping. While stereotyping 
consists in such a classification into categories that could suggest significant inferences, the result 
is that it also fixes the classified persons to certain basic and often over-exaggerated traits 
associated with such categorization, admitting no possible variations from the, sometimes, (over)-
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determined characteristics, and therefore insisting on these attributes as natural. As a result, it 
becomes accepted that whatever needs to be known about the individual is summed up in the 
characteristics of the stereotype, and any intricacies are often disregarded and wholly repudiated. 
In consequence, the stereotype essentially defines the person. It is through this manner of 
stereotyping that Donkin is described as a sort of everyman true to his kind. And in remaining true 
to his nature, he invariably excludes himself from the rest of the crew who, though coming together 
for the first time, are knit together by ‘courage’, ‘endurance’, ‘unexpressed faith’, and ‘unspoken 
loyalty’, all of which, are described as foreign to the ignoble Donkin. 
To emphasise or possibly prompt the expected reaction to such a character, Conrad 
prescribes a universal aversion towards him expressed in the action of one of the crew-members, 
who is unnamed: “A taciturn long-armed shellback, with hooked fingers, who had been lying on 
his back smoking, turned in his bed to examine him dispassionately, then, over his head, sent a 
long jet of clear saliva towards the door” (Narcissus 6). This unnamed crew-member could very 
well be anybody and the spitting towards the door seems to connote such utter disdain that would 
cause anyone to probably want to toss this Donkin-type out of the door, discarding him altogether. 
Besides, in identifying this unnamed character as a ‘shellback, with hooked fingers’, Conrad 
alludes to the endurance of an old and well-travelled sailor who has put in his fair share of hard 
work testified to by the hooked nature of his fingers. These allusions to experience and diligence 
plainly contrast with Donkin’s reckless and lazy nature. It is clearly the stark contrast drawn 
between these two incompatible natures that provokes a revulsion towards Donkin symbolised in 
the act of spitting. However, upon such a person as Donkin, who, as we have learnt earlier, is used 
to being spat at or treated with disdain, this sign of aversion has no effect. And, of course, he 
remains a member of the crew despite the revulsion towards him because of his abject nature. This 
evokes once again Kristeva’s notion of the abject as being inherently a part of the system which 
repulses it; as it grips the system even while it is repelled by it (135). Mostly portrayed in this 
manner, Donkin’s position on the ship is confirmed by the narrator as “distinguished but unsafe” 
as he typically stands “on the bad eminence of a general dislike” (Narcissus 24). 
Thus, in Conrad’s depictions of the two characters that I identify as Othered, Donkin is 
portrayed as the underdog whose contempt for and rebellion against the ordered system cast him 
mostly as the mutinous Other who poses the threat of anarchy to the system. Wait, on the other 
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hand, is depicted as a terrorising Other who insists on being recognised and acknowledged, if 
certainly not loved, by imposing his will on others, forcing them to wait on and serve him, even if 
grudgingly, and so completely obstructs the norm through his overbearing nature. However, as the 
narrative unfolds, it becomes evident that these separate representations are in no way pinned to 
these characters as their roles become confounded and even inverted in their respective functions. 
For Donkin perpetually incites the rest of the crew to near-mutiny, thus obstructing the 
conventional order of this nautical universe, while Wait becomes the ultimate loser despite his 
effort to deceive the whole crew by initially pretending to be sick to avoid work only for him, in 
the end, to surely die of his diseased lungs while steeped in his own self-deceit. In their conflating 
representations, an important trope that significantly binds these two to each other is the concept 
of the confidence trickster or the con-man. Throughout the narrative, we observe that both Donkin 
and Wait display con-man tendencies as they strive to assert themselves. They do not only employ 
these ruses on their shipmates, but also on each other, especially Donkin on Wait, in an 
unconscious besting match. While in all cases, they use their conning schemes to gain advantage 
in their individual situations, this trait also points to an effort to influence the power balance in 
their favour. As I have alluded to earlier, differentiation of the Other through a stereotyped image 
systematises the subtle play of power relations, especially those that prevail between the 
represented and the culture and/or system doing the representing. In the Narcissus, the power play 
exists between the Othered pair respectively and the rest of the ship’s crew, against whom they are 
defined. This hegemonic disparity points to a splitting between the individuals and the group. As 
Gilman points out, splitting is another strategy employed by the technique of stereotyping to 
indicate difference. It reinforces binaries, specifically making it possible for one to distinguish 
“between control and loss of control, between acquiescence and denial” (17). Thus, the degree of 
control that an individual exercises over the way in which they are represented corresponds to that 
individual’s compliance to or resistance of the image by which they are represented. Therefore, 
the stereotyped subject upon whom an inferior image is cast can repudiate such stereotyping by 
gaining control over the entity or the system that confines it to the stereotype. 
From this perspective, it becomes clear that the way in which Donkin projects onto the 
other crew-members his conceited discontent and tries to topple the authority of Captain Allistoun, 
and of the other officers on the ship is evidence of a battle for control, most likely in the interest 
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of self-preservation. Feeling isolated and deprived due to his overall appearance and lack of 
clothing, he envies his shipmates and expresses this through his insolence towards all, including, 
and especially more, towards the officers. Through the narrator we learn that Donkin, loathsome 
and lazy, was generally “left alone” (24): 
….and in his isolation he could do nothing but think of the gales of the Cape of 
Good Hope and envy us the possession of warm clothing and waterproofs. Our sea-
boots, our oilskin coats, our well-filled sea-chests, were to him so many causes for 
bitter meditation: he had none of those things, and he felt instinctively that no man, 
when the need arose, would offer to share them with him. He was impudently 
cringing to us and systematically insolent to the officers. He anticipated the best 
results, for himself, from such a line of conduct—and he was mistaken. Such 
natures forget that under extreme provocation men will be just—whether they want 
to be so or not. (Narcissus 24). 
In this account, Donkin’s penury and his instinctive feeling of possibly being treated meanly 
evokes sympathy and runs counter to the overall aversion towards him. The narrator betrays a hint 
of this sympathy while he states his belief in the human propensity to be charitable in the face of 
crisis. From the standpoint of these empathetic undercurrents, the narrator then seems to deplore 
what he considers Donkin’s rather blinkered view of his situation and his misjudgement of his 
shipmates. In his deprecation, he reveals that Donkin, who has already been depicted as deprived 
and shameless, takes on an even more insolent attitude towards the rest of the crew because he 
begrudges them their possessions in the face of his lack. As observed by the narrator, Donkin 
probably thought that through his impertinence he might be able to get an advantage over some of 
the crew, perhaps by bullying them into sharing their things with him when it became most 
necessary. However, the narrator deemed this attitude unnecessary since, in his opinion, if it 
became critical, he believed that the men would demonstrate a soundness of moral judgement and 
fairly share, even if grudgingly. Yet, Donkin persists in this arrogance to the extent that, at the 
height of his insolence, he upsets the order on the ship and creates confusion by trying to sway his 
shipmates to disregard the Captain’s orders and take orders from him instead. In this first attempt 
to usurp power, Donkin capitalises on the crew’s displeasure with the Captain who decidedly puts 
the ship at risk during a particularly bad spell when they encounter a storm. The ship turns on her 
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side and the whole crew scream for the masts to be cut: “They all yelled unceasingly: - ‘The masts! 
Cut! Cut!’” (36). However, in the anarchy of the moment, Captain Allistoun yells his command 
“No”, and this command is taken up and echoed around the confused ship. While the rest of the 
crew heed the command of the Captain and do what else they can to contain the situation without 
having to cut the masts, Donkin alone continues to yell for the masts to be cut as he “shouted curses 
at the master, shook his fist at him with horrible blasphemies, [and] called upon [the crew] in filthy 
words to ‘Cut! Don’t mind that murdering fool! Cut, some of you!’” (37). He is finally silenced 
by “a back-handed blow over the mouth” (37) from a crew-member who has just helped to rescue 
him from slipping over the side. Much later after the storm has passed and some order is restored 
on the ship, Donkin launches into a speech of grievances to the crew about how much they work 
for so little pay and how they constantly put their lives at risk, sacrificing so much for such little 
gratitude from the command. Despite the overall derision for his lazy and contemptuous attitude, 
the crew actually listen to him: 
We remembered our danger, our toil—and conveniently forgot our horrible scare. 
We decried our officers—who had done nothing—and listened to the fascinating 
Donkin. His care for our rights, his disinterested concern for our dignity, were not 
discouraged by the invariable contumely of our words, by the disdain of our looks. 
Our contempt for him was unbounded—and we could not but listen with interest to 
that consummate artist (Narcissus 61) 
From this account, we observe that even though the crew persistently ill-treat Donkin in their 
contempt for him, they are swayed by his speech and pay attention to his rationalisation of their 
situation. What we cannot miss, however, in the narrator’s description is the reference to Donkin 
as a ‘consummate artist’. From Philipp Schweighauser’s revision of art in his work Beautiful 
Deceptions, it is worth noting that art over time has been taken to also mean deception (10). In this 
regard, the reference here to Donkin ultimately depicts him as highly skilled at deception. 
Therefore, it is obvious that the word ‘artist’ as used here implies con artist, a reference that extends 
from the narrator’s suggestion that Donkin, demonstrating his con skills by sensationalising the 
condition of the crew members, manages to defraud their consciences. Through his sensational 
speech he causes a sense of general dissatisfaction among the crew which results in a rift between 
the men and the command. Further consolidating this suggestion of Donkin as a con artist with 
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reference to this same situation, Conrad states that Donkin’s “picturesque and filthy loquacity 
flowed like a troubled stream from a poisoned source” (62). In piling up the use of adjectives with 
negative connotations – filthy, troubled, poisoned – Conrad, in this description, portrays Donkin 
as a rabble-rouser whose sole interest is to assert himself in some way, even if negatively through 
mutiny. And in his attempt to do this he projects onto the rest of the crew, through his speech, 
these negative traits that, earlier on in the narrative, have often been alluded to in connection with 
his character. Despite Donkin’s near-success at instigating his shipmates against the Captain and 
his officers, he is soon silenced and the Captain’s control and superiority are reasserted. As Daniel 
Schwarz indicates, “Donkin is Conrad’s gross caricature of a political thinker” who offers hope 
with “temporary formulas” and a “misguided sentimentalism” (42). This observation by Schwarz 
recalls Conrad’s reference to Wait as mocking the sentimentalism of his shipmates, a fact that 
demonstrates that, in the shared fact of their portrayal as conmen, both Donkin and Wait abuse the 
sentimentalism of their shipmates. this ties in with a standard reproach against sentimentalism as 
tear-jerkingly manipulating our affections. In the case of Donkin, for instance, this is depicted right 
at the beginning of the narrative, when he appeals to the men for spare clothing after he has told 
an obvious tale of how he escaped lynching for standing up for his rights on an earlier ship. He 
claims he ran off that ship, leaving his belongings behind in the process. Even though they are 
certain of his lousy character, they offer him their spare articles in an expression of kindness. 
Recounting this, Conrad states: 
He knew how to conquer the naïve instincts of that crowd. In a moment they gave 
him their compassion, jocularly, contemptuously, or surlily; and at first it took the 
shape of a blanket thrown at him as he stood there with the white skin of his limbs 
showing his human kinship through the black fantasy of his rags. Then a pair of old 
shoes fell at his muddy feet. […] a rolled-up pair of canvas trousers… The gust of 
their benevolence sent a wave of sentimental pity through their doubting hearts. 
They were touched by their own readiness to alleviate a shipmate’s misery. 
(Narcissus 7) 
In this description, Donkin demonstrates an ability to ‘conquer’ the emotions of the crew by 
appealing to their ‘naïve instincts’. The influence he obtains over them is depicted in their prompt 
sympathetic response to his deprived condition. In his elaboration of the ‘benevolence’ of the men, 
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the author states that through their own demonstration of kindness, a ‘sentimental pity’ is aroused 
in them. He furthermore alludes to the possibility that this sentimentalism may have additionally 
been inspired through the hint of the character’s shared humanity indicated in the fact of his ‘white 
skin’ tainted by ‘the black fantasy of his rags’. As the characters of Donkin and Wait are revealed 
through the rest of the narrative, it becomes evident that what they take advantage of to dupe the 
sentimentality of their shipmates is the empathy that they receive because of such a suggestion of 
a shared humanity. In Beautiful Deceptions, Schweighauser points out that, in sentimental novels, 
this sense of a shared humanity establishes “emotional bonds between characters” (115) to the 
extent that even “faked emotional distress can call forth heartfelt sympathy” (114). Stating that 
such “sympathetic identification” is the problem that “haunts sentimentalism” for the fact that “its 
emotional appeals” may be based on deception (114), Schweighauser, further demonstrates that 
such affective identification depicts what Dobson refers to as the “emotional and philosophical 
ethos” of sentimentalism which “celebrates human connection, both personal and communal, and 
acknowledges the shared devastation of affectional loss” (Dobson 266 cited in Schweighauser 
115). Examining the affective influence of both Donkin and Wait over the crew from this 
perspective, it is obvious that it is as a result of the men’s tendency to sympathetically identify 
with these, albeit dubious, characters that they are emotionally duped by them. In effect, as alluded 
to above, the men respond with compassion to Donkin’s plight even though they do so with 
“doubting hearts” about the veracity of his claims. Donkin, on the other hand, obviously dupes 
them by exploiting their emotions, and, as earlier discussed, by also unnecessarily drawing their 
attention to and sensationalising their working conditions. This exploitation, exhibited by Donkin, 
of the men’s affective tendencies, is even more acutely employed by Wait who uses his sickness 
and the persistent reminder of his imminent death to bully the other crew-members into “a weird 
servitude” (26). Thus, he makes the men submit to his every whim, so that, for instance, they 
cannot talk loudly or sing because that is too noisy for him, and they give him the best portion of 
the meals even while he constantly abuses them and shows no appreciation for their efforts: 
Our singers became mute because Jimmy was a dying man. For the same reason no 
chap… could ‘drive a nail to hang his few poor rags upon,’ without being made 
aware of the enormity he committed in disturbing Jimmy’s interminable last 
moments. At night, […] the watches were called man by man, in whispers, so as 
not to interfere with Jimmy’s, possibly, last slumber on earth. True, he was always 
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awake, and managed, as we sneaked out on deck, to plant in our backs some cutting 
remark that, for the moment, made us feel as if we had been brutes, and afterwards 
made us suspect ourselves of being fools. We spoke in low tones within that fo’c’sle 
as though it had been a church. We ate our meals in silence and dread, for Jimmy 
was capricious with his food, and railed bitterly at the salt meat, at the biscuits, at 
the tea, as at articles unfit for human consumption—‘let alone for a dying man!’ He 
would say:—‘Can’t you find a better slice of meat for a sick man …? But there! If 
I had a chance, you fellows would do away with it. You would poison me. Look at 
what you have given me!’ We served him in his bed with rage and humility, as 
though we had been the base courtiers of a hated prince; and he rewarded us by his 
unconciliating criticism. He had found the secret of keeping for ever on the run the 
fundamental imbecility of mankind; he had the secret of life, that confounded dying 
man, and he made himself master of every moment of our existence. We grew 
desperate, and remained submissive. (Narcissus 22-23). 
In this account, the narrator outlines the numerous ways in which Wait manipulates the crew on 
the basis of his purported ill-health and his claim to be dying. In an extreme exploitation that 
deprives his shipmates of the ability to indulge themselves or to carry out their duties freely, Wait 
tyrannizes the ship as he casts the morbid mood of his alleged approaching death over the crew. 
As a result, the crew feel inhibited in their foisted consideration of him. Their expression of 
joviality is ‘muted’ and even essential actions that may be performed towards certain needs (such 
as driving a nail to hang clothes) are hindered. In this already stifled atmosphere, Wait does not 
cease to vilify the men at the least opportunity, making them feel morally deficient and 
apprehensive of their own personalities. In his continued disparaging treatment of the men, Wait 
additionally criticises the meals he is served and even goes as far as to accuse his shipmates of the 
possibility of poisoning him. Despite the aspersions he casts on the men, they continue to serve 
him and continue to be ruled by him, as implied through the metaphor of the ‘base courtiers of a 
hated prince’. This notion of Wait ruling, tyrannically, over the lives of the men is later reiterated 
in the narrator’s assertion: “He became the tormentor of all our moments; he was worse than a 
nightmare” (27). Yet, despite their despair due to the persecution they suffer from Wait, they 
remain ‘submissive’. Following from this account of the crew’s servitude towards Wait, I point 
out that the character routinely imposes upon the crew a performance of the literal pun on his 
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name: he gets them to wait on him, in spite of themselves. He achieves this by capitalising on their 
emotions and making them feel morally obliged to respect the last wishes of a dying man. 
Nevertheless, the narrator further reveals that even while they acquiesce to his appeal to their 
sympathy, they cannot help feeling or suspecting that they are being conned. Expressing this 
suspicion, he states: 
And we hated James Wait. We could not get rid of the monstrous suspicion that 
this astounding black man was shamming sick, had been malingering heartlessly in 
the face of our toil, of our scorn, of our patience—and was now malingering in the 
face of our devotion—in the face of death. Our vague and imperfect morality rose 
with disgust at his manly lie. But he stuck to it manfully—amazingly. (Narcissus, 
44-45). 
Notably, this assertion of the shipmates’ hatred for Wait is made at a time when the character is 
genuinely in distress: he is trapped in a locked-down hatch during a violent storm and the crew set 
out to rescue him. Whereas this statement reveals that the crew suspects Wait of pretending to be 
sick and abusing their benevolence towards him, it also reveals their disgust at his attitude to 
persistently hold on to the suspected falsehood. Thus, while they yet treat him with consideration 
based on his claim of sickness, they cannot help feeling that they are also being hoodwinked. This 
notwithstanding, they remain devoted to him at the risk of their own lives, as they neglect the 
imperilled ship and misdirect their efforts to save Wait. Thus, they continue to ‘wait’ on him, even 
in the face of death. While the narrator’s allusion to a ‘monstrous suspicion’ and a ‘manly lie’ 
insinuates the men’s increasing doubt about Wait’s claims, to the reader, it is already clear that the 
character has achieved this feat of winning the undying allegiance of the crew through a sustained 
act of deception. From this perspective, he fully evokes the concept of signifying as it is used in 
African-American discourse, and specifically in reference to the Signifying Monkey. It is 
important to point out, however, that while Gates’ analysis of signifyin(g) takes a more affirmative 
turn in his reading of the practice as a positive activity, in my reading of the Narcissus through this 
concept I identify that Conrad explores the flipsides of this practice that Gates affirms. In his 
analysis of the concept, Gates explains that the symbolic figure of the Signifying Monkey is the 
“‘signifier as such’” (689), to the extent that it embodies all the modes of signifying within African-
American discourse. Noting that the Signifying Monkey, representing “black mythology’s 
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archetypal signifier, […] is a trickster figure” (687), Gates further points out that “as tricksters 
[such figures] are mediators and their mediations are tricks” (687). Drawing on Roger Abrahams, 
Gates moreover posits that from the standpoint of African-American cultural discourse, signifying 
“certainly refers to the trickster’s ability to talk with great innuendo, to carp, cajole, needle, and 
lie” (689). Referring to these extended implications of the meaning of signifying as expounded by 
Gates, I note that it is interesting to view Wait, in his manipulation of his shipmates, as 
exemplifying such a trickster character. This is evidenced in the fact that he uses deception to sway 
the emotions of his shipmates and to cause them to pander to his whims without pausing for a 
moment of scepticism. In relation to this, I draw further on Gates and argue that through his name 
(Wait, nomen est omen), the character signifies upon the rest of the crew as he cons them into 
becoming submissive to him. In this manner, Wait, bearing upon the other men the full significance 
of his name, can be seen, again through Gates’ notion of signification, as signifying upon the men. 
To further understand the characterisation of Wait, it is instructive to note Gates’ assertion that “in 
black discourse ‘signifying’ means modes of figuration itself” (687). An examination of the 
character with these notions in mind reveals that Wait displays many of these tropes, which 
therefore capture him in these signifying modes of figuration. As earlier mentioned, we find that 
he is marked for his race and colour, and that he defies the description of him as a ‘nigger’ by 
calling out his name (10). Besides, our attention is also persistently drawn to his booming voice 
(11), and in his later admission to Donkin that he is not sick (68), he demonstrates what Geneva 
Smitherman calls the “semi-serious tradition of ‘lying’” (Smitherman 79) which, in black 
discourse, forms part of a rhetorical performance that signifies the individual within his social and 
cultural space. Following from this idea of performance in black discourse, Gates’ statement that 
signifying implies modes of figuration – that is, allegorical representation – elucidates the portrayal 
of Wait as allegorically representative of the universe of the Narcissus where the moral qualities 
of its men are evaluated. These qualities are examined through Wait’s character which highlights 
the excesses of negative moral responsibility towards others. However, while Wait, embodying 
morality, is literally held up to the light of scrutiny in this way, his inclination to self-gratification 
is compensated by Singleton who, alone among the men, remains unmoved by Wait’s ruses, and 
displays an unwavering commitment to the business of steering the ship. Displaying, thus, a 
steadfastness to a purpose, Singleton commits to that which is right and in the long run beneficial 
to all within this microcosmic universe, while Wait is steeped in self-indulgence to his own 
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detriment. Consequently, in the fact of its redeeming nature, Singleton’s resoluteness, which helps 
to keep the ship on its homeward course, contradicts Wait’s act of sticking ‘manfully’ to his ‘manly 
lie’, which in the end destroys him. It then becomes obvious that in upholding falsehood, Wait 
shirks a moral responsibility towards his shipmates, and it is clearly this moral neglect that 
eventually results in his demise. Once again, in this regard, I necessarily emphasise that Gates 
gives a far more affirmative notion of signifyin(g) as creative word play as opposed to Wait’s 
audacious lying and deception, portrayed mostly as adverse, in the Narcissus. A similarity can, 
however, be identified between the outcome of such signifyin(g) both in the Narcissus as in Gates’ 
discussion of the concept with reference to the Monkey figure of this African-American practice. 
For just as in Conrad’s text, Wait’s demise results from his deception, in the African-American 
myth, the trickster Monkey receives a retributive trouncing from the Lion who, after being himself 
trounced by the Elephant, ultimately realises that he has been fooled by the Monkey into going to 
confront the Elephant who purportedly insulted him (the Lion). 
From the foregoing, I assert that to the representation of Wait as a con artist is also strongly 
associated the motif of falsehood. Wait is indeed unwell right from the beginning and shows signs 
of this in his sluggish attitude towards work on the ship. The narrator reveals that all the men 
“remarked that Jimmy from the first was very slack at his work, but [they] thought it simply the 
outcome of his philosophy of life” (27). However, when, for his languid movement, he is 
reprimanded by one of the officers, who scolds “what’s the matter with your hind legs?”, Wait 
answers morbidly: “it isn’t my legs, … it’s my lungs. […] Can’t you see I’m a dying man? I know 
it!” (27). Thus, it is evident that he is unwell and is aware of it. Even so, the manner and intensity 
with which he seems to revel in his condition, especially since it gives him an excuse to avoid 
work and to bully his fellow shipmates into serving him, makes him subject to that “monstrous 
suspicion” of a lie that the narrator alludes to and for which reason he is hated: “we hated him 
because of the suspicion; we detested him because of the doubt” (45). Thus, he is captured as an 
embodiment of falsehood which begets suspicion and doubt. Yet, it is also evident that it is through 
this trope of falsehood that we can understand the magnitude of Wait’s control over his shipmates. 
For, it is because of their uncertainty about the actual severity of Wait’s condition, and their desire 
to escape the guilt of callousness to a dying man, that the crew become trapped in servitude to him. 
As the narrator recounts: 
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We were trying to be decent chaps, and found it jolly difficult; we oscillated 
between the desire of virtue and the fear of ridicule; we wished to save ourselves 
from the pain of remorse, but did not want to be made the contemptible dupes of 
our sentiment. (25) 
For fear of being considered indecent, very likely in the sense of failing to show 
compassion to a dying man, the crew become victims, simultaneously, of their presumed standards 
of virtue and of their impressionable sentiments. As a result, Wait, capitalising on their doubt to 
control them, continues to take advantage of their oscillating ideals to impose his will upon them 
and to project his frustrations onto them. In this regard, Donkin taunts them, stating that they are 
“an imbecile lot, daily taken in by a vulgar nigger” (25). Towards the end, however, Wait, in the 
true embodiment of falsehood, is depicted as becoming a victim of his own duplicities. Claiming 
at one moment that he was a dying man, and then declaring in the next that he was “trying to get 
home to be cured” (23), Wait seemed to believe more earnestly in the veracity of the latter 
statement than in any hint of the faintest possibility of the former. That unfortunate lie is his ‘truth’ 
with which he deceives himself, which undergirds his overbearing nature, and which eventually 
transforms him into an Other that symbolically signifies, and is ultimately overcome by death. In 
a description that demonstrates this, the narrator states: 
[…] in the confused current of impotent thoughts that set unceasingly this way and 
that through bodies of men, Jimmy bobbed up upon the surface, compelling 
attention, like a black buoy chained to the bottom of a muddy stream. Falsehood 
triumphed. It triumphed through doubt, through stupidity, through pity, through 
sentimentalism. We set ourselves to bolster it up from compassion, from 
recklessness, from a sense of fun. Jimmy’s steadfastness to his untruthful attitude 
in the face of the inevitable truth had the proportions of a colossal enigma—of a 
manifestation grand and incomprehensible that at times inspired a wondering awe; 
and there was also, to many, something exquisitely droll in fooling him thus to the 
top of his bent. The latent egoism of tenderness to suffering appeared in the 
developing anxiety not to see him die. His obstinate non-recognition of the only 
certitude whose approach we could watch from day to day was as disquieting as the 
failure of some law of nature. (85). 
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At this point in the narrative, the ship has survived a horrible storm but has lost a lot of its 
supplies to the storm. As the crew try to steer it homewards, they persistently encounter bad 
weather and it seems as though the ship “has forgotten the way home” (88) as it tosses about 
aimlessly in strong head winds. Due to the shortage of supplies, the crew, surviving on small 
rations, endure hunger and have gradually become pensive. It is in such a moment when 
conversation is absent and each crew member is deeply engrossed in their own ‘confused current 
of impotent thoughts’ that Jimmy is described as ‘bobb[ing] up upon the surface’. The surface here 
indicates the deck and so implies that Jimmy has come up deck out of his cabin. However, the use 
of the verb ‘bob’ to describe his appearance on deck connotes a suddenness that distracts and 
‘compel[s] attention’. This notion of Jimmy distracting his shipmates and ‘compelling attention’ 
underscores his control over them. However, in extending the image evoked by the word ‘bob’ by 
introducing the metaphor of a ‘black buoy chained to the bottom of a muddy stream’, the narrator 
transcends the moment and portends a subversion and the end of Wait’s control. This is indicated 
through the metaphor of the buoy and its connotative meanings. A buoy is an object that is 
purposefully left to float in sailing waters to serve as signals or markers of reefs or other hazards 
below the surface, or to provide mooring for a ship. To best serve its warning purpose, it is 
normally fluorescent bright in colour. From its extended notion of a signal or a marker, the buoy 
metaphor used in connection with Wait signals or marks a potentially fatal event, in the likely 
failure of its function to signal danger. Complementing the use of the verb ‘bob’ to indicate the 
buoy’s purpose as a float, this likelihood of a failure of function is concretised in the fact that this 
buoy is ‘black’ in colour and ‘chained to the bottom of a muddy stream,’ thus indicating its 
capriciousness as a marker or a signal. This unreliability is suggested, firstly, because, in being 
black the buoy is not visible, and, secondly, because in muddy waters, any danger beneath the 
surface that it might signal is obscured. Therefore, the metaphor carries a double concealment that 
foils any caution of imminent disaster. While the disaster is the impending death of Jimmy, this 
fact is unperceived by the character himself through the lie to himself that he is not as sick as he 
pretends to be and for which reason he secretly disposes of all the medicine given to him, tossing 
some overboard into the sea and hiding another under his pillow without ever taking a drop (28). 
It is this act of lying to himself while thinking he is lying to others that constitutes the falsehood 
that he symbolises and that ultimately engulfs him. From the narrator’s observation about Jimmy’s 
‘steadfastness to his untruthful attitude in the face of the inevitable truth’, and his ‘obstinate non-
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recognition of the only certitude’ that was obvious to all, he indicates the reality that Jimmy has 
indeed become stricken by the illness that he has all along feigned. In his own game of deception, 
he has been trumped and overcome by the falsehood that he embodies; and, as the narrator 
emphasises, falsehood triumphs in the end. Here again, even though the trickster remains a much 
more positive figure than Wait, in this notion of being outdone at his own con game, Wait evokes 
once more the mythological character of the Signifying Monkey, whose tricks always flip back on 
him in retribution. Thus, in his representation as a trickster similar to this symbolic trickster figure 
of African-American culture, Wait’s ruses are eventually uncovered, causing him to be subjected 
to retributive measures which invariably result in his death. 
While Wait is thus represented as embodying falsehood that results in his demise, it is 
important to note the role of Donkin, his fellow conman, as an enabler of Wait in his performance 
of falsehood, and as a catalyst for Wait’s eventual demise. This is indicated by the fact that, despite 
the general suspicion of the crew, Donkin is the only one among the shipmates who actually gets 
a confession from Wait that he is not half as sick as he is pretending to be. This occurs during an 
intuitive match of conscience between the two in which Wait chides Donkin for avoiding work 
with the others and always talking “like a poll-parrot, … a screechin’ poll-parrot” (68), who keeps 
on chattering “like a dirty white cockatoo” (68). In this comparison to a parrot, or a cockatoo, the 
metaphor of the bird in reference to Donkin is reiterated with the added effect that here, as the bird 
is specified as a parrot, Wait insinuates that Donkin is only good at talking and, perhaps, more 
specifically at repeating things he has heard about a person’s rights without necessarily knowing 
what he is talking about. At this slur, Donkin, takes up the challenge to prove to Wait what he 
knows. Subsequently, he confronts Wait with the knowledge of his deception, stating that his claim 
of ill health is “a blooming imposyshun. A bloomin’, stinkin’ first-class imposyshun—but it don’t 
tyke me in” (68).  Unsettled, Wait, upon Donkin’s confession that he has “seen the inside of every 
chokey in the Colonies” (68) for obstinately standing up for his rights, refers to Donkin as a “jail-
prop” (68), to which he replies: “I am… an’ proud of it, too. You! You ‘aven’t the bloomin’ 
nerve—so you inventyd this ‘ere dodge….” (68). Besides the obvious wrangle transpiring between 
the two, it is important to point out that, here and everywhere else in the narrative, Donkin’s speech 
is much more thoroughly Othered than Wait’s. Significantly, Wait’s speech and language 
throughout the narrative is impeccable, and, early in the narrative, the first time the two are 
captured in a verbal exchange, Wait is depicted as being shocked by the crudity of Donkin’s speech 
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causing him to stare “like a man addressed unexpectedly in a foreign language” (14). When in his 
crude speech Donkin jokingly requests for “a bit of ’baccy” (tobacco) from Wait, the latter firmly 
retorts: “Don’t be familiar. […] We haven’t kept pigs together”, thus causing Donkin to be startled 
in his turn, “out of sheer surprise” (14). In the Othering of the two characters, it is impossible to 
ignore this focus on their speech. In the evidence that Donkin’s crude speech may suggest a 
baseness of character that falls short of a Eurocentric standard, the twisted contradiction captured 
in matching his Otherness to Wait’s resides in the fact that Wait’s own eloquence does not measure 
up enough to salvage him from an Otherness that is sealed by his racial identity. Thus, in this later 
exchange in which they verbally spar with each other in what seems to be a match to assert each 
other’s Otherness by subconsciously determining who has the worst traits that exclude them from 
a centric communality with the rest of the crew, Wait’s deception is revealed: 
[Donkin] paused; then with marked afterthought accentuated slowly:—‘Yer ain’t 
sick—are yer?’ 
‘No,’ said Jimmy, firmly. ‘Been out of sorts now and again this year,’ he mumbled 
with a sudden drop in his voice. 
Donkin closed one eye, amicable and confidential. He whispered:—‘Ye ‘ave done 
this afore ‘aven’tchee?’ Jimmy smiled—then as if unable to hold back he let himself 
go:—‘Last ship—yes. I was out of sorts on the passage. See? It was easy. They paid 
me off in Calcutta, and the skipper made no bones about it either…. I got my money 
all right. Laid up fifty-eight days! The fools! O Lord! The fools! Paid right off.’ He 
laughed spasmodically. Donkin chimed in giggling. Then Jimmy coughed 
violently. ‘I am as well as ever,’ he said, as soon as he could draw breath. 
Donkin made a derisive gesture. ‘In course,’ he said, profoundly, ‘any one can see 
that.’—'They don’t,’ said Jimmy, gasping like a fish.—‘They would swallow any 
yarn,’ affirmed Donkin.—‘Don’t you let on too much,’ admonished Jimmy in an 
exhausted voice.—‘Your little gyme? Eh?’ commented Donkin, jovially. Then with 
sudden disgust: ‘Yer all for yerself, s’long as ye’re right…’ (Narcissus 68). 
54 
 
In this exchange that bears the hint of a contest of morality between these two conmen on the ship, 
Wait’s secret is exposed, and so is his egoism which ties in with the symbolism of the name of the 
ship, Narcissus. Even at this point, it is already evident that his falsehood, in the form of the 
sickness he has been laying claim to, is stealing upon him. This is suggested through the references 
to him cough[ing] violently and ‘gasp[ing] like a fish’. Thus, Wait cannot escape the performative 
nature of language, and the sickness he has literally been simulating finally creeps up on him, 
manifesting into reality. In this regard, I defer to Jean Baudrillard’s notion on the difficulty to 
distinguish between the ‘real’ and the ‘imaginary’ or between that which is ‘true’ or ‘false’ in the 
case of persons simulating illness. Expanding this notion from an accepted definition of simulation, 
he states that a person “who simulates an illness produces in himself some of the symptoms” of 
the illness (171). This seems to be the case in Wait’s simulation of fatal illness. However, in his 
conceit, he remains unsuspecting of this fact. Rather, he thinks that the rest of the crew are fools, 
as can be inferred by extending his expression of this opinion regarding the crew of the last ship 
on which he played a similar hoax by pretending to still be unwell after a brief spell of 
indisposition. To this confession of successfully fooling the crew, Donkin suggests that this is 
possible because the men are gullible and “would swallow any yarn”. In an earlier reference to the 
men’s gullibility, he already describes them as “a driven lot of sheep” (68), and it is this flaw that 
both he and Wait, having detected, capitalise on. Upon drawing out the confession, Donkin derides 
Wait and tells him that he is on his own in his game of deception. By insinuating that he will not 
be the one to expose his game, Donkin enables Wait’s deception by being an accomplice to his 
deception through his own silence. However, given the fact that Donkin is himself a conman who 
tries to better his lot – “look after [his] rights (68) – through an altruistic demonstration of concern 
for others, he uses his knowledge of Wait’s deception as a trump card to attempt to once more 
incite the crew against their officers.  
In this second attempt to assert himself against the authority of the command, Donkin 
builds on the already massaged egos of the petulant crew and capitalises on their sense of grievance 
to incite them to further rebellion. Despite the fact that Donkin himself shirks work, often leaving 
his shipmates short of his contribution to their labour, he draws the attention of the men to the fact 
that Wait has been allowed to lie up while the rest of them must do the work, short of one man. As 
Donkin uses this argument to incense the men, Wait tries to appease the crew and the command 
by assuring them that he would return to work the very next day or even immediately. He does this 
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when he realises that the men have become suspicious of his malingering. However, despite Wait’s 
putative earnestness to return to work, Captain Allistoun refuses to allow him to do this:  
“No. You don't," said the master, curtly. Bare feet shuffled, disapproving voices 
murmured all round; he went on as if he had not heard:—"You have been skulking 
nearly all the passage and now you want to come out. You think you are near 
enough to the pay-table now. Smell the shore, hey?"  
"I've been sick... now—better," mumbled Wait, glaring in the light. —"You have 
been shamming sick," retorted Captain Allistoun with severity; "Why..." he 
hesitated for less than half a second. "Why, anybody can see that. There's nothing 
the matter with you, but you choose to lie-up to please yourself—and now you shall 
lie-up to please me. Mr. Baker, my orders are that this man is not to be allowed on 
deck to the end of the passage." (Narcissus 74) 
This exchange between the captain and Wait confirms Donkin’s earlier statement that 
Wait’s deception is obvious, or rather has become obvious, to the rest of the crew. What is obvious 
in this interaction is the shift in Wait’s story: that he has been sick, but is better now, as opposed 
to his earlier statements of being a sick and dying man. Obviously, this revision of his story is yet 
another gambit, which, however, does not work this time with the captain. Subsequently, the 
captain orders that he remain confined to his cabin for the rest of the journey. Notably, the prompt 
shift in Wait’s story, points to a performance of identity through a fluidity of language that negates 
an essentialist construction of subjectivity. By moving from the one notion of ‘I am sick and dying’ 
to claiming a different notion of ‘I have been sick, but now better’, Wait plays out an identity that 
is conceptually hooked onto the condition of sickness and its pendulating possibilities of either 
improvement, clearly opposed to wellness, or death. In such a performance of identity, the 
character defies essentialism defined by absolutes by signifying, through his assumed condition, a 
variability that also impacts on his personality. With regard to our character, it is important to note 
that this manner of signifying, central to both a post-structuralist notion of subjectivity as to the 
work of the con-man, tends to have the centrifugal effect of causing him to become separated from 
the ship’s centre of life and activity – the deck – and also from the rest of the crew as his ruse is 
uncovered. 
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As a result of the captain’s order, Wait remains confined to his bunk while the rest of the 
crew start to grumble and throw a row over having to work shorthanded. Capitalising on their 
already agitated state, Donkin further inflames their passion and instigates them to a strike: 
There were exclamations of surprise, triumph, indignation. The dark group of men 
swung across the light. "What for?" "Told you so..." "Bloomin' shame..."—"We've 
got to say somethink about that," screeched Donkin from the rear. […].—"Are we 
bloomin' masheens?" inquired Donkin in a piercing tone, and dived under the 
elbows of the front rank.—"Soon show 'im we ain't boys..."—"The man's a man if 
he is black."—"We ain't goin' to work this bloomin' ship shorthanded if Snowball's 
all right..."—"He says he is."—"Well then, strike, boys, strike!"—"That's the 
bloomin' ticket." (Narcissus 74) 
While Donkin’s reference here to Wait as ‘Snowball’ might be ironic because of the imagery of 
whiteness that it evokes, it is also interesting for its connotation of Wait as symbolising an object 
that Donkin metaphorically throws at the crew in a malicious jest. This notion is consolidated by 
his suggestion to the men that using Wait’s situation as the reason to strike is their ‘bloomin’ 
ticket’. Thus, extending from the snowball metaphor, I suggest that Donkin uses Wait to pelt the 
men into believing that they have a justified reason to revolt against their officers, while Donkin 
himself takes pleasure in the idea of causing such a revolt. In his instigation, the question as to 
whether they are ‘masheens’ evokes a recurrent motif in Conrad’s writings of the machine which 
invariably signifies the depersonalisation of individuals caught in an abstract fate. In his recurrent 
reference to this metaphor, Conrad himself alludes to the Schopenhauerian notion of the blind will 
that, in its agentic force lacks a conscious purposive striving which is however present in the way 
the will is experienced. As Mark Wollaeger puts it, “the machine can be read as a … version of 
Schopenhauer’s blind will [which] stands beyond the ward and woof of the reality it determines”, 
or, in its operation, it can represent “a fiction of skepticism cognate with Descartes’s malin génie” 
(Wollaeger 68). In the context of Donkin’s reference here to the men as machines, both these 
interpretations of the machine bear relevance to my analysis. First, in the Schopenhauerian sense 
of a blind will, Donkin is able to incite the men to a senseless near-revolt through his altruistic 
posturing of fighting for their rights. In their penchant for delusion, the men, failing to think for 
themselves, are easily swayed by Donkin’s manoeuvrings. Secondly, Donkin, included in the 
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machine analogy through his use of the pronoun ‘we’, may be seen as signifying the Cartesian evil 
demon who, as a “malicious deceiver”, plays on the scepticism of the men. He at once makes them 
believe that by demanding that Wait be allowed to work, (as he suddenly claims to be able to), 
they are asserting their rights; while, at the same time, he causes them to raise questions about their 
actions so far without giving thought to the immediate action of their revolt. During the tumult, 
one of the men shouts out: “We have been hymposed upon all this voyage, […] but this ‘ere fancy 
takes the cake” (74); and another yells: “Give is our Jimmy!” (74). The irony of their protests is 
that they fail to realise that if they have indeed been imposed upon, this has been by Wait himself 
for whom also they believe they are protesting. In the farcical confusion of the illusion of the rights 
that they are fighting for, Donkin continues to urge them on to violence as he insists: “‘Go for 
them … it’s dark!’” (75). In the confusion that ensues, someone shouts, “Never been sick” (74) 
while another declares, “He’s as fit as any ov us!” (75). Finally, Wait attests in a half-confession: 
“I am rather weak from lying-up so long” (75). Meanwhile, Donkin takes advantage of the chaos 
that has erupted and throws an iron belaying pin across the deck aiming at the captain, but missing. 
At this the crew hold themselves in check as shouts of reproof ring through: "Don't!" "Drop it!"—
"We ain't that kind!" (76). Thus, the attempted brutal attack on the captain shocks the incensed 
crowd back to the conviction that they may be anything – gullible, impressionable – but murderous. 
With the slow return to sanity, Donkin is subdued and calm restored. After this second futile 
attempt to challenge the authority of the command, Donkin is shamed, called a “blackguard” (84) 
by the Captain, and mostly ignored by the rest of the crew. This reference to Donkin as a 
‘blackguard’ recalls, as over and over again, his tainted filthy whiteness that causes him to fall 
short of being considered white. In his book How the Irish Became White, Noel Ignatiev suggests 
that in order to be “acknowledged as white”, the Irish (who not altogether considered as white) 
made sure to “avoid the taint of blackness” by resorting to a racist exclusion of blacks from the 
initially black-held “menial” occupations, which they (Irish) were “willing to take” (Ignatiev 130). 
Thus, he demonstrates that in their economic scuffle to identify as white, the Irish were still equated 
to blacks because of their identification with what was considered “black man’s work” (ibid 130). 
Besides, Eric Lott’s study on the emergence and performance (through a blackface act) of Irish 
minstrelsy in 19th Century America demonstrates that poor, southern immigrant Irish were equated, 
“in both class and ethnic terms, to ‘blackness’” (Lott 96). This manner of equating a tainted 
whiteness to blackness seems to be the concept at work in Donkin’s portrayal throughout the 
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narrative as a poor and dirty white man. Based on this analysis, it is illuminating to note that 
Donkin and Wait are paired in an Othering, which, however different, is still related through the 
shared similarity of their signifying tropes. Thus, in being described as a ‘blackguard’ by the 
captain, Donkin is drawn parallel to Wait, in the suggestion of contemptible behaviour as well as 
in the notion of blackness indicated in the term. In an earlier instance in which such a suggestion 
of blackness is pinned to Wait, Donkin reviles him as being a “black-faced swine” (Narcissus 28). 
However, Donkin’s own connection to this blackness, through the notions of filth and dirt, is 
inevitably suggested in Wait’s reference to him as an “East-end trash” (Narcissus 28), a term 
loaded with the connotations of the filth and poverty of this London slum district, historically 
known to have been heavily populated by Irish immigrants. Therefore, even though Donkin hints 
quite early in the narrative that he is “an Englishman” (6), this ‘East-end’ reference to him 
associates him with the Irish, who have in the past been racially excluded from whiteness. In what 
may appear to be a subconscious contest to separately strip themselves of and map their Otherness 
onto each other, it is revealing that for the rest of the journey, Donkin sticks around Wait, mocking 
and reviling him to the point of death; and then stealing his money in his full glare just as he is 
dying. After Jimmy’s death, Donkin now starts to sham sick and is given permission to “go lay-
up” (Narcissus 97). When the ship finally docks and the crew line up for their payment, Donkin 
reappears very well dressed and mockingly arrogant and refuses his “discharge” claiming “I’m 
goin’ ter ‘ave a job ashore. […] No more bloomin’ sea fur me” (Narcissus 105). In watching Wait 
die, and in fact, precipitating his demise, Donkin seems to have taken over the malevolence with 
which Wait was associated and he now becomes the embodiment of that malignant attitude. In 
response to the stony looks that he receives from the rest of the men, he ironically retorts, “Ye’re 
the scum of the earth” (Narcissus 105). Through his words and by his refusal of his wage, he has 
putatively risen above the control of his superiors as well as the disdain of his former crew-mates. 
However, in their minds as well as in the readers’ minds, he remains the “stinking, cadging liar” 
(Narcissus 92) that he has earlier been depicted as – the inferior Other. 
Thus, it is evident that Donkin overtly pitches his strength against the command of the ship 
by inciting rebellion through his Mephistophelian wiles. In the case of Wait, however, the power 
play is even more subtle as he becomes the embodiment of the death that he incessantly talks about, 
playing on the effect that this ominous association has on the crew and how it allows him to control 
them. In the narrator’s description of this sinister association, he states: 
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Men stood around very still and with exasperated eyes. It was just what they had 
expected, and hated to hear, that idea of a stalking death, thrust at them many times 
a day like a boast and like a menace by this obnoxious nigger. He seemed to take a 
pride in that death which, so far, had attended only upon the ease of his life; he was 
overbearing about it, as if no one else in the world had ever been intimate with such 
a companion; he paraded it unceasingly before us with an affectionate persistence 
that made its presence indubitable, and at the same time incredible. No man could 
be suspected of such monstrous friendship! Was he a reality—or was he a sham—
this ever-expected visitor of Jimmy's? We hesitated between pity and mistrust, 
while, on the slightest provocation, he shook before our eyes the bones of his 
bothersome and infamous skeleton. He was for ever trotting him out. He would talk 
of that coming death as though it had been already there, as if it had been walking 
the deck outside, as if it would presently come in to sleep in the only empty bunk; 
as if it had sat by his side at every meal. It interfered daily with our occupations, 
with our leisure, with our amusements. (Narcissus 22). 
This account of the narrator describes one of the instances in which Wait berates his shipmates for 
talking too loudly “like a blooming lot of old women” (21) while he is trying to catch some sleep 
in his cabin. In his complaint against the men, Wait, as usual, reproaches them for not caring 
enough for “a dying man” (21). By indicating that this occurs ‘many times a day’, the narrator 
draws attention to Wait’s habitual practice of reminding the men that he was waiting to die and, 
hence, of requiring them to comply with his demands, depriving them of their freewill and self-
expression in the process. By depriving them of their freedom, Wait holds the men ransom for his 
imminent death, even while his persistent complaints against them causes them to become 
exasperated. This exasperation is expressed in the fact that even though they know that Wait will, 
as always, chide them with his approaching death, they ‘hate’ to hear about it as it is ‘thrust’ at 
them often ‘like a boast and like a menace’. His persistence in manipulatively thrusting the idea of 
this death at the men animates it with the ability to ‘stalk’, so that it is further referred to as an 
‘ever-expected visitor’ whom Wait could ‘trot out’ and who could be expected at any moment to 
be seen ‘walking the deck’, ‘com[ing] in to sleep’ or sitting beside Wait at meal times. Besides, 
the simultaneous comparison of ‘that coming death’ to a boast and a menace creates scepticism. 
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This is because while the idea of a boast connotes achievements, possessions or abilities, that of a 
menace connotes threat, danger or harm, making these notions paradoxical in nature. To the extent 
that this paradoxicality suggests a brooding presence which can however only be suspected 
because, due to its obvious absence, it cannot be substantiated, the men remain sceptical as to 
whether this death is ‘a reality’ or ‘a sham’. However, from the narrator’s depiction, we realise 
that Wait does not allow the crew even the freewill to be sceptical as in his ‘affectionate 
persistence’ to ‘parade’ his sinister ‘companion’ he would ‘on the slightest provocation’ shake 
before them ‘the bones of his bothersome and infamous skeleton’. While the words ‘bones’ and 
‘skeleton’ here undoubtedly refer to the emaciated body of Wait, their association with and 
evocation of death suggest that even though this death is not tangible, and is otherwise absent, it 
assumes an uncanny manifestation in Wait himself, thereby making ‘its presence indubitable’. In 
thus parading death through embodying it, Wait instils a fear in the men which is also a fear of 
contagion and of their own death. For, in Wait, embodying and signifying the ominous Other, they 
perceive the threat of their own non-negotiable mortality which cannot be appeased through their 
identification as Self. Later in the narrative, this unspoken dread is verbalised by Donkin when he 
is approached by one of the men who repeats the received verdict regarding Wait stating, 
“Singleton says he will die” (26). To this, Donkin spitefully responds “And so will you” (26). It is 
this hint of a shared fate with the Other, this reminder of their own death displayed to them through 
Wait that, in the narrator’s words, ‘interfered daily with [their] occupations, with [their] leisure, 
with [their] amusements’. Through his imposition of this fear on the crew, Wait gains so much 
control over the men and even over the ship to the extent that the men would even attempt to refuse 
duty for his sake. The narrator states that when, on one occasion, they are asked to wash out the 
forecastle, they come “as near as possible to refusing duty” because “Jimmy objected to a wet 
floor” (Narcissus 28). In Schwarz’s analysis of this effect that Wait has on the men, he asserts that 
“the crew’s experience with Wait represents a confrontation with death. […] Thus their catatonic 
fear of death evoked by the presence of Wait displaces the captain as master” (Schwarz, 44). In a 
vivid confirmation of this fact, the narrator states that: 
[Wait] overshadowed the ship. Invulnerable in his promise of speedy corruption he 
trampled on our self-respect, he demonstrated to us daily our want of moral 
courage; he tainted our lives. Had we been a miserable gang of wretched immortals, 
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unhallowed alike by hope and fear, he could not have lorded it over us with a more 
pitiless assertion of his sublime privilege. (Narcissus 29). 
In their abiding allegiance to Wait and their submission to the power he wields over them, Belfast 
(another Irish reference), who dedicates himself to caring for Wait, even goes as far as to steal the 
officers’ Sunday fruit pie from the galley “to tempt the fastidious appetite of Jimmy” (Narcissus 
23). This causes a possible unsettling of the “mutual confidence” between the officers and the crew 
on the ship (Narcissus 23), but fails to impress or mollify Jimmy, as he persistently derides the 
men and exerts control over them. In a continuous tussle for control over the men, Singleton, the 
only crew member who remains unaffected by Jimmy’s deception, at one point rebukes him, much 
to the delight of the crew:  
One day, […] at dinner […] Jimmy expressed his general disgust with men and 
things in words that were particularly disgusting. Singleton lifted his head. We 
became mute. The old man, addressing Jimmy, asked:—"Are you dying?" Thus 
interrogated, James Wait appeared horribly startled and confused. We all were 
startled. Mouths remained open; hearts thumped, eyes blinked; a dropped tin fork 
rattled in the dish; a man rose as if to go out, and stood still. In less than a minute 
Jimmy pulled himself together:—"Why? Can't you see I am?" he answered shakily. 
Singleton [declared] —"Well, get on with your dying," he said with venerable 
mildness; "don't raise a blamed fuss with us over that job. We can't help you." 
Jimmy fell back in his bunk, and for a long time lay very still wiping the 
perspiration off his chin. (Narcissus 26). 
This confrontation temporarily breaks the spell of Wait’s control over the men. The indication that 
after this exchange Wait falls back in his bunk, where he remains for a long time ‘very still wiping 
the perspiration off his chin’ gives the impression of another contest. Whereas his contest with 
Donkin signified an effort between like natures to outwit each other in their identification of 
Otherness, this contest with Singleton assumes a mysterious quality which leaves Wait baffled and 
trounced. This is because it subtly represents a match between two opposing forces in which 
Singleton, consistently depicted as impassive, remaining duty-bound,  and unaffected by Wait’s 
schemes, signifies the force of good against Wait, whose tainting influence and devilish portrayal, 
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signifies the force of evil. Notably, this contest, almost imperceptible in the context of this 
exchange, recurs in a more significant form later in the narrative as Wait clearly draws close to his 
death. After Captain Allistoun curbs Wait’s influence by exposing his subterfuge and confining 
him to his bunk, Wait’s control over the crew begins to wane, making him simply the object of 
their sympathetic visits and warm interest, and the permanent subject of their discussions. He, 
however, continues to display a “superb impudence” (87) with which he scolds his shipmates for 
being cowardly in not standing up for him against the captain. At this point, even though the men 
know better, they indulge him just so they can “keep him alive till home—to the end of the voyage” 
(87). However, while everyone tries to cheer Wait in the hope of preserving him, the reader learns 
that: 
Singleton as usual held aloof, appearing to scorn the insignificant events of an 
ended life. Once only he came along, and unexpectedly stopped in the doorway. He 
peered at Jimmy in profound silence, as if desirous to add that black image to the 
crowd of Shades that peopled his old memory. We kept very quiet, and for a long 
time Singleton stood there as though he had come by appointment to call for some 
one, or to see some important event. James Wait lay perfectly still, and apparently 
not aware of the gaze scrutinising him with a steadiness full of expectation. There 
was a sense of a contest in the air. We felt the inward strain of men watching a 
wrestling bout. At last Jimmy with perceptible apprehension turned his head on the 
pillow.—“Good evening,” he said in a conciliating tone.—“H’m,” answered the 
old seaman, grumpily. For a moment longer he looked at Jimmy with severe fixity, 
then suddenly went away. It was a long time before any one spoke in the little cabin, 
though we all breathed more freely as men do after an escape from some dangerous 
situation. (Narcissus 87). 
Set in the mood of a subliminal confrontation, this encounter between Singleton and Wait is rightly 
described as bearing the ‘sense of a contest’. From the narrator’s account of it, we realise that the 
struggle between the two is so intense and the atmosphere so charged that the rest of the crew, 
unwittingly caught as spectators, feel ‘the inward strain of men watching a wrestling bout’. From 
the indication that prior to this unexpected stop at the door of Wait’s cabin, Singleton ‘held aloof’ 
in ‘scorn’, it is evident that the tension that characterises this contest was already simmering only 
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to climax at the point of the subconscious impact of Singleton’s ‘scrutinising gaze’ upon Wait. 
The intensity of this impact is captured through the use of terms such as ‘peer’ to refer to 
Singleton’s gaze; and ‘profound silence’ and ‘steadiness’ to indicate the resolute and deliberate 
manner in which he carries out this action. Besides, the stunning effect it has on the onlookers who 
remain ‘very quiet’ and on Wait who remains ‘perfectly still’ is further proof of the high-strung 
impact of Singleton’s confrontation. We know it to be confrontational and not just observational 
from the impression we get that Wait, in a display of the cowardice he has just accused his 
shipmates of, tries to avoid facing up to Singleton. This impression is given to the reader when the 
narrator first states that Wait is ‘apparently not aware’ of Singleton’s gaze, but then later reveals 
that ‘at last’ he turns his head ‘with perceptible apprehension’. From this, it appears that, in his 
deceptive nature, he only pretends not to be aware of Singleton’s challenge only for him to finally 
meet the challenge with obvious anxiety. From this expression of anxiety, the reader may interpret 
Wait’s effort to placate Singleton by greeting him ‘in a conciliating tone’ as a sign of defeat, 
whereas it becomes evident from Singleton’s refusal to be mollified and his persistent austere 
nature that he has subdued his opponent at last. As Singleton leaves the scene, the suspense that 
hung over the whole crew is lifted and a sense of relief slowly falls upon the men who can now 
breathe ‘more freely as men do after an escape from some dangerous situation’. That the release 
of tension should be described as a relief experienced due to the escape from danger, is quite 
significant. This is because as part of the account of this contest between Singleton and Wait, the 
narrator explains that everyone knew Singleton’s ideas about Wait which could notably be 
summed up in the theory that “Jimmy was the cause for head winds” as “[m]ortally sick men… 
linger till the first sight of land, and then die; and Jimmy knew that the very first land would draw 
his life from him” (87). Being the oldest seaman among the crew and grounding his hypothesis on 
the claim to his long experience at sea with an emphatic, “It is so on every ship” (87), Singleton’s 
notion harbours the suggestion that, to keep from dying, Wait, in a deliberate force of will, holds 
a supernatural sway over the ship and even over the natural elements surrounding the ship so as to 
prevent the Narcissus from coming in sight of land. Even though the rest of the crew are hesitant 
to fully admit Singleton’s claims, they are also unable to dispute them based on the evidence of 
extremely bad and capricious weather they keep experiencing and also on the fact that, despite 
their diligent efforts, the ship keeps tossing about aimlessly “distracted, like a timid creature at the 
foot of a wall” (88). Following from the idea of Singleton’s theory and from the actual experience 
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of the Narcissus at sea, this metaphor that casts the ship as a timid creature, also implies Wait as 
the wall that prevents the ship from moving in the desired direction. Once again, in a pun on his 
name, Wait seems to be able to make even the ship and the natural elements wait on him, while he 
tries to hold on to life. Thus, to extend the metaphor, we may interpret Singleton’s silent contest 
with Wait as a breaking down of that wall in order to make way for the ship. Additionally, the 
relief felt by the men may be read as a relief experienced from escaping the ‘dangerous situation’ 
of risking being crushed by the falling wall. Meanwhile, these men continue to pay sympathetic 
visits to Wait while longing “for a sign of hope, for a sign of fair wind” (88) to sail them home and 
in their vain expectation it seems as though the “universe [has] conspired with James Wait” (88). 
The final element that breaks Wait’s spell by causing his death is Donkin, who, desperate to steal 
Wait’s money, taunts him to death by “the venom of his thoughts” and “his hate” (88). Thus, if 
Wait’s contest with Singleton marked a disempowering encounter in which Wait’s supernatural 
hold over the ship is broken, then, the role that Donkin plays in his eventual death can once again 
be marked as that of a catalyst that precipitates his demise. 
In a remarkable twist of events, when Wait dies, the weather does indeed clear up, granting 
the ship safe passage for the rest of the journey, and a swift sail home. Thus, the portrayal of Wait’s 
life and death as having some supernatural significance in the narrative cannot be ignored. So 
profoundly is this notion incorporated and romanticised in the text that it is not left to implication 
but is explicitly suggested by the narrator. As Wait nears his death, the narrator observes: 
He was so utterly wrong about himself that one could not but suspect him of having 
access to some source of supernatural knowledge. He was absurd to the point of 
inspiration. He was unique, and as fascinating as only something inhuman could 
be; he seemed to shout his denials already from beyond the awful border. He was 
becoming immaterial like an apparition; his cheekbones rose, the forehead slanted 
more; the face was all hollows, patches of shade; and the fleshless head resembled 
a disinterred black skull, fitted with two restless globes of silver in the sockets of 
eyes. He was demoralising. (Narcissus 85). 
In this depiction of Wait at the verge of death, he is represented as not even belonging any longer 
to the race of humans: he is Other-than-human. In fact, so obvious is his Otherness beyond the 
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human that it causes the narrator to state that he was ‘unique, and as fascinating as only something 
inhuman could be’. In this uniqueness that evokes the inhuman, he is imagined as having already 
transcended the sphere of the living through the notion of him as being already ‘beyond the awful 
border’. This being ‘beyond’ suggests a crossing of boundaries, a transgressivity, that produces a 
duality in his existence: of being simultaneously present in two otherwise opposite spheres. While 
he obstinately holds on to ‘his denials’ regarding his imminent death, his present appearance 
signifies the inexorable reality indicated in the evidence of him ‘becoming immaterial like an 
apparition’. Since the notion of an apparition implies a presence ominously marked by an 
antecedent absence signalled by death, the description of Wait through such a comparison already 
draws on the prognostication of his absence through death to exclude him from a corporeal 
presence which is gradually disembodied into immaterial form. This disembodiment extends the 
symbolic representation of the character as Other-than-human beyond the immateriality of an 
apparition as the description of Wait escalates into gothic proportions. The portrayal of his face as 
‘all hollows’ and ‘patches of shade’, and the depiction of his ‘fleshless head’ as resembling ‘a 
disinterred black skull, fitted with two restless globes of silver in the sockets of eyes’, create an 
effect that is not only ‘demoralising’ for his shipmates, but that also instils in them a sense of 
apprehensiveness about Wait’s death, causing them, in the face of his obstinacy, to ‘suspect him 
of having access to some source of supernatural knowledge’ 
 In the end, even while Wait yet refuses to accept the fact of its approach, he helplessly 
succumbs to the death that he had much earlier and all along exulted in. The battle of wills that 
breaks his supernatural hold over the ship also seems to have culminated in a loss of control over 
his own life, resulting for him in a double loss: the inability to assert any more control over the 
ship, and the loss of his life. For all his denial, it is only at the very last moment that he is shocked 
to the reality of his fate by Donkin who reviles him with his approaching death, stating that once 
he dies he will be tossed into the ocean, “Feet fust, through a port … Splash! Never see yer any 
more. Overboard!” (94). At this, and as he starts to feel worse, he sobs “with an incredibly strong 
and heart-breaking voice…: ‘Overboard! … I! … My God!’” (95). In this mixed expression of 
dread, sorrow and disbelief, Wait finally evokes the sympathy, albeit deferred, of the reader. This 
effect of Wait’s death is projected onto us through the narrator, whose use of the term ‘heart-
breaking’ insinuates a rather delayed empathy for Wait. While in his use of this term the narrator 
identifies with the fallible humanity of the character, who elevated himself above his shipmates in 
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his narcissistic nature, the reader cannot help but also notice that the narrator’s sentimentalism is 
expressed at this latter part of the narrative when the character has already been established as the 
dreaded Other whose symbolic exclusion through separation and confinement guarantees the 
preservation of the Self. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
SI(GH)TING THE OTHER: SPACE AND TIME IN LORD JIM 
Conrad’s novel Lord Jim is arguably the most complex of all his writing. Divided into two parts, 
it explores the meaning and the motives behind the actions of both the main character, Jim, and 
the narrator, Marlow. In its enquiry of intention, it problematises the notion of what it means “to 
be” as well as what it means to be a “gentleman” in the strange, and perhaps alien, circumstances 
in which Jim finds himself (Sewlall 147). 
In this chapter I examine the notion of alterity in Conrad’s Lord Jim from the perspective 
of how space and time contribute to the construction of alterity. For this analysis, I focus on Jim, 
the eponymous character, as the Other. My argument evolves from the premise that right from the 
onset of the narrative Conrad, through Marlow, postures Jim as an Other; and that, throughout the 
rest of the story, his narration of events and how these correspond in time and place to other events, 
and also his description of places all culminate to validate Jim’s alterity. Conrad achieves this by 
parading Jim as an exhibit under the critical gaze of his listeners/ readers, and situating him 
spatially and temporally in a liminal site between reality and imagination. Drawing substantially 
on Edward Soja’s concept of Thirdspace (1996) and also on Homi Bhabha’s (1994) 
conceptualisation of hybridity and the third space in postcolonial discourse, I propose that Jim can 
most fruitfully be discussed in terms of a “third-as-other” from three main perspectives: that of 
seeing, through which I will explore the moment he is seen, the way he is seen and his way of 
seeing others; that of contact, by which I mean his encounter with and avoidance of others; and 
that of location which allows me to examine the various settings in which he is placed, and also to 
focus on his erratic self-imposed banishment away from a certain imagined centre. Accordingly, I 
will stage my argument under three sub-headings, namely ‘Thirdsight and the Other,’ ‘Othering 
Encounters,’ and ‘Mapping the Other.’ 
In my first section, ‘Thirdsight and the Other,’ I coin the term ‘thirdsight’ to probe the 
connections between visualisation and thirding-as-othering. Thirdsight refers to a way of seeing 
things in both real and imagined ways which impact on our judgment of situations and people. In 
formulating this concept, I am drawing on the notion of the ‘third’ in thirdspace as “the […] most 
important step in transforming the categorical and closed logic of either/ or to the dialectically 
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open logic of both/and also…” (Soja, 60). Thus, I will explore ‘thirdsight’ as the visual instances, 
and possibilities of real and imagined events in the narrative that contribute to Jim’s Othering. 
In my second section, ‘Othering Encounters,’ I look at various encounters related to Jim 
which consolidate his characterisation as an Other. Here, I examine Jim’s own encounter with 
other people like Marlow and his fellow crew officers on the Patna; but I also examine encounters 
between other people (like that between Marlow and Stein), all of which invariably expose Jim as 
an Other. I equally explore Jim’s avoidance of contact with others as a consequence of his 
Otherness. 
In the third section of this chapter, subtitled ‘Mapping the Other,’ I map out Jim’s spatial 
and temporal locations, discussing how these settings serve to portray him as an Other. I also 
explore connections between Jim and other characters, such as George, his shipmate on the Patna, 
and Cornelius, his commercial rival in Patusan, showing how their spatiotemporal situations reflect 
on Jim and suggest his Otherness. Additionally, Jim’s exile and flight from himself and from others 
is explored in this section. 
Jim’s story, as narrated by Marlow, is structurally divided into two main parts and it is 
possible to discern a certain amount of theatricality in each as both parts present us with a dramatic 
staging of events. The major events in the first part revolve around the botched journey of the 
Patna, the ship on which Jim assumes his first command as chief mate and which he and his other 
shipmates abandon on the suspicion of a possible imminent wreckage, leaving about eight hundred 
pilgrims on board to an ominous fate. The second part centres on events that take place in Patusan, 
the fictional Asian region to which Jim retreats in self-imposed exile, where his ideas about himself 
take firmer shape, and where also he dies. 
 
THIRDSIGHT AND THE OTHER 
To begin my discussion in this section, I demonstrate how Marlow’s encounter with Jim constitutes 
an Othering experience by equating Othering to thirding through the narrator’s sustained indication 
that Jim consistently occupies an in-between category that impacts on his identity. Thus, in 
addition to my reliance on Soja for the exploration of the concept of thirding in relation to this 
novel, I also draw on Homi Bhabha’s (1994) notions of hybridity and third space to examine the 
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consolidation of Jim as an Other. More specifically, I read Marlow’s narration of the events 
surrounding Jim from the vantage point of Soja’s argument that “[t]hirding recomposes the 
dialectic through an intrusive disruption that explicitly spatializes dialectical reasoning” (Soja, 
1996: 85). From this perspective I argue that, through his tenacious ‘thirding’ representation of 
Jim, Marlow persistently transforms the concrete facts of his narrative into abstract notions through 
which his listeners/ -readers might evaluate Jim. Besides, his uncompromising decision to depict 
Jim as an Other right from the start, imposes on the reader the fixed assumption of Jim’s Otherness 
which only increases in form as he is transformed from corporeal human subject to evanescent 
phantasmic matter. This Othering of Jim depicts him as constantly located within a liminal space 
between reality and imagination which produces in him a fluidity of identity marked by an 
ambivalent subjectivity. This ambivalent subjectivity, resulting from Jim’s projection of his 
imaginary world onto the real, can be more fully understood when examined from the perspective 
of Bhabha’s analysis of Levinas’s notion of reality in parentheses. According to Bhabha, such a 
parenthetical perspective “effects an ‘externality of the inward’” which marks “the very 
enunciative position of the historical and narrative subject” who introduces “‘into the heart of 
subjectivity a radical and anarchical reference to the other which in fact constitutes the inwardness 
of the subject’” (22). In this assertion, Bhabha indicates the possibility of the subject developing 
an ambivalent identity as a result of being influenced and inevitably controlled by a suppressed 
and internalised Other. Evidently, in Conrad’s novel, Jim’s efforts at negotiating an identity 
(which, as informed by his imagination, can be nothing short of heroic) is impacted strongly by 
such an inwardness. This results in the fact that he is constantly positioned in a third space created 
through the projected externality of his fantasised world, which he imagines to be able to control, 
and to which he invariably escapes only to find it as penetrable, as elusive, and as defiant of control 
as the ‘real’ world from which he is fleeing. At first, this third space is depicted as a psychological 
construct of his imagination. But as the narrative unfolds, it progressively manifests as physical 
sites, and then eventually combines the imaginary and the physical to converge into the Utopian 
world of Patusan. It is in the initial psychological site of a third space that Marlow first encounters 
Jim; and, as this relationship develops, Marlow’s own experiences with and suggestions of Jim’s 
other ‘third sites’ provide the frame from which he evaluates his own as well as Jim’s actions, and 
tries to make his listeners/-readers do so too. 
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Marlow’s first encounter with Jim seems to have come about as the result of what he 
describes as a fated encounter since it appears that he “was doomed to be the recipient of 
confidences, and to be confronted with unanswerable questions” (LJ 197). Suggestive in this 
description of himself is the idea that he becomes privy to the psychological conflicts of people 
who confide in him. In his own assessment of this role that he plays as the listener of confessions, 
he discerns that by some malicious manoeuvring the devil “lets [him] in for that kind of thing” (LJ 
21): 
the kind of thing that by devious, unexpected, truly diabolical ways causes me to 
run up against men with soft spots, with hard spots, with hidden plague spots, by 
Jove! And loosens their tongues at the sight of me for their infernal confidences. 
[…] And what I have done to be thus favoured I want to know. (LJ 21). 
In light of this role as “a receptacle of confessions” of doomed men, Marlow’s own confidences 
to his listeners and to us, Conrad’s readers, are called into question, for his narration implies the 
betrayal of the trust placed in him, thus giving one a suspicion that his rather subjective perspective 
may not be entirely trustworthy due to his readiness to disclose the confessions shared with him. 
In this regard, the conscientious reader cannot help but wonder about Marlow’s own ‘soft spots’, 
‘hard spots’ or ‘hidden plague spots’ that, at the sight of eager listeners, render his own tongue 
loose about the ‘infernal confidences’ of other men. In effect, even though we have little choice 
but to rely heavily on Marlow’s narrative perspective and the portrayal of characters that that 
perspective offers, the subtle hint of his unreliability also prompts us to assess his narrative from 
the possibility of other perspectives, which may still be nonetheless inevitably tainted by what J. 
H. Stape refers to as Marlow’s “highly individualized” frame narrative (Stape 67). In an elaborate 
analysis of the function of the frame narrative in Conrad’s text, Stape makes the elegant 
observation that this technique “supports the formal elegiac romance, the recollection and 
judgement in retrospect of one man by another” (68). He demonstrates how this is achieved 
through the “the counterpointing of the voices of innocence and experience” (69) represented in 
the “senex-puer (old man/ young man) relationship […] with its opposition of youthful ardour and 
sagacious distance” (69). In relation to this, I posit that this opposition of youth and sagacity, 
innocence and experience is not only depicted through the relationship between Marlow and Jim, 
but also through the subtle distinctions between the older and the younger Marlow as between the 
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earlier and the later Jim, distantiated through time. Drawing further on the notion of Marlow’s 
story as a frame narrative, I point out that, through this narrative technique, we are presented with 
the surface story of Jim in search of himself (specifically his fictional heroic self). But we also 
detect the subtle subtext of Marlow’s own confrontation with his Other in an encounter that shakes 
the core of his belief system as it dramatizes what Stape refers to as “the contrast between a man 
from the ranks with his fixed standard of conduct and the man whose ‘soft spot’ […] unfixes such 
an ardent belief” (69). While the use of this technique of framing might provide a narrative distance 
that helps to make Marlow’s story about Jim more plausible, it also betrays Marlow as unreliable 
because although his narrative is ostensibly about Jim, it is primarily self-serving as he uses it as 
a means by which he comes to terms with the illusions of his own standards and beliefs. The 
evidence that Marlow’s telling is indeed self-referential and aimed at an assessment of his own 
identity and values exists in the fact that, in the narrative, he is present in two distinct forms. There 
is, first, the younger Marlow, who experienced the events being recounted, had interacted 
personally with Jim, and was even instrumental in Jim’s withdrawal from active seafaring as it 
was he who persistently offered him meaningful alternatives to a life of service at sea. Then, there 
is the older Marlow, the narrator, who tells this story in retrospect, appealing to our sense of 
judgement and drawing on the retrospection of his encounter with his Other to assure himself of 
his own identity. But his very appeal to our sense of judgement, however, indirectly invites us to 
subject him, the narrator, to critical scrutiny and, perhaps, to see him as a betrayer of the confidence 
placed in him by Jim. As a result, we become wary of fully giving him our own confidences; and 
we are drawn to assess his own motives in relation to his presentation and evaluation of Jim’s 
actions and motives as we transpose his narrative of self-assertion and self-identification onto that 
of Jim’s search for self. In effect, the frame narrative technique, contributing to rendering us more 
critical in our assessment of Marlow’s narrative, makes us remain ambivalent in our reception of 
his story. This is because it simultaneously implicates him in, while it also salvages him from the 
suspicion of total untrustworthiness because his retrospective retelling temporally juxtaposes his 
earlier judgement of the actual events against his later meticulous assessment of his own actions 
as of Jim’s on the basis of a presumed social code of ethics and seemly practice.  
Such a code of ethics, indicating an accepted standard, is invariably what Jim aims to 
conform to, and which he so pathetically falls just short of every time. In the novel, Conrad 
ingeniously captures this notion of falling short of a standard in the metaphor of a jump, which, 
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always miscalculated, is taken at the wrong time, or is not taken at all when it must be, or is 
altogether botched. The first instance of such a shortfall is depicted right at the beginning of the 
narrative when, on a training ship at sea, Jim fails to respond quickly enough to an emergency. As 
Jakob Lothe observes, this incident proleptically indicates “his major weaknesses” later in the 
narrative (Lothe 171), and Marlow projects these weaknesses as strong indicators of Jim’s 
Otherness. By projecting Jim as the ‘weak’ Other who falls short of the standard, Marlow assumes 
the stance that he and his listeners unanimously accept, approve and even represent such a set of 
standards. In fact, he explicitly states that much when, in trying to justify his curiosity to find out 
more about the shameful Patna affair, he hints that he is driven by the simple fact of being “a 
member of an obscure body of men held together by a community of inglorious toil and by fidelity 
to a certain standard of conduct” (31). With this justification on the grounds of upholding a certain 
general code of ethics, Marlow’s listeners/ -readers are coerced into identifying with his ethical 
stance and they become invariably a part of his imagined community constructed on and bound by 
a ‘standard of conduct’. When his identification of himself as a seaman bearing the responsibility 
of upholding the “honour of the craft” (28) drives him to witness the court case concerning the 
Patna at which he first observes (and then later meets) Jim, it is his persistent assumption of their 
common fraternity bound by a mutual charter, albeit unspoken but understood, that prompts 
Marlow to consistently refer to Jim as “one of us” (2). Although this refrain is not unique to Lord 
Jim, it is more frequently intoned, and more doubtfully so, in this narrative than in other novels 
such as An Outcast of the Islands or The Nigger of the Narcissus both of which share the theme of 
the consequences of egotistically elevating oneself above others. In fact, whereas, in these other 
texts, the use of the phrase largely adduces a sense of belonging, in Lord Jim it more profoundly 
denotes an ideal of standards, an ethics of conduct expected of “all akin with the brotherhood of 
the sea” (The Nigger of the Narcissus, 45). According to Rachel Hollander, however, this 
“foundation is challenged […] especially by encounters with the […] other, [hence] the ideal 
provides a starting place for evaluating the ethical and political dilemmas of [the novel]” 
(Hollander 2). Corroborating Hollander’s argument that the moral ideal is undermined by 
encounters with alterity, I assert that it is through such an encounter with his Other that Marlow is 
led to doubt “the sovereign power enthroned in a fixed standard of conduct” (31). It is also through 
such an encounter that he constantly questions his own actions, albeit inexplicable even to himself, 
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which result from his assumption of responsibility for saving Jim from his moral failings or helping 
him to overcome them (LJ 106; 111). 
Thus, in this text, as in most of his other fictional works, Conrad’s construction of a 
universe anchored on a collective belief of what constitutes a moral code for life is systematically 
undercut by growing doubt. In Lord Jim, this philosophical discourse on the assumption of an 
incontrovertible universal morality binding humanity is conducted on two levels, viz land and sea. 
While the notion of land in contrast to that of sea would imply a sense of concreteness or certitude, 
as opposed to the sense of abstraction, fluidity and uncertainty that the sea connotes, Jim’s travails, 
on land as at sea, reveal the precariousness of constructing an identity on conventional 
philosophical ideals. Conrad’s subtle conflation of these levels of concreteness and abstraction, by 
demonstrating that Jim’s experiences on both land and sea culminate in a pursuit of illusion, reveals 
that on a deep level of analysis one would realise that conventional philosophical idealism, 
marking a universal human need to uphold morality, is itself a form of “idyllic imagination” – a 
disillusion. In relation to this, George Panichas suggests that Jim is a slave to such an imagination 
and that as his identity evolves he “comes to discern not only the pitfalls of this imagination but 
also the need to free himself from its bondage” (Panichas 15). While I agree with Panichas’ 
proposition of Jim’s enslavement to his illusions, I, however, contend that he is hardly aware that 
his pitfalls are the result of these illusions nor does he realise the importance of distinguishing 
between reality and imagination. In fact, quite contrary to the claim that he “comes to discern” his 
condition, Jim, as the plot develops, progressively withdraws from reality to live out a purely 
utopic existence that merges with his idealistic self. Thus, when this dream-like existence is 
disrupted by the intrusion of the pirate Gentleman Brown, a series of conflicts leading to Jim’s 
death is set in motion. In the end, the final shot that marks his death may be seen as an implosion 
through which Jim is permanently sucked into his imagination that remains an “inscrutable […] 
and excessively romantic” (253) existence governed by some fantastic “ideal of conduct” (253). 
Following from Marlow’s narrative, it is revealed that much of Jim’s failure can be 
summed up as cowardice, and the lack of courage or quick-wittedness to act under pressure or in 
the face of calamity. This moral weakness constitutes a serious flaw for “men of his calling” (LJ 
8). Jim, however, fails to admit this either to Marlow or even to himself. Yet, the fact of his 
shortcomings depicts Jim as “an Everyman in the sense that what happens to him could happen to 
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anyone, including [even] Marlow” (Rueben Sanchez 68). This view is primarily based on the 
argument that Marlow’s reflections lead him to conclude that “there are two sides to man – a side 
visible to others in society, and a darker, submerged side, to which no one else […] will admit” 
(Sanchez 9). While Sanchez sees this as an evocation of “the dichotomy between good and evil 
within man” (9), his argument begs the question of whether Jim’s lack is indeed proof of a darker, 
evil side that is opposed to a good, ideal character or whether it simply proves that Everyman exists 
both as a Self and as an Other, as an ego and an alter-ego, where the former simultaneously strives 
to make the latter achieve the ego-ideal even while it attempts to suppress the alter-ego, attributing 
to it any shortcomings of the ego. In his introduction to Orientalism, Edward Said describes this 
mechanism on the larger scale of Europe’s relation to its Oriental Other when he states that 
“European culture gained in strength and identity by setting itself off against the Orient as a sort 
of surrogate and even underground self” (Said, 3). However, in this dichotomous existence 
between the Self and its Other, there is an undeniable third space that subverts the binary 
relationship between the two, thus undoing the formalist notion of the double bind of a two-part 
term through the claim to a third. In Said’s assertion, such a thirdness is to an extent acknowledged. 
For the terms “surrogate” and “underground” imply that the West projects features of its own 
culture that it deems inadmissible or inferior onto a Western Other. Thus, already in Said, the Other 
is at least partly a projection of the Self. As a result of this claim to a third part within the link, the 
Other is never necessarily the opposite of the Self, nor is the Self ultimately superior to the Other; 
but the two are constantly contesting, questioning, evaluating each other while intermediating 
through the third, in a never-ending process of becoming. According to Bhabha, this third is the 
hybrid that:  
displays the necessary deformation and displacement of all sites of discrimination 
and domination. It unsettles the mimetic or narcissistic demands of […] power but 
reimplicates its identifications in strategies of subversion that turn the gaze of the 
discriminated back upon the eye of power. For the […] hybrid is the articulation of 
the ambivalent space where the rite of power is enacted on the site of desire, making 
its objects at once disciplinary and disseminatory – or, in my mixed metaphor, a 
negative transparency. (112). 
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Thus, from Bhabha’s notion of the third as a hybrid as noted above, we are able to infer the 
emancipatory potential of this hybrid thirdspace from its ‘deformation and displacement of all sites 
of discrimination and domination.’ In deforming and displacing such sites, the third achieves two 
things. First, through its action of wedging a thirdspace within the binary polarity of either-or, it 
effects a deconstruction, or better still a dismantling of an established binary system in which one 
term is the lesser and inferior of the other. Thus, it overturns the inveterate expediency to ranking 
that results from binarism. Second, upon its insertion within that in-between space wherein it 
produces the hybrid, the third causes a shifting of the dynamics of reactive force from the 
production of a one-way effect emanating from a superior unto a subordinate agent, thereby 
resulting in the reciprocity of such reactivity triangulated through the existence of that third. Thus, 
the third constitutes that ‘ambivalent space’ where, in an extension of Bhabha’s mixed metaphor, 
it not only constitutes a negative transparency but also becomes the site of reflection from which 
the subject/object simultaneously identifies itself and reflects upon itself. In effect, the Self is at 
once Other and the Other, Self as through the hybrid it becomes equally possible for a rite of desire 
to be enacted on a site of power, capturing its objects in an antithetical multiplicity in which they 
are neither one thing nor the other, at once claiming and repudiating the right to belong to any 
group or place.  
It is in such an ambivalent and hybrid third space that Jim is located; and from which he 
persistently subverts Marlow’s inclusion of him among seamen who honoured the “solidarity of 
the craft” (80). It is also from this third space that, during the court trial to judge his actions and 
invariably determine his fitness as a seaman, Jim’s rite of desire for heroism is enacted on Captain 
Brierly whose lofty self-regard and disdain for all others epitomises him as the site of power for 
the determination and preservation of what he calls “professional decency” (42). As one of two 
nautical assessors leading the inquiry into the “criminal weakness” (26) displayed by Jim’s 
abandonment, along with his other shipmates, of an ostensibly sinking ship and its passengers, 
Brierly is confronted at once with Jim’s courage to submit himself to the inquiry and with his 
cowardice which forms the substance of the inquiry. This confrontation arouses within Brierly a 
personal conflict between what he considers courageous and what for him constitutes cowardice. 
While, in conversation with Marlow, he questions these attributes as they are revealed to him 
through Jim, Brierly is also unable to come to terms with any claim to courage made on the strength 
of Jim’s readiness to face trial for his ineptitude.  
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This psychological conflict to distinguish between courage and cowardice points to the fact 
that thirdness also marks a moral category between the binary terms that undercuts the possibility 
of neatly defining Jim’s failure. Jim alludes to this ambivalence himself when in his confession to 
Marlow he intimates that, faced with the challenge to quickly decide what to do at the critical point 
of the Patna crisis, he was “not sure” and felt “so lost” (79). In that indecisive state of uncertainty, 
he simply follows the actions of his fellow crew members who, acting on their conviction that the 
ship will sink, decide to jump out and save themselves. In his introspective disclosure to Marlow, 
Jim asserts that the belief that fuelled their decision to abandon the ship “was something like the 
wretched story they made up” later to explain their action (79). He, however, makes the 
retrospective observation that their action can hardly be justified as the idea that motivated it “was 
not a lie—but it wasn’t truth all the same” (79). In this observation, the ambivalence of that notion 
that is neither a lie nor the truth is further emphasised by the clash of morality that it draws attention 
to as Jim declares: “There was not the thickness of a sheet of paper between the right and the wrong 
of this affair” (79). 
In the narrative, such a conflict of morality forms a key thematic element that is explored 
from diverse perspectives, including the authoritative view of Brierly, the initially self-assured and 
later disconcerted view of Marlow, and even the philosophical and anthropological views of 
Marlow’s friend Stein, and of the French Lieutenant who happened to be on a French gunboat that 
later rescued the abandoned Patna. Plagued with this thematic concern in their discussion about 
Jim’s trial, Marlow suggests to Brierly that “[t]here is a kind of courage in [Jim] facing it out as 
he does, knowing very well that if he went away nobody would trouble to run after him” (41). To 
this, Brierly contemptuously responds: “Courage be hanged! […] That sort of courage is of no use 
to keep a man straight, and I don’t care a snap for such courage. If you were to say it was a kind 
of cowardice now – of softness” (41). This exchange dramatizes the difficulty of describing what 
Jim’s attitude represents exactly, and while Brierly remains adamant to accept the suggestion that 
it is in any way courageous, his use of the word ‘softness’ mollifies his initial entrenched notion 
that it is a display of cowardice. Plagued by such an inability to categorically place Jim, when 
Marlow counters that, in relation to the trial, the cowardice of Jim and his shipmates “did not seem 
to him a matter of such great importance,” Brierly retorts: “And you call yourself a seaman, I 
suppose” (41). In this rebuttal of Marlow’s opinion, Brierly returns to his hard-line notions that 
leave no room for subtleties and thematically ties the responsibility of evaluating cowardice as 
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ethically abhorrent to the worth of their profession. He also implies that such moral judgement is 
the standard for determining good seamanship or maintaining the ‘professional decency’ of the 
trade. In line with this notion, he instinctively executes judgement not only over Jim but also over 
the whole community of seamen as he declares: “The worst of it […] is that all you fellows have 
no sense of dignity; you don’t think enough of what you are supposed to be” (42). That this moral 
dispute between Marlow and Brierly should be presented in the sequence of the narrative right 
after Marlow’s visit to the hospitalised engineer of the Patna whose moral deficiency seems to 
have reduced him to madness is significant. This is because it thematically adumbrates Conrad’s 
embedded existential concern expressed through Stein’s evocation of Shakespeare’s Hamlet: 
“That is the question […] How to be! Ach! How to be!” (129). Additionally, the occurrence of this 
debate within a temporal parallel to Jim’s trial again adumbrates the character’s ontological crisis 
which results in his constant effort to strive towards that idea, expressed by Brierly, of ‘what [he] 
is supposed to be’. Lastly, that this debate on morality should occur shortly before Brierly’s act of 
suicide (committed soon after Jim’s trial), portends the danger of holding on to rigid moral 
standards that leave little room for human error. Analysing this stylistic mechanism of juxtaposing 
such scenes that emphasise moral concerns, Ian Watt indicates that: 
[it] calls upon us to mediate between two antithetical moral analogies: the engineer 
[who] has shown that the most unscrupulous reprobate may not be able to stand up 
to the unconscious idea of his guilt; [and] Brierly [who] has shown that the most 
beribboned pillar of society may not be able to stand up to the shameful idea of his 
fear. (Watt 280-281). 
Referring to this technique as a case of thematic apposition, Watt observes that these two characters 
represent two extremes of morality that thematically frame the narrative: moral depravity depicted 
by the engineer, and moral conceit depicted by Brierly. To extend Watt’s argument, I assert that 
the thematic association between the deranged engineer and Brierly’s suicide proleptically signal 
the eventual ominous outcome of Jim’s tendency to dwell on what, in his own imagination and 
according to societal expectation, he is supposed to be. The fatal demise of both the engineer and 
Brierly demonstrate the result of thoroughly embracing either extremity of morality. Yet, the fact 
that Jim occupies an indeterminate moral thirdspace does not absolve him from a similar fate, for 
it is much less the ethical stance itself than the sell-out of ethical reason to live up to rigid social 
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and personal standards that culminate in self-destruction. Therefore, when Jim, in his egoistic 
ambition to achieve his fictionalised heroic standards of honour, once again ‘jumps ship’, deserting 
those who depend on him by giving himself up to be killed in Patusan, he suffers the same fate as 
the engineer and Brierly – that is death through moral suicide in the one instance and physical 
suicide in the other. The difference with Jim’s death is that it is his desire to make atonement for 
his moral failure, to live up to a certain standard of morality, and his inadvertent failure to sustain 
his moral fantasies, (when he thinks he has finally achieved them in Patusan), that results in his 
suicide which takes the form of him voluntarily surrendering himself to be killed by Doramin. 
 
OTHERING ENCOUNTERS 
Just as in the case of the engineer and that of Brierly, the excessive dearth or demonstration of 
morality is largely self-serving, it becomes evident also that Jim’s moral thirdness is primarily 
egocentric. In this regard, Marlow observes that when Jim jumps from the sinking Patna leaving 
the eight hundred pilgrims on board to a perilous fate, what his action actually displays is a “breach 
of faith with the community of mankind” (95). In effect, he, like the two moral extremists, becomes 
morally ostracised from humanity. Thus, Marlow’s efforts to help him are aimed at saving him 
from such ostracism, and his narrative demonstrates a sustained effort to assert Jim’s affinity with 
humanity rather than with valour. Jim, however, persistently strives for honour over social 
integration. Or, more precisely, he deems the achievement of honour as the key to obtaining social 
integration by becoming respected and thereby accepted. His achievements and esteem in Patusan 
testify to such a philosophy. So, at the beginning of the narrative, Jim’s jump from the Patna, 
appears to be an unconscious bid to save himself so he may yet have the opportunity, which he 
had not yet had, to live up to his heroic ideal. However, when, in the end, he gives himself up to 
be killed by Doramin, this act appears to be the crowning touch that seals his accomplishments in 
Patusan, marking also the end of the peace and order he had established there. Besides, as he has 
already been referenced in several instances throughout the narrative as bearing a certain aspect of 
liminal thirdness, in his demise he gains in this liminality by embodying the spectral Otherness of 
his imagined self. 
In effect, Jim’s failure to determinately fit into a neat moral categorisation is unhinging at 
all levels of social integration, both for him personally as well as for people who come into contact 
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with him. On a personal level this ambivalence makes him unable to identify with others. For, as 
I will discuss later, his heroic fantasies, often make him rate himself above others despite his 
impetuous nature. This invariably accentuates his liminality within the social spaces he finds 
himself in, resulting in the ambivalence of being neither fully included in nor completely excluded 
from such spaces. Besides, as the narrative reveals, his contact with others often plunges those 
others into ethical battles with themselves resulting in uncertainties about their long-held 
convictions. It is in this manner that he destabilises Brierly who, from his position of judgement 
and his pompous concern to uphold professional decency, sees Jim’s failure as “a disgrace” (42) 
that affects every one of them, including, and perhaps especially, himself. This is confirmed by 
Marlow’s retrospective summation of his interaction with him when he states that “at bottom poor 
Brierly must have been thinking of himself” (41). For in his declaration that he had been “caught” 
for the inquiry (40) which he considered “the stupidest set-out you can imagine” (41), he states 
that, during the hearing, he felt “like a fool all the time” (41), and that “[s]uch an affair destroys 
one’s confidence” (42). By such an intimation, Brierly, in actual fact, declares his shame to be in 
any way involved in or tinged by Jim’s affair. In his narration, Marlow observes that after this 
exchange with Brierly he becomes convinced that “the inquiry was a severe punishment to that 
Jim, and that his facing it – practically of his own free will – was a redeeming feature in his 
abominable case” (42). What he leaves unsaid, however, is the suggestion that this enactment of 
Jim’s redemption in the very face of Brierly’s condemnation of him results in an inversion in which 
Brierly, the self-righteous judge carries out upon himself the sentence that he passes on Jim, the 
abominable moral criminal. So, for Brierly, the inquiry is a severe embarrassment and his forced 
involvement in it becomes a condemning feature (contrasting with Jim’s ‘redeeming feature’) for 
his cocksure attitude as it tinges and destroys his self-assuredly successfully built career. Having 
suggested that Marlow advise Jim to abscond and avoid the trial; and learning from Marlow that 
Jim may not have the financial means to do so, he retorts: “Well, then, let him creep twenty feet 
underground and stay there! By heavens! I would! (41). One obvious interpretation of Brierly’s 
statement would be: ‘If I were Jim, I would hide my face in shame!’. And that is what he proposes 
that Jim does. However, a focus on the ‘underground’ metaphor that he employs makes this 
pronouncement sound like a sort of death sentence because of the imagery of burial that it evokes. 
Besides, the occurrence of the term ‘underground’ here links to my earlier evocation of Said’s use 
of the term where it bears decidedly psychoanalytic overtones of a surrogate, perhaps 
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imperceptible self, an Other that is ‘burrowed’ deep into the perceivable subject. The added effect 
that the connection of this metaphor to Jim produces is that it foreshadows the staging of varying 
forms of committal that occur throughout the narrative. I choose the term committal for its 
additional suggestion of putting a person away or out of sight. Michael Greaney’s exploration of 
embarrassment in this novel promotes this idea as he states that this is precisely what Brierly 
proposes in particular reference to Jim: he wants him “banished from sight” because he is “a 
colossal embarrassment to the European colonial establishment” (Greaney, 9). But, perhaps, that 
is more because Jim is unable to pretend about or cover up his moral dilemmas which he actually 
shows unabashedly. As a result, Brierly feels embarrassed by Jim’s indecisiveness which he 
considers morally culpable, and also by the fact that Jim does not fit neatly into the judges’ binary 
schemata, thus provoking Brierly’s own psychological conflict and frustration. In effect, even 
though Brierly thinks of himself as probably the most honourable of seamen within that region, by 
his association with Jim’s case, he feels tainted by Jim’s dishonourable act. Besides, while 
symbolically condemning Jim to a funerary-like disappearance, his emphatic “I would!” sets him 
up as the frame of reference for this morbid recommendation for Jim. In thus directly juxtaposing 
himself against Jim and standardizing Jim against himself, he sets the basis for a contestation of 
the inherent binary implied in what he considers an unwelcome association. 
It is worth noting that while Brierly scorns any connection to Jim because he feels morally 
tarnished by him, such a connection between the two of them extends spatiotemporally beyond the 
Asian port where he is compelled to literally sit in judgement of him. This indicates a sort of 
psychoanalytical bond between the two which adumbrates their eventual collision into each other. 
In this bond which again echoes Said’s implication of the Other as a partial projection of the Self, 
Jim may be seen as Brierly’s repressed Other, whose emancipatory act of willingly facing trial 
confronts Brierly with his worst fears of having to admit his connection to the dishonourable Jim, 
thereby sharing in his shame. Tracing this shameful connection back over place and time, he 
angrily declares:  
“Confound him! I wish he had never come out here. Fact is, I rather think some of 
my people know his. The old man’s a parson, and I remember now I met him once 
when staying with my cousin in Essex last year. If I am not mistaken, the old chap 
seemed rather to fancy his sailor son. Horrible” (42). 
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In this exasperated outburst, Brierly reveals that the connection with Jim does not only transcend 
their immediate geographical location, but it also extends beyond their individual selves and links 
their ‘people’. Besides, in the incident of having met Jim’s father, the old parson’s reference to his 
‘sailor son’ inadvertently links the two men through an allusion to their common profession. From 
the force of the final vituperation – “Horrible!” – that sums up his observation that ‘the old chap 
seemed rather to fancy’ his son, there appears to be a slight hint of incest or homosexuality that is 
subtly implied and which is reinforced by the equivocal remark – ‘If I am not mistaken’ – with 
which he introduces this opinion. This apposition of familiar interrelations concluded with a 
suggestive hint at some obscure deed reveals that Brierly finds all of this connection quite 
despicable. Besides, what this outlining of a geospatial connection reveals is that Jim takes on a 
hybrid nature in which he is at once himself but also a reminder to the captain of his Western roots 
and even, perhaps, of his younger self. Thus, Jim becomes a representative of the social, cultural 
and professional ethos that shape subjectivity and form the basis of the personal convictions that 
an individual lives by. In becoming associated with Brierly, at all these levels, Jim’s submission 
to the judicial inquiry possibly triggers a self-evaluation in Brierly who obviously comes to the 
shocking personal realisation that if he were in Jim’s place, he would rather run away, than stand 
trial for his shortcoming. Marlow’s provocative assertion of Jim’s courage in this respect arguably 
causes Brierly to feel all the more doubtful of his personal convictions, as his encounter with and 
judgement of Jim forces on him the experience of aporia. For on the one hand, he is unable to 
accept the possibility of any other form of courage than that which he prescribes; whereas on the 
other hand, his very recommendation that Jim run away suggests that he, Brierly, is himself a 
coward. Thus, in a twist of representation, Jim, from the paradoxical and hybrid status of a 
courageous coward, faces up to his trial ‘of his own free will’, while Brierly, secretly a coward at 
heart, is unable to turn down what may seem to be a position of honour that forces him to sit in 
judgement of Jim. Consequently, it becomes possible to build on Conrad’s aporia to suggest that 
while, as Marlow states, Jim’s courage to face his trial constitutes for him a ‘redeeming feature’, 
Brierly’s cowardice in not declining the proposition of standing judge over the ‘abominable case’ 
translates into a damning feature which likely culminates in his suicide. 
To Marlow who tries to save Jim, to “keep [him] straight” (LJ, 41) and to help him redeem 
his honour from the shameful dereliction of duty, by keeping a disciplinary eye, so to speak, on 
him, Jim’s hybridity is partly unveiled. This partial unveiling first occurs in the form of an obscure 
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image that does not present itself as a unified whole. Marlow states that shortly after his first 
personal encounter with Jim:  
The views he let me have of himself were like those glimpses through the shifting 
rents in a thick fog – bits of vivid and vanishing detail, giving no connected idea of 
the general aspect of a country. They fed one’s curiosity without satisfying it; they 
were no good for purposes of orientation. Upon the whole he was misleading. 
That’s how I summed him up to myself… (47). 
This description is in many ways a gradual build-up to the representation of Jim as symbolising 
the inscrutable nature of man, a symbolism which makes him inseparable from and unifies him 
with Nature in both form and essence. By thus merging Jim with an unfolding landscape and with 
Nature, Marlow stages an ethnographic analysis of him. In recounting these impressions of Jim at 
the end of this initial encounter, Marlow, by evoking the imagery of a thick fog, conjures up notions 
of obscurity and of restricted visibility which reinforce Conrad’s overall motif of inscrutability. 
Besides, the use of the term ‘shifting rents’ alludes to the violently wrenched strands of a drapery 
such as a curtain or a veil, while the ‘glimpses’ oscillating between ‘bits of vivid and vanishing 
detail’ indicate a frustration of overall clarity of impression through a visual engagement with the 
landscape. This obstruction of clarity is reflected in the assertion that, consequently, one obtains 
‘no connected idea of the general aspect of a country’. In this metaphorical comparison between 
Jim and a country, Marlow’s transformation of Jim from a human subject into a geospatial 
landscape mapped precariously upon the visual imagination of the reader/ listener echoes a 
Westphalien transgressivity upon the narrative topos. According to Bertrand Westphal, 
transgression constitutes a way “of seeing what unfolds beyond the threshold” (42), where the 
threshold itself represents both a restriction – a limes, and a challenge – a limen. As a limes, (a 
boundary line), it was “intended to make one stop”, whereas it simultaneously acted as a limen, (a 
porous border), “intended to be crossed” (42). In its paradoxical representation, the threshold acts 
both as a prohibition and an invitation, or, perhaps in stronger terms, a lure. Referring thus to 
Marlow’s depiction of Jim from this perspective, the reader is at once presented with a duality of 
perception which, foggy in presentation, prevents the attainment of a full or clear picture of the 
character while, assuming a Westphalien “closed and striated space” (Westphal, 42), 
simultaneously makes one eager to see more. This duality, echoed in the characterisation of Jim, 
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drafts the listeners/ readers into the ethnographer role that Marlow plays, as we become complicit 
in ‘reading’ (or seeing) Jim through the landscape upon which he has been spatially transposed. 
Additionally, the character himself is also impacted by such a duality as he constantly strives 
toward a self-realisation through a persistent will to flee from one site of refuge to another. His 
constant flight, resulting from a determination to prevent others from getting to know his past 
failure by associating him with the Patna affair, also marks a persistent movement beyond his own 
self-doubt of ever reaching his heroic ideal, thus reflecting Marlow’s optimistic musing: “And 
what if something unexpected and wonderful were to come of it?” (114). In line with such an 
optimistic view, it appears that for Jim, the probable ‘what ifs’ are what lures him in his persistent 
movement which is simultaneously aimed at achieving that ‘something unexpected and wonderful’ 
and at obscuring his past which together contribute to making him inscrutable. 
In A Personal Record, Conrad himself attests to his persistent use of this recurring motif 
of inscrutability in his writing. Drawing from his confessed profuse exploitation of this technique, 
it is evident that, in this novel, Jim is constantly captured as “a figure behind the veil; a suspected 
rather than a seen presence – a movement and a voice behind the draperies of fiction” (A Personal 
Record, 4). This insinuation of a suspected presence also suggests the possibility of an absence 
which the narrator seems to persistently implore us to repudiate so that we may perceive and accept 
Jim as existing beyond myth. However, as I locate Jim within the broader context of Conrad’s 
style, this notion of Jim as myth remains a compelling thought largely fuelled by hints at such 
motifs as ‘the veil’ and ‘the draperies’ which link to my analysis of Marlow’s reference to his 
perception of Jim as through ‘shifting rents’. Through his extensive use of these motifs of veiled 
and shifting sights in the narrative, Conrad succeeds in making Jim increasingly opaque to the 
point where we can only perceive him as a figment of our imagination. Consequently, this 
technique produces a double effacement of the character and results in making Jim appear steadily 
more fictionalised in this work of fiction. Hence, we observe that in his narration, Marlow deploys 
this fictionalising technique as he recounts the moment where Jim unburdens himself to him 
regarding the Patna affair. Describing the effect of Jim’s morbid revelation on him, Marlow states 
that the “mist of his feelings shifted between us, as if disturbed by his struggles, and in the rifts of 
the immaterial veil he would appear to my staring eyes distinct of form and pregnant with vague 
appeal like a symbolic figure in a picture” (81). Marlow’s description here depicts Jim as obscured 
in vagueness through the effects of the ‘mist’ and ‘the rifts of the immaterial veil’ conveyed 
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through Jim’s feelings. By indicating that he observed Jim with ‘staring eyes’, Marlow alludes to 
a strained effort to better perceive, and so better understand him. Despite such an effort, however, 
he remains uncertain about Jim whom he compares to a ‘symbolic figure in a picture’. This 
metaphorical reference to Jim freezes him in picture mode, reinforcing his portrayal as part of a 
creative piece of art – as fictionalised.  
This fictionalisation of Jim harks back to his hybrid nature of being both a real person and 
an abstract idea which Marlow consistently alludes to. It also recalls Bhabha’s mixed metaphor of 
a ‘negative transparency’ which invests Jim with the ability to be, at the same time, seen and not 
seen. This paradoxical quality characterising his existence and visibility renders Jim to some extent 
invisible. It additionally makes it possible for Marlow to associate him with different people and 
groups as he draws attention to Jim’s hybridity, which he also acknowledges. Thus, while he 
asserts, or perhaps hopes, that Jim is “[his] very young brother” (136), Marlow also states that he 
belongs to the unsavoury and derelict masses who represent a darkness from which he must be 
rescued. In his half-hearted admission of a shared fraternity with Jim, Marlow observes: 
It struck me that it is from such as he that the great army of waifs and strays is 
recruited, the army that marches down, down into all the gutters of the earth. As 
soon as he left my room, that “bit of shelter,” he would take his place in the ranks, 
and begin the journey towards the bottomless pit. […] It is when we try to grapple 
with another man’s intimate need that we perceive how incomprehensible, 
wavering, and misty are the beings that share with us the sight of the stars and 
warmth of the sun. […] It was the fear of losing him that kept me silent, for it was 
borne upon me suddenly and with unaccountable force that should I let him slip 
away in to the darkness I would never forgive myself. (LJ 109.) 
 
Marlow’s description of Jim as belonging both with “the fellowship of the craft” (79), like himself, 
and with ‘the great army of waifs and strays’ depicts him as bearing a split image of self which 
reinforces his hybridity, his thirdness. Enhanced by his invisibility – the fact that he could be 
counted among seamen (considered honourable) and among ‘waifs and strays’ simultaneously – 
Jim’s hybridity is deeply threatening because it exposes the indeterminacies of social identification 
and the variability of the beliefs upon which a set of ethics may be created. Attesting to the 
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disruptive ability of Jim’s thirdness, Marlow states that it causes him to become less confident 
about what to say for fear of losing Jim altogether to the ‘darkness’. As he becomes more keenly 
aware of Jim’s shifty identity, he feels more compelled to draw him out of the darkness, out of the 
ranks of ‘the army that marches down […] into all the gutters of the earth’ so he might include 
him among socially acceptable ranks, even if as a “straggler yearning inconsolably for his humble 
place in the ranks” (137). For this reason, he keeps an eye on him. However, examining this 
surveillance still from Bhabha’s notion of hybridity, we observe that Jim’s consistently 
“proliferating difference evades that eye, escapes that surveillance” (Bhabha, 1994: 112) and fades 
into an inscrutable obliquity that defies inclusion in the ranks of authority. As he imposes upon 
himself a self-exile and retreats farther into the East, the fact cannot be ignored that he joins the 
masses of the discriminated. However, being a “white man” (149) in those parts, he never fully 
belongs and is considered as much a foreigner as any other immigrant. Nonetheless, even then, he 
is still considered as different; and we can yet perceive this as a hybridised sort of difference that 
“gets us out of the simple racial binaries of colonizer-colonized to speak of the particular 
circumstances by which this European subject learns, as it were, to heed difference, ‘within’ and 
‘without’” (Sanjay Krishnan, 2004: 345). As a result of being excessively sensitive to an 
overbearing sense of guilt and of being desirous of a fantasised ideal of self, Jim becomes separated 
from other Europeans by the burden of his illusive ideals. In Patusan, however, he is marked as 
different simply because he is identified as European. From this analysis, I conclude that it is 
through such a paradox of identification that Jim considers himself different from Europe’s idea 
of what or who he must be, and therefore feels unaccepted in/ by Europe. It is also this that drives 
him into self-imposed exile resulting in his persistent flight from Europe and its representatives 
and models. 
This, however, also marks a flight from himself and a cowering from his true identity, 
which lend weight to the proposition that Jim is a coward. Based on my argument that Jim is a 
coward, I further posit that the title of the text, ‘Lord Jim’, is in fact doubly voiced in the sense 
that throughout the narrative Jim is quite easily perceived to be a slave to his fears and doubts to 
which he, nevertheless, refuses to own up. This act of denial itself indicates his lack of courage, 
and much as he strives to believe in and live up to his illusory standard of bravery, he is really a 
coward at heart. This claim is consolidated by the way he deals with this ever-present undesirable 
trait by constantly skulking or running away from himself or from his nonetheless abiding memory 
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of himself and of his failures. In effect, our protagonist bears a double personality – real (cowardly) 
and imagined (brave). Such a duality captured in the ironical title, ‘Lord Jim’, leads me to argue 
that the titular incongruity gestures towards a representation of the Other in which the illusion of 
the self serves as a mask for the perpetuation of alterity. In this regard, Lefebvre’s concept of a 
“double illusion” expounded in Soja’s analysis of the thirdspace (Soja, 1996: 62) can help to 
elucidate Conrad’s narrative. In a simplification of this concept, Soja refers to the double illusion 
as constituting “myopia (nearsightedness, seeing only what is right before your eyes and no 
further) and hypermetropia (farsightedness, seeing so far into the distance that what is immediately 
before you disappears)” (62). Drawing on these notions for my discussion I posit that thirdsight is 
the effect of all forms of ametropia including both myopia (not seeing the wood for the trees) and 
hypermetropia, and, especially, astigmatism resulting always in the blurring of vision, in the 
potential multiplicity of meaning, and in the possible failure, or compromise of ethical judgement. 
Understood in this way, thirdsight combines a series of optical processes very often occurring 
simultaneously or in such rapid succession as to be considered on the whole as one. These 
processes include visualisation and imagination, introspection and retrospection, projections and 
even wishes, all of which together inform existential questions framed by logico-epistemological 
spatio-temporalities surrounding the world of the text. While it may be quite easy to chart this 
phenomenon through an analysis of the symbolic universe of a text and through the experiences 
and realisations of the literary character confined in that universe, it is equally important to admit 
the, perhaps unlikely, probability of this phenomenon of thirdsighting to occur with the reader who 
experiences it subliminally through the text. Tallying this argument to Lefebvre’s critique of the 
double illusion of transparency and opacity, I posit that, in reference to Conrad’s narrative, all the 
possibilities of thirdsight comprehensively create a double illusion in the text. This “double 
illusion” goes right through from Jim’s vision of himself to Marlow’s vision of him (which, he 
admits, is never very clear), to Marlow’s presentation of Jim for his listeners (seated and shrouded 
in darkness and seemingly disinterested and to whom Marlow seems to be trying to justify his 
tale), to his readers (for whom the reading of Marlow’s narrative is a tortuous and complex affair 
and who no doubt oscillate between sympathy and critical judgement of Jim – perhaps exhibiting 
those very sentiments that the narrator hopes to arouse in us). The overall ambiguity created by all 
these levels of opacity, which conceal an illusion of transparency through their revelatory attempts, 
map themselves onto the character of Jim whose rather ironic “[s]olipsistic individuality masks 
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itself as heterotopic, where space functions for little beyond the consumption of otherness as a 
means of underwriting a fantasised self” (Madhu Krishnan, 2015: 686). 
Krishnan’s assertion about Jim’s heterotopic posturing draws to my discussion the added 
dimension of Michel Foucault’s concept of heterotopia, through which lens, an analysis of Jim’s 
peripatetic search for self-affirmation becomes clearer. Foucault uses the analogy of the reflection 
of the self in the mirror as the starting point for developing his argument on heterotopias in general. 
Stating that the mirror is an utopia because it presents the subject with a visibility of itself within 
a virtual space, he further asserts that it is also a heterotopia in the sense that it retains its own 
reality while reflecting an image that is “at once absolutely real, connected with all the space that 
surrounds it, and absolutely unreal, since to be perceived it has to pass through this virtual point 
which is over there” (4). Thus, through the mirror, the subject can see itself in a space where it is 
not; or, in other words, it can perceive of its presence in absence. In Conrad’s narrative, Jim appears 
to reflect, both through his character as through his lofty imagination, this metaphor of the mirror. 
In connection to Jim as an individual, this mirror metaphor is validated in the fact that for other 
characters, such as Marlow and Brierly, Jim reflects the Other of themselves that they would rather 
suppress or hide. With regard to himself, it is his vivid imagination that symbolises the mirror 
through which his real self and his heroic self are connected in space and time through his romantic 
ideals. After listening carefully to Marlow present Jim to him as “a specimen” (p. 129), Stein, the 
entomologist who collects butterflies and beetles, pathologically declares Jim a “romantic” (129). 
Even with this diagnosis, Stein indicates an ambivalence in such a trait as he states: “He is romantic 
– romantic, […]. And that is very bad – very bad. … Very good, too” (132). This verdict, equivocal 
at best, does not only allude to Jim’s tendency to fantasise, but it also suggests that he may be 
illusory about his very existence. This extended implication of Stein’s diagnosis is not lost on 
either Stein or Marlow. Marlow reveals this by observing that all the while they were talking about 
Jim: “We avoided pronouncing Jim’s name as though we had tried to keep flesh and blood out of 
our discussion, or he were nothing but an erring spirit, a suffering and nameless shade” (131). To 
link this to my discussion of spectrality in my analysis of Razumov in Under Western Eyes, I assert 
that the comparison of Jim to a spirit or a shade through the circuitous reference to him results in 
a disembodiment of Jim that renders him Othered to the point of being likened to a spectre or a 
ghost that is plagued by sin and anonymity. Besides, as though to consolidate this disembodiment 
of Jim and the reduction of his existence to that of a distressed ‘spirit’ or a ‘shade’, Stein asks 
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Marlow: “What is it that by inward pain makes him know himself? What is it that for you and me 
makes him – exist? (132). From an essentialist perspective, Stein makes us call into question Jim’s 
very existence. Besides, his enquiry, framed as a rhetorical question, indicates the need for Jim to 
look within himself in order to achieve self-actualisation which will in turn convince others about 
his authenticity. Therefore, in an extended Foucauldian sense, this question presents Jim as the 
mirror through which his own identity can be authenticated both to himself as to others. In effect, 
while Stein’s question serves to buttress his judgement of Jim as romantic, it also provokes Marlow 
to reflect on what might be the true essence of Jim’s existence. Consequently, Marlow recounts: 
At that moment it was difficult to believe in Jim’s existence – starting from a 
country parsonage, blurred by crowds of men as by clouds of dust, silenced by the 
clashing claims of life and death in a material world – but his imperishable reality 
came to me with a convincing, with an irresistible force! I saw it vividly, as though 
in our progress through the lofty silent rooms amongst fleeting gleams of light and 
the sudden revelations of human figures stealing with flickering flames within 
unfathomable and pellucid depths, we had approached nearer to absolute Truth, 
which like Beauty itself, floats elusive, obscure, half submerged, in the silent still 
waters of mystery” (132). 
In relation to this moment of reflection, I point out that throughout his narrative of Jim’s peripatetic 
search for self-affirmation, Marlow often draws a parallel between Jim and geographical space/(s) 
– that is, space in either abstract (imagined) or concrete (real) forms. The comparison cited earlier 
between the character of Jim and the unclear view of a country covered in fog serves as one such 
example, and in the passage cited above he resorts to this technique once again. In his fast 
dissipating certainty about Jim’s existence, Marlow conjures up images of place (concrete) and 
space (abstract) through which he portrays Jim in a paradox of reality and illusion. The image of 
the “country parsonage” relates to the actual geographical place from which Jim originates. 
However, this image is “blurred by crowds of men as by clouds of dust”, a blurring which alludes 
to daily human activity, but which also calls up the biblical allusion to the “cloud of witnesses” 
watching the progress of Man’s toil in the race of life. In the biblical reference to such a race, the 
expectation is for it to end with a crown of glory, an inference which can be extended to Marlow’s 
assessment of Jim. However, in his growing scepticism, this arduous race, with respect to Jim, is 
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marked by futility as a result of being “silenced by the clashing claims of life and death in a material 
world.” Marlow insists, nevertheless, on the reality of Jim’s existence, only to disintegrate this 
reality once again by capturing his perception of it in ambivalent terms. Thus, though he claims to 
see Jim’s existence “vividly”, he counters that claim of clarity by his appeal to the contradictory 
metaphors of “lofty silent rooms,” “fleeting gleams of light,” and “sudden revelations of human 
figures stealing with flickering flames within unfathomable and pellucid depths.” Consequently, 
even though Marlow obstinately tries to assert that Jim is real, he inadvertently admits to the 
“absolute Truth” that like an abstract idea such as Beauty, Jim is in essence “elusive, obscure, 
[and] half submerged, in the silent still waters of mystery.” Analysing Marlow’s assertion from 
the Foucauldian perspective of the mirror image further illuminates how the extensive use of 
metaphors such as “pellucid depths” and “still waters” allude to notions of transparency and 
accentuate the theme of reflection as a means by which an individual may identify, acknowledge, 
recognise and situate itself as a social subject. Further implied in this mirror imagery, however, is 
also the possibility of a blurred reflection or a miscalculated identification because the depths 
which represent the reflecting agent are “unfathomable”. In effect, the subject risks winding up in 
a state of misrecognition in which its identified self is really only a creation of its imagination and 
derives from its illusions. In this state, the subject, through a process of interpellation, adopts its 
imagined identity, thereby becoming alienated from its true self. It is moreover important to draw 
attention to the fact that while Marlow is engaged in this moment of contemplation, he and Stein 
are actually walking through dark rooms within which there are “distant mirrors” where “the forms 
of two men and the flicker of two flames could be seen for a moment stealing silently across the 
depths of crystalline void” (132). This persistent allusion to mirror reflections is also used earlier 
with specific reference to Jim as he unburdens himself to Marlow and appears to be haunted as his 
“unconscious face reflected the passing expressions of scorn, of despair, of resolution – reflected 
them in turn, as a magic mirror would reflect the gliding passage of unearthly shapes” (94). In all 
of these instances, the trope of the mirror indicates or reflects heterotopic spaces and times that are 
triggered by the memory of Jim’s failure and his struggle to become other than he perceives himself 
to be based on his past actions. 
It is upon this same trope that Jim is ushered into Patusan, (where he temporarily masters 
his fate), on a “tiny black canoe… with two tiny men, all black, who toiled exceedingly, striking 
down at the pale water: and the canoe seemed to slide painfully on a mirror” (202). Here again the 
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mirror metaphor evokes the idea of a reflection of the subject from a space of reality onto a space 
of illusion which nonetheless encapsulates the real in time and space – a heterotopia. Thus, Patusan 
becomes this heterotopic space on the other side of the mirror into which Jim enters to discover 
and assert himself. That the canoe bearing him into the heart of Patusan along with its 
accompanying rowers are all black and tiny hints at some sort of dream experience. Such an 
allusion to a dream-like experience in connection to Jim’s entry into Patusan is consolidated by 
Marlow’s assertion that sending Jim to Patusan was like sending him “into a star of the fifth 
magnitude” where he “left his earthly failings behind him and what sort of reputation he had, and 
there was a totally new set of conditions for his imaginative faculty to work upon” (LJ 133). With 
reference to Patusan, George Panichas asserts that it is “another world” into which Marlow and 
Stein have schemed to “tumble” Jim who, as a “spiritual exile, alone and friendless,” enters into 
“the wilderness of Patusan, where ‘all sound and all movements in the world seemed to come to 
an end’” (Panichas 22). In an extensive discussion on dream sensations in Lord Jim, Kenneth 
Newell (2011) points out that Conrad’s figurative comparison of life to a dream has been earlier 
referenced in the Heart of Darkness where Marlow relates his adventure in pursuit of Kurtz to a 
dream sensation, stating that “We live, as we dream – alone” (Heart of Darkness, 28 cited in 
Newell, 82). Likening this to dream-like references in Lord Jim, Newell points out that the features 
that typify Jim’s life and experiences in Patusan as a dream are essentially that these experiences 
are “strange and remote,” that they give “wondrous fulfillment,” they are adventurous with the 
added qualities of “instability and precariousness,” and they end in death which is itself “like a 
dream” (Newell, 82). All of these features can be identified in Jim’s life in Patusan which, in its 
portrayal as an illusion, nevertheless signifies a complement to and a place of compensation as 
well as of penance for his earlier life and failings. In being captured in Patusan as in a dream, Jim’s 
already vague character, as constantly indicated by Marlow, gains in elusiveness as it becomes 
unified with the dream-like Patusan, a heterotopia where all other spaces and places in relation to 
Jim converge, and where his reality remains unresolved as he comes to his end constantly “under 
a cloud” (LJ, 253).  
While such a discussion of heterotopias within the novel elucidates the function of space, 
both real and imagined, as a means to inscribe Jim’s Otherness through the ambivalence of reality 
and illusion, I further point out that this function of space within the novel is moreover consolidated 
by a reading of Marlow’s rather lengthy narrative through de Certeau’s notion of “space [as] a 
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practiced place” (1984:117). In this regard, space is conceived of as the actual enactment or display 
of an action, it is a place of activity in much the same way in which “an act of reading is the space 
produced by the practice of a particular place: a written text, i.e., a place constituted by a system 
of signs” (de Certeau, 1984:117). From de Certeau’s analysis, it is important to note that function 
is essential to and invariably defines space through the practice of a particular activity prompted 
by a particular place. It is the practice of such an activity that constitutes a “system of signs.” For 
my discussion on Lord Jim, this perspective of de Certeau’s analysis elucidates my argument as I 
point out that Jim’s Otherness is the space produced by the projection of an imagined self, which 
encapsulates all the possibilities of what he can be and do, onto his real self. This projection is 
carried out not only by Jim himself, but also by other characters, like Brierly and Stein, and 
especially by Marlow, whose support of Jim also masks a latent expectation for him to measure 
up and prove himself. These imaginations of Jim then constitute the system of signs that prompt 
his Othering. Thus, when all the signs in the text are taken together, it becomes viable to perceive 
Jim as occupying that space of the Other who exists in relation to the spaces alluded to by Marlow. 
Drawing further on de Certeau, this notion of Jim as an embodiment of Otherness through the 
ambivalence of real and imagined spaces can be understood from the added perspective that 
“[s]pace occurs as the effect produced by the operations that orient it, situate it, temporalize it and 
make it function in a polyvalent unity of conflictual programs and contractual proximities” (de 
Certeau 117). From this angle, de Certeau argues that space, emerging from specific practices, 
results from a combination of actions related to and contributing to the space-producing practices; 
and that in being thus formed from a culmination of several actions, that space invariably becomes 
an unstable and a compromising entity, lending itself to varying interpretations depending on the 
context. In my analysis of Conrad’s novel, I posit that this is the sort of space that Jim morphs into: 
a space of Otherness that is, simultaneously, the inferior self of the superior image that Jim has of 
himself, the inferior subject of the superior Self that is represented by the likes of Marlow, Stein 
and Brierly, the superior Other of the Other’s Other captured in such despicable characters like the 
engineer, Cornelius and Gentleman Brown, and even the superior Self referred to in Patusan as the 
“white lord” (165) whose “especial protection” (202) of the land was restoring in the people a 
“belief in the stability of earthly institutions” (236). In light of all of these functions that Jim 
performs in relation to embodying the space of Otherness, it becomes clear how it is that he forms 
a “polyvalent unity of conflictual programs and contractual proximities” through the fact that he 
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is at once all of these identities that might seem to contradict but which in actual fact complement 
each of their opposites while aggregating into that evasive subject who is caught in the ambiguity 
of existence. 
From my foregoing analysis, I assert that Marlow’s narration of Jim’s life, actions and 
related events gives the impression of creating what Edward Soja explains as: 
The illusion of transparency, […] [which] makes space appear “luminous,” 
completely intelligible, open to the free play of human agency, wilfulness, and 
imagination. It also appears innocent, free of traps or secret places, with nothing 
hidden or dissimulated, always capable of being “taken in by a single glance from 
that mental eye which illuminates whatever it contemplates” (Soja 63). 
In this explanation of Lefebvre’s notion of the double illusion, Soja highlights the seemingly 
panoramic nature of perception that gives the impression that reality can be captured in an all-
revealing glance through one’s imagination. He holds, however, that such a perception is, at best, 
deceptive or illusory as it substitutes the real with that which is imagined, leaving actuality to be 
defined by an “‘encrypted reality’” (63) constructed through discourse. A reading of Marlow’s 
narration of Jim through this notion of the illusion of transparency foregrounds and facilitates an 
understanding of the subjectivism of Marlow’s representation of Jim who, being reduced to a 
subject of knowledge through the narrator’s discourse, represents a subject who would be 
invariably analysed on the basis of that which is communicated or known about him, hence 
creating the illusion of being “completely intelligible” while in fact remaining mysterious because 
obscure. Besides, with specific regard to this reference from Soja, I further advance my argument 
through a conceptualisation of Jim-as-space taking my cue from Marlow’s comparison of Jim to a 
landscape or a country which I have earlier alluded to. Pursuing this spatial metaphor, I argue that 
as Jim evolves, revealing different aspects of himself, his nature becomes palimpsestic. This is 
because even though he tries to forge a new identity free of his past, the earlier places and 
experiences he has passed through leave visible traces on his identity. In effect, Jim’s emerging 
form, superimposed on a past that he has tried to efface, persistently bears vestiges of his earlier 
self that define him and contribute to his construction of an identity. Moreover, in his metaphorical 
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spatial self, Jim, through his fantasies, transposes the imagined over the real so that by the end of 
the narrative, the real spaces such as the Eastern port of the Patna affair, and other seaports to and 
from which he flees in exile, are overshadowed by the Utopic and dream-like Patusan, in as much 
the same way as his real self is eclipsed by his imagined self which Marlow always refers to as 
inscrutable as result of its indistinct presentation. In this respect, I borrow Soja’s terminology in 
my analysis of Jim and contend that the character is presented to us through an illusion of 
transparency which makes him appear luminous, whereas we detect that he is in actual fact 
dissimulated through the impressions of him given to us by Marlow and through the free play of 
his own imagination upon his subjectivity. As a result, it is impossible to take him in by a single 
glance of the mental eye, for in order to properly make him out we need to attempt a bifurcated 
gaze that distinguishes between the real and the imagined while yet discerning the liminal 
categories that exist between these polarities. 
For Jim, it is such categories of liminality that strongly impact his identity. For he is neither 
fully one thing nor the other, and as he tries to fit in as a social being within the different spaces in 
which he finds himself, he is plagued by the demands of systemic conventions that require him to 
conform or be considered aberrant. In that regard, to conform would suggest a moral uprightness 
that is universally approved, whereas to deviate would imply a depravity that suggests a lack of 
regard for the rules. Through Marlow’s narrative, we are urged to consider that the fact that Jim 
makes an effort at all to live up to the rules or to conform is basis enough to adjudge him morally 
sound. Thus, Marlow’s efforts at presenting Jim clearly are really efforts to assert the latter’s moral 
identity. While this endeavour seems more specifically related to Marlow our narrator within the 
context of the text, the reader cannot help but think that the author is himself determined to use his 
character to highlight such moral ambiguities that query the moral supremacy of socially 
determined and universally accepted standards or rules. In this regard, Conrad declares that Lord 
Jim is a story about 
those struggles of an individual trying to save from the fire his idea of what his 
moral identity should be, this precious notion of a convention, only one of the rules 
of the game, nothing more, but all the same so terribly effective by its assumption 
of unlimited power over natural instincts, by the awful penalties of its failure (LJ, 
50). 
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This individual is, of course, the eponymous character Jim whose whole existence is built primarily 
on an idea, a notion, extended from his imagination of himself – of what he is and what he is 
becoming. Informed by ideas he has amassed from his reading of “light literature” (LJ, 4; 5) about 
sea-going adventures, he imagines himself to be a perfect seaman on his way to becoming a heroic 
adventurous marine officer. This imagined self is what Jim tries to ‘save from the fire’, the fire 
symbolising the challenges of real life which threaten to scorch his fantasised beliefs and notions 
of himself and his abilities. The indication that his imagined, fantasised self is in actual fact created 
from his fictional readings draws attention to the power of fiction explored in this fictional work. 
It, therefore, becomes obvious that Jim forms his notions of the ideal from fiction and transposes 
these on reality. In effect, he is trapped in the illusion of the ideal as he trips over himself to attain 
heroic status. As Linda Dryden observes of Conrad’s heroes, such a preoccupation to attain 
heroism “is the illusion of fiction, an insubstantial dream posed against the limitations of individual 
character” (78). By thus implying the power of fiction to influence its readers, Conrad gives the 
impression of capitalising on this power to force his readers to develop a critical sense of inquiry 
into the conventions and rules that we live by rather than to give in to self-delusion. In this way, 
he expatiates on the possibility of the very opposite effect that fiction has on Jim as he incites his 
readers to judge or evaluate themselves and society by identifying in Jim our individual alter egos 
that remind us of our own fallibility, thereby saving us from the delusion of being able to attain 
some fanciful heroic ideal. A close reading of the text reveals that Jim’s story seems to have such 
an effect on Marlow, whose narration consistently draws attention to the thin line between truth 
and illusion as he states that between the two “there is so little difference, and the difference means 
so little” (136). Thus, Marlow leaves his listeners with such a feeling of ambivalence about his 
narrative and about the existence of Jim even though he tries hard to convince us that his story is 
true. The irony presented with this ambivalent situation is that whereas, through Marlow’s 
narration, Conrad highlights the “power of words” (109) to simultaneously delude and convince, 
he also demonstrates how such power captured in fiction affects the imagination of his main 
character, Jim, to the point of complete delusion. For while Marlow insists on the truth of his 
narration, he equally indicates that his encounter with Jim has caused him to doubt his own belief 
systems and to question “the illusion of [his own] beginnings” (109). Left in this state of 
uncertainty, he becomes “afraid to speak, in the same way one dares not move for fear of losing a 
slippery hold” (109). Even though Marlow goes further to explain that this “fear of losing a 
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slippery hold” relates directly to his efforts to save Jim from obscurity, we, the readers, cannot 
help but think that this metaphor also directly refers to his narration which hovers between fact 
and fiction, between truth and illusion. We, therefore, become profoundly aware of his struggle to 
convince us about the reality of his story, which is redolent of fantasy, as he describes it as “the 
truth disclosed in a moment of illusion” (196). Such moments of illusion are not lost on the reader 
who Conrad drafts into his pool of “silent listener[s]” (LJ, 21) as he tries to convince his audience, 
through Marlow, that Jim was “one of us” (LJ, 2). To strongly make this point, Marlow 
metaphorically describes Jim as an everyman who represents “all the parentage of his kind, […] 
men and women by no means clever or amusing, but whose very existence is based upon honest 
faith, and upon the instinct of courage” (27). By thus linking Jim with all mankind, Marlow asserts 
his propinquity to us. However, Marlow’s revelation that Jim displays a “breach of faith with the 
community of mankind” (95) when he jumps from the sinking Patna leaving the eight hundred 
pilgrims on board to a perilous fate proves that Jim is really not “one of us” but that he is in fact 
an extension of each of us in the sense that through him we are able to assess ourselves. Like some 
shadowy double of our individual selves, he provides the safe distance from which we may identify 
and appraise our fantasies and illusions. So, I argue that he is consistently portrayed as an Other 
whose actions, thoughts and life serve as “reminders of our folly, of our weakness, of our mortality; 
all that makes against our efficiency—the memory of our failures, the hints of our undying fears” 
(106). Such a portrayal of Jim as an alter ego is consolidated by the fact that Marlow identifies in 
him a younger version of himself, and in his retrospective narration, he relies on his memories and 
imaginations of Jim, thereby rendering him more shadowy than human to the reader. 
Thus, by inference from Marlow’s own words, we are invited to consider that Jim does not 
directly exist for us and that we can only imagine him: “He existed for me, and after all it is only 
through me that he exists for you” (137). In this statement, the first ‘me’ refers to Marlow-the-
character, whereas the second ‘me’ refers to Marlow-the-narrator. Therefore, in relation to this 
assertion, it is important to note that this is Marlow-the-narrator speaking to us of Jim’s existence 
for Marlow-the-character. I must also point out that even for Marlow-the-narrator, there is a certain 
extent to which Jim only exists for him through his past encounter with him as Marlow-the-
character up to his final visit with Jim in Patusan. For the rest of the narrative, Marlow-the-narrator 
depends on what he has later heard of Jim from the disreputable Gentleman Brown, all of which 
he has captured in a letter to a “privileged reader” (214). Thus, from that point, Marlow sees Jim 
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only through the eyes of Gentleman Brown and, in a prelude to this portion of his narrative, he 
admits that “it is impossible to see [Jim] clearly – especially as it is through the eyes of others that 
we take our last look at him” (206). This is equally true for the reader, for it is only through the 
eyes of others that we are able to perceive Jim. Besides, Marlow’s admission here may very well 
connect to his arbitrary confession that he hardly understands nor sees Jim clearly himself. Thus, 
his admission-confession is suggestive of a visual opacity that metaphorically undermines the 
transparency that Marlow lays claim to in revealing Jim to us. His concern that we do not see Jim 
clearly enough creates an illusion of opacity which nourishes and complements the illusive 
transparency of his narrative purpose, viz, to reveal Jim to us. To “see him clearly” one would 
need to break through at least five levels of opacity. At the first level is Jim (as object). At the 
second level is Marlow (as privileged perceiving subject) up to his final personal contact with Jim 
in Patusan, after which he is substituted by Gentleman Brown. At the third level are Marlow’s 
audience, (representing the ‘narratee’), who are intratextual as they exist within the text. At the 
fourth level, (as secondary perceiving subjects – since we see Jim through Marlow’s eyes), are 
Marlow’s empirical readers who are extratextual as they exist outside the text. At a fifth level the 
agents that I locate at the fourth level become super-privileged perceiving subjects to whom 
Conrad presents the rest of the story through Marlow’s written account of Jim to a “privileged 
man” (205) who, (with Conrad’s readers), is the only one of all Marlow’s listeners to “ever hear 
the last word of the story” (205). At this fifth level, the super-privileged agents are given an insight 
on Jim in the final phase of his life through the omniscient narrator who takes over the narration, 
subsuming Marlow’s written account under his omniscient perspective. Extending this analysis 
beyond the world of the text, it is worth noting that, in his author’s note, Conrad, commenting on 
the sheer length of the narrative and on the criticism that he “had been bolted away with” (1), 
declares that the story was not very clear to him either and that “all [the] moods and stirrings of 
spirit were rather obscure [to him] at the time, and […] do not appear clearer […] now after the 
lapse of so many years” (1). In his own struggle to counter the double illusion of opacity and 
transparency Conrad inadvertently casts Jim in an-Other space that transposes him beyond the 
dichotomous us-and-them logic and frames him as an all-inclusive ‘third-as-Other’. From this I 
draw the conclusion that, by constructing his characters through several layers of perception, 
Conrad’s politics of representation constantly seek to subvert a binary portrayal of difference 
through stable oppositions but upholds the possibility of varying degrees of difference that nullify 
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dualism. It is in this regard that Conrad’s narrative style, perhaps intuitively, presents Jim 
progressively as a disembodied character whose “form [is always] under a cloud – perfectly silent 
(2); and who, for Marlow, existed as “a mere white speck at the heart of an immense mystery, […] 
standing disregarded […] but always mute, dark – under a cloud” (208). At the end of the narrative, 
when Jim decisively surrenders to the wrath of the chieftain Doramin and he is shot dead, Conrad 
builds on this technique to further obscure Jim in the opacity of disembodiment while yet insisting 
through Marlow on his shared affinity with ‘us’ – narrator, listeners, and readers: 
  And that’s [his] end. He passes away under a cloud, inscrutable at heart, […]. 
But we can see him, an obscure conqueror of fame, tearing himself out of the arms 
of a jealous love at the sign, at the call of his exalted egoism. He goes away from a 
living woman to celebrate his pitiless wedding with a shadowy ideal of conduct. Is 
he satisfied – quite, now, I wonder? We ought to know. He is one of us – and have 
I not stood up once, like an evoked ghost, to answer for his eternal constancy? Was 
I so very wrong after all? Now he is no more, there are days when the reality of his 
existence comes to me with an immense, with an overwhelming force; and yet upon 
my honour there are moments, too, when he passes from my eyes like a 
disembodied spirit astray amongst the passions of his earth, ready to surrender 
himself faithfully to the claim of his own world of shades. (253) 
Indicating upon Jim’s demise that he remains “under a cloud” and “inscrutable at heart” Marlow 
insists nevertheless that “we can see him” even now. He, however, continues to emphasise the 
opacity of this perception by qualifying Jim as an “obscure conqueror of fame”. It is worth pointing 
out that on the one hand, the term “obscure” as used here would readily evoke the adjectival 
meaning of that which is undiscovered, unknown, and of which one is uncertain or of that which 
is unclear or not easily understood. On the other hand, however, the term also draws attention to 
its use as a verb to indicate the effort to keep something from being seen, to conceal. From 
Marlow’s narration it might be possible to suggest that the obscuring of Jim provides the 
opportunity for other characters to conceal the truth of their own convictions. For it seems that 
while Jim blindly tries to live out his convictions and rigidly stand for his ideals, however romantic 
they may be, this attitude provokes in other characters an assessment of their own convictions 
while drawing to the fore memories or secrets that they would rather not disclose. Captain Brierly, 
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for instance, is affected in this way and, seemingly unable to deal with a secret shame, he drowns 
himself, carrying his secret with him. Marlow insinuates that as he served as judge over Jim’s case, 
“he was probably holding silent inquiry into his own case. The verdict must have been of 
unmitigated guilt, and he took the secret of the evidence with him in that leap into the sea” (36). 
Conrad’s indication of guilt here comes across as intentionally ambiguous, as it seems to refer 
simultaneously to Jim as to Brierly. Also, in his discussion with Marlow about Jim, Stein suggests 
that everybody, including himself, has a secret failing or two (133). In response to Marlow’s 
remark about Jim letting a “splendid opportunity [to] escape” (132) unlike others would do who 
may have dreamt for so long about such an opportunity, Stein cuts him short and states: “And do 
you know how many opportunities I let escape, how many dreams I had lost that had come in my 
way?” (132). Earlier in this conversation, Stein prescribes that “the way” to live is “in the 
destructive element immerse” and to “follow the dream, […] ewig – usque ad finem” (forever – 
until the end) (131). Thus, in his attempt to follow his dream to the end, Jim abandons life itself, 
including Jewel, the orphaned ward of Cornelius whom he falls in love with in Patusan, “to 
celebrate his pitiless wedding with a shadowy ideal of conduct” – shadowy because they are at 
best ill-defined. By this, Marlow refers to Jim’s decision to give himself up to Doramin to be killed 
for the death of Doramin’s son Dain Warris because Jim felt that he had failed to protect this son, 
who was also his best friend, from being killed by Gentleman Brown. While Marlow states that he 
is not sure if Jim has finally found peace from this action, he solicits the complicity of his listeners-
readers in his conclusion as he contends that “we ought to know” because Jim is “one of us”. 
Within the same breath, however, Marlow here again expresses an uncertainty as to the reality of 
Jim’s existence; and in this ambivalence of his insistence on and denial of Jim’s existence he at 
once animates Jim for his audience and then promptly effaces him before our very eyes. The very 
effort made to send him off to Patusan constitutes also an attempt to obliterate him by isolating 
him from known society and confining him to the unknown – an act which also hints at 
concealment. Thus, once again, Marlow vacillates between revealing and concealing Jim, between 
affirming and obliterating him. In a similar observation of Marlow’s deployment of such a 
technique of affirmation and negation with regard to Jim, Paul Kintzele states that even though 
Marlow continues to insist that Jim is “one of us”, throughout his narration Jim “is constantly 
placed in scenes of isolation, concealment, and confinement; like Leggatt in ‘The Secret Sharer’ 
he is present by his particular absence” (Kintzele, 74). 
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To thus help us better ‘see’ Jim, Marlow asserts, “I’ve led him out by the hand; I have 
paraded him before you” (137). This idea of leading Jim out by the hand and parading him before 
others casts him in the frame of an exhibit that is displayed under the scrutinising gaze of intent 
observers. What, in actual fact, Marlow does here is to appeal to our imagination to picture and 
perceive Jim as he has constructed him for us. This appeal extends from Marlow’s constant 
emphasis on Jim’s imaginative tendencies, in reference to which he states that what he feared most 
about Jim was “how imaginative he was, and your imaginative people swing farther in any 
direction, as if given a longer scope of cable in the uneasy anchorage of life” (137). So, ironically, 
Marlow appeals to his audience to extend our imagination to better perceive Jim, whereas he 
expresses his apprehension over Jim’s own rather excessive imaginative drive. Worthy of note in 
this regard is the fact that, throughout the narrative, such references to the power of the imagination 
abound. For Marlow’s listeners/ readers, the imagination motif is indicated as the tool through 
which we may better ‘see’ Jim; and for Jim, it serves as his means for negotiating an identity. Thus, 
while this trope is stylistically deployed as Jim’s device for self-construction, its telescopic focus 
on him aimed at revealing him to the reader, gives it an ethnographic function that Others him 
through Marlow’s additional treatment of him as an exhibit ‘paraded’ under the imaginative gaze 
of his audience. 
In his own imagination, however, Jim thinks of himself as a superior heroic kind and, often, 
while at sea in a busy ship, “he would forget himself, and beforehand live in his mind the sea-life 
of [great adventure]. He saw himself saving people from sinking ships, cutting away masts in a 
hurricane, swimming through a surf with a line; […]. He confronted savages on tropical shores, 
quelled mutinies on the high seas, and in a small boat upon the ocean kept up the hearts of 
despairing men – always an example of devotion to duty, and as unflinching as a hero in a book.” 
(5). In this fascinating vision of himself and his abilities, Jim imagines himself as chivalrous. It is 
interesting to note that as he elevates himself to this grand status, he equally engages in an act of 
Othering in which he stages himself as the dominant force that confronts ‘savages on tropical 
shores’, imposes calm over riotous situations and restores hope to the faint-hearted. The irony of 
these imaginations is that they are really just fantasies. For when, in reality, he is confronted by an 
emergency at sea he freezes into inaction; and while others bustle around him to counter the 
emergency all he does is stand still (5). Afterwards, when calm returns and he hears the other 
shipmates excitedly discuss the event, he finds it all “very contemptible,” “a pitiful display of 
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vanity” and “felt sure” that in the face of “greater perils” “[w]hen all men flinched, […] he alone 
would know how to deal with the spurious menace of wind and seas.” (7). Besides, we further 
observe that, in direct connection to Marlow’s tale, when as chief mate of the Patna, he is once 
again confronted with a crisis at sea, he numbs once again into inaction; and eventually when he 
does take an action, it is to jump out of the ship, saving himself and abandoning the 800 pilgrims 
on board to the vagaries of the sea. From this comparison between the real and Jim’s ideal, I 
contend that an analysis of the character through thirdsight reveals a trichotomous existence in 
which we can identify Jim’s idea of himself as separate from how he is presented to us by Marlow 
which may also vary from what we, in actual fact, perceive him to be. This is because both Jim’s 
and Marlow’s presentations are triangulated by our own assessment of the character, of his actions, 
and of his opinions about himself and others, thus leaving us to form our own impressions of him. 
In effect, as we gradually follow him through the rest of the story, we remark how his delusions 
cause him to project “headlong into the fanciful realm of recklessly heroic aspirations. […] 
penetrating deeper into the impossible world of romantic achievements” (51). Living thus 
imprisoned in his idea of who and what he is, Jim fails to come to terms with reality and also fails 
to be one of us as he transforms into more of an imagined character living an imaginary life. In 
this way, Jim is Othered in the fact that he remains more imaginary than real, and the insights that 
we gain into the dissonance between his ideal self and his real self are mediated through thirdsight. 
The other way in which our perception of Jim is Othered through thirdsight is through the 
use of the animal metaphor. Marlow names two animals in connection with Jim. The first is a 
yellow dog that happens to be mysteriously around the court where Jim’s enquiry was held. We 
can ‘see’ it and can actually form a mental picture of this dog from Marlow’s description of it. As 
people crowd out of the court after the day’s hearing of Jim’s case, someone right behind Marlow 
nearly trips over the dog and indignantly says: “Look at that wretched cur”. As this reaches Jim’s 
hearing he assumes it is in reference to him, as he does not notice the dog. As a result, he confronts 
Marlow about it only to realise his mistake much later. However, while, as readers, we have the 
advantage of this play of dramatic irony on our main character, we cannot help but also have our 
perception of him once again triangulated by the interference of “the wretched animal” (46). From 
this ostensibly innocuous interruption that causes us to shift our mental gaze from Marlow to the 
dog and then to Jim and back to the dog, we irrevocably make a connection between Jim and the 
dog, a connection that he has already facilitated by the mistake of thinking the statement was made 
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in reference to him and thereby taking offence. Later on, as he unburdens himself to Marlow, he 
again makes reference to this incident when he asks him: “You think me a cur for standing there, 
but what would you have done? What! You can’t tell – nobody can tell.” (57). Thus, the parallel 
between Jim and the dog is sustained by his own persistent use of the metaphor to demand an 
evaluation of his actions. 
In her analysis of this incident, Sanjay Krishnan points out that there is  
the mix of half-comprehended sights and sounds concatenated around the dog. […] 
the stranger stumbles over the yellow dog as a result of being distracted by the 
‘high-pitched shrewish tone’ of the native woman. This subtle association between 
native and animal is reinforced by the sound of an ‘oriental voice’ […] within the 
courtroom that ‘whines abjectly’ […]. This resonance offers the first indication of 
a world excluded from yet operating alongside Marlow’s narrative agenda. 
(Krishnan, S. 336). 
But in effect, it is to this world, real and imagined, structurally involved yet essentially excluded, 
that Jim is eventually ‘abandoned’ (LJ, 95). This paradoxically excludes Jim from being ‘one of 
us’ despite Marlow’s persistent yet weak insistence on his inclusion in the moral world, a world in 
which one is able to make morally good, and fair judgements of situations. He fails to do this 
already, at the beginning of the narrative and continually throughout the rest of the text. 
The second animal that is mentioned with regard to Jim is a bull. Right at the beginning of 
his narrative, Marlow, in his description of Jim’s stature, observes: “He was […] powerfully built, 
and he advanced straight at you with a slight stoop of the shoulders, head forward, and a fixed 
from-under stare which made you think of a charging bull” (3). Once again, this image of Jim is 
reinforced by the singular word “buffalo” (44) which Marlow hears from the court on the same 
occasion on which he is being confronted by Jim about the mistaken insult of being called a 
“wretched cur”. That the image of the bull should be recalled at this time simultaneously with the 
actual presence of the dog, and that this should happen while Marlow feels cornered by Jim and in 
clear danger of a physical attack from Jim lends credence to the assumption that the images of the 
animals are here evoked metaphorically in reference to Jim. 
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Besides, this technique of alluding to animals in reference to Jim is sustained through 
Marlow’s description of the landscape as he walked to the court on the morning of Jim’s 
sentencing. On the one hand he (Marlow) is concerned about Jim’s “execution” being “a hole-and-
corner affair” (95) with “no high scaffolding, no scarlet cloth […], no awe-stricken multitude to 
be horrified at his guilt and be moved to tears at his fate” (96). On the other hand, on his way to 
the court for the determination of an inexorable judgement of culpability, the sights he is 
confronted with include: 
the clear sunshine, [with] a brilliance too passionate to be consoling, the streets full 
of jumbled bits of colour like a damaged kaleidoscope: yellow, green, blue, 
dazzling white, the brown nudity of an undraped shoulder, a bullock-cart with a 
red canopy, a company of native infantry in a drab body with dark heads marching 
in dusty laced boots, […]. (96 emphasis mine) 
These sights accompanying Jim’s sentencing form a subtle parallelism between the allusion to 
“scaffolds and heads rolling” (96) and Jim’s “execution” (95). And from these it is possible to 
make up for the absence of an “awe-stricken multitude” with the presence of a rather grey 
“company of native infantry in a drab body”, the grim aspect of which characterises the whole 
judgement. Besides, as though the suggestive chaotic portrayal of the trial and of the accused 
through the ‘jumbled bits of colour’ from a ‘damaged kaleidoscope’ is not disconcerting enough, 
our narrator has to notice and include images of ‘nudity’ and of ‘a bullock-cart with a red canopy’. 
These images contribute the doleful effect of replacing the ‘high scaffolding’ and the ‘scarlet cloth’ 
of a definite execution by transposing the notion of such a death from the historico-geographical 
site of “Tower Hill” (96), (representing the site of the Tower of London, and an ancient fortress 
on the east side of the city of London, famously used as a prison and a place of execution), to the 
anonymous South Pacific site of Conrad’s narrative. While the ‘nudity of the undraped shoulder’ 
may allude to the uncovering of a convicted person’s body in preparation for a beheading, the 
‘bullock-cart with a red canopy’ may hint at an improvised hearse or bier appropriate to the 
“picturesque” (96) setting which looked “like a chromo-lithograph of a camp in a book of Eastern 
travel” without the “obligatory thread of smoke in the foreground and the pack-animals grazing” 
(96). Once more, the association of the bullock to Jim’s sentencing and the evocation of anarchy 
drawn out by the observation of the absence of peacefully grazing pack-animals in the entire scene 
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sets a parallel between aggression and composure, between Jim’s guilt (a rashness of action devoid 
of morality, like the charging of an unthinking bull) and his fate (the abject fate of amoral animals, 
serenely grazing yet static in time) which attract “the cold vengefulness of a death sentence, [in 
the form of] a sentence of exile” (97). 
A further reference to the animal metaphor occurs in Jim’s early account to Marlow of his 
self-imposed exile to Patusan, the out-of-the-way Malay country to which he flees and where he 
hopes to stay hidden from the shame of his past. In his recollection of his dramatic arrival in 
Patusan, he describes his despondent condition by using an animal metaphor. He states that upon 
his unexpected arrival, the royal governor of the native people and his council endlessly deliberate 
upon what to do with him, strongly considering that he “be killed without more delay” (154). 
Realising the perilous situation he is in, Jim makes an escape and, running towards a muddy creek, 
he takes a “flying” leap (154), landing in the mud. As he relates this experience to Marlow, Jim 
states that when he laboriously emerges from the mud he thinks he is “alone […], alone, with no 
help, no sympathy, no pity to expect from any one, like a hunted animal” (156, emphasis mine). 
In this account, the recurring metaphorical allusion to the animal is further qualified by the notion 
of being hunted. This additional description suggests that, in his self-exile, Jim is not only 
separated from humanity by the fact that he is likened to an animal, but he is also hounded, 
persecuted, by his knowledge of himself (from which he permanently remains a fugitive), from 
the community of mariners among whom his shame remains an open secret, and also by sections 
of the native people in Patusan who consider him a stranger. These cross-references between Jim 
and animals which establish Jim as an Other through animalisation has the effect of dehumanising 
Jim so that he becomes invariably excluded from humanity. As a result, it becomes evident that 
his self-exile to Patusan represents also an extreme form of exclusion that captures him as some 
sort of social outcast. Thus, it is possible to ‘see’ Jim as Marlow wants us to: as “one of us” through 
a rather strained effort at inclusion and acceptance in spite of prevailing counter evidence. 
However, I also argue that through a ‘thirding’ of our perception of how Jim is presented in the 
narrative, Marlow may very well be more forcefully implying that Jim is in fact ‘Other’ to us, 
representing the ugly truths about ourselves that we would rather suppress and keep out of the 
sight of others. 
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In line with my argument that Jim is presented to us as an Other, I further submit that his 
Othering is enhanced through the contacts that he makes throughout the narrative. A close 
consideration of Conrad’s Lord Jim reveals that the novel can be read as a “contact zone” along 
the lines theorised by Mary Louise Pratt at two levels – both at the level of the narrative as on the 
level of encounters described within the text. Analysing the text from this viewpoint, Marlow’s 
narrative may yet retain notions of the old discourse of imperial superiority. However, the notion 
of contact points up the limitations of Marlow’s master narrative. Deploying Pratt’s concept of the 
contact zone in his examination of travel and exploratory literature, N. E. Currie affirms that “the 
contact zone […] creates its own context as two parties meet and form relationships that cannot 
entirely be understood within the framework of either party. Instead, each group must feel its way 
into interactions with the other, essentially creating a new shared culture in the process.” While 
this statement already draws attention to the creation of a third space within the context of the 
contact zone, Currie further asserts that “[a]lthough one [party] may have greater power than [the 
other] in the […] encounter, the process of transformation is not one-directional, nor does it happen 
only in the literal space of contact.” (13). Thus, he suggests the possible occurrence of a multi-
directional process and also hints at the fact that such a process may also take place in virtual or 
imagined space. Following from this line of thought, I further agree with his claim that “textual 
history […] transports the contact zone from the Pacific coastline to the moment of reading, in the 
here and now […] and invites us as readers to also make meanings in relationship to the text” (13). 
It is in this sense that I consider Conrad’s Lord Jim as an “ongoing contact zone” (Currie, 13) 
which not only reveals Jim’s encounters, but which also anticipates many more imagined 
encounters through which we are invited to “imagine” Jim and, perhaps, along with Conrad “to 
seek fit words for his meaning” (LJ, 2). 
In my consideration of these encounters with regard to Jim, I also take the notion of 
hybridity as theorised by Homi Bhabha as “a problematic of […] representation […] that reverses 
the effects of […] disavowal, so that other ‘denied’ knowledges enter upon the dominant discourse 
and estrange the basis of its authority” (1994: 114). I defer to this notion of hybridity because it 
helps us to discover, through a close examination of Conrad’s text, various interstices of 
overlapping meaning which may be derived from that which he is not saying – the ‘denied’ 
knowledges embedded within Marlow’s narrative which culminate in formulating an Othered 
image of Jim. A deciphering of such instances of silence or of unspoken facts undermines the 
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superiority and reliability of Marlow’s authoritative representation of Jim as it reveals subtle 
inferences from the associations that Jim has with other characters in which he is depicted as an 
Other. 
For this analysis, I proceed by focusing on the keyword ‘encounter’ in the text. This focus 
allows me to delimit my discussion to a few specific examples that illuminate my point about the 
novel as a contact zone in which we meet Jim whose alterity is portrayed to us through Marlow’s 
Othering narrative. Besides, I mainly look at the encounter between Marlow and Jim as I consider 
this the primary encounter that produces all other encounters in the narrative. Considering the 
endless number of encounters that proliferate the narrative, it is worth noting that the actual word 
‘encounter’ occurs only four times in the whole text. The first two instances in which this word 
appears refer to Marlow’s altercation with Jim, and the final two instances occur in relation to a 
feeling of fear that Marlow expresses regarding two other persons connected to Jim in a love-hate 
drama. While these two pairs of incidents are in no way directly related, it is, however, possible to 
draw a link between them as, from the one set to the other, one can sense Marlow’s growing sense 
of trepidation with regard to Jim and his interrelations. To examine the first two instances in which 
this word occurs, let us return to a passage discussed in a different light above. This passage relates 
to the occasion of Jim’s confrontation of Marlow when he believes he has heard himself being 
referred to as a dog. In his narration of that exchange, Marlow states that when Jim asked “Did 
you speak to me?” (44), he, answering in the negative, felt that: 
Something in the sound of that quiet tone of his warned me to be on my defence. I 
watched him. It was very much like a meeting in a wood, only more uncertain in 
its issue, […]. ‘Some mistake,’ I protested, […] never taking my eyes off him. To 
watch his face was like watching a darkening sky before a clap of thunder, shade 
upon shade imperceptibly coming on, the doom growing mysteriously intense in 
the calm of maturing violence. 
I was getting a little angry, too, at the absurdity of this encounter. It strikes me now 
I have never in my life been so near a beating – I mean it literally; a beating with 
fists. I suppose I had some hazy prescience of that eventuality being in the air. Not 
that he was actively threatening me. On the contrary, he was strangely passive […] 
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but he was lowering, and, though not exceptionally big, he looked generally fit to 
demolish a wall. (44 emphasis mine). 
This incident marks the first time Marlow actually comes into direct physical proximity to Jim. 
Hitherto, he has observed him from the distance of an interested or, perhaps, curious, yet 
nonchalant, spectator at the court trial. From his narration, we gather that during much of that 
observation, Marlow simply wonders about Jim’s psychological disposition. So, this close 
encounter represents a defining moment in which he experiences Jim as a rather impetuous 
character. Feeling the need to be ‘on his defence’ against such impetuousness, Marlow also 
indicates the ‘absurdity of the encounter’ and remarks how this made him a little angry. As he 
recalls this confrontation that ‘was very much like a meeting in a wood’, Marlow describes Jim’s 
attitude through the extended metaphor of a ‘darkening sky before a clap of thunder’ and sums 
him up as ‘lowering’. All of these comparisons draw attention to the insinuation of something 
dismal in Jim’s nature that could inadvertently result in calamity either for himself or for people 
he came into contact with. Marlow, in fact, points to this when he states that, as he assessed this 
hostile encounter, he was “conscious of a certain trepidation as to the possibility—nay, 
likelihood—of this encounter ending in some disreputable brawl” which would make him appear 
“ridiculous” (44). 
This sense of trepidation is carried over into Marlow’s journey to Patusan to see how Jim 
is faring. During his visit, he meets the girl aliased ‘Jewel’ with whom Jim has fallen in love in 
Patusan and who expresses her deep anxiety to Marlow about the possibility of Jim eventually 
leaving her. She harbours this fear due to her deep suspicion that Jim is haunted by something he 
is running away from but which he would not reveal to her. She, therefore, charges Marlow to tell 
her what it is; and in his narration of the arduous and “hopeless” (192) task he faces in calming her 
fears, he states that he wished he could simply say to her: “Have no fear!” (192). However, there 
was 
Nothing more difficult. How does one kill fear, I wonder? How do you shoot a 
spectre through the heart, slash off its spectral head, take it by its spectral throat? It 
is an enterprise you rush into while in a dream, and are glad to make your escape 
with wet hair and every limb shaking. The bullet is not run, the blade not forged, 
the man not born; even the winged words of truth drop at your feet like lumps of 
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lead. You require for such a desperate encounter an enchanted and poisoned shaft 
dipped in a lie too subtle to be found on earth. (192, emphasis added).  
In this expression of hopelessness, Marlow compares his efforts to quell Jewel’s fear to a tackle 
with ‘a spectre’. The spectral metaphor alludes to the abstract nature of fear, and therefore, to the 
difficulty of confronting it. Moreover, it also foreshadows my discussion of spectrality in Conrad’s 
Under Western Eyes, where I demonstrate how the protagonist, Razumov, is Othered by being 
progressively stripped of his humanity. Through this form of Othering, he is consistently compared 
to a ghost or linked to notions and images of spectrality. In Lord Jim, we observe that Jim gradually 
undergoes such a form of Othering through references to spectrality made in connection to him. 
Marlow’s reference here to the spectre obviously connotes Jewel’s fear that he is unable to assuage. 
However, knowing what Marlow knows of Jim which he is unable to reveal to Jewel, we realise 
that the spectre here also very much alludes to the truth about Jim’s past, to the secret of his 
shameful cowardice and his constant fear of failure that persistently haunt him. If Jim is a haunted 
man, he is haunted by the ghost of his past failures that resides prominently in his mind and that 
determines all his actions. This spectre, Marlow is unable to suppress in Jim since he can only 
imagine it whereas it remains vividly real for Jim. Consequently, it remains the one thing about 
Jim that defies Marlow’s intervention. Thus, when Cornelius, for his own selfish reasons, tries to 
appeal to him to take Jim away from Patusan, Marlow recalls the sense of hopelessness that he 
feels in the previous incident with Jewel and he states, “I don’t know whether it was the 
demoralisation of my utter defeat in my encounter with a spectre of fear less than an hour ago, but 
I let him capture me without even a show of resistance.” (197). By the end of Marlow’s narrative, 
Jim is overcome by the spectre so that, in his death, he fades out of existence and takes on a 
shadowy quality that casts him in the aspect of spectrality. 
Instances of other encounters that contribute to the Othering of Jim include those directly 
related to the fated Patna in connection with which I mention two associations. There are first the 
“eight hundred pilgrims” (9) aboard the ship. In reference to them, the German skipper remarks, 
“[l]ook at dese cattle” (10), immediately transforming them from an image of persons to one of 
animals – cattle – “driven on board” (9) the ship. Being chief mate of the ship and also being the 
only one among the ship crew who seemed at all concerned about the fate of the pilgrims, it is 
interesting to note that Jim’s association to “dese cattle” carries beyond the fact that he is also 
108 
 
animalised as a “bull” (3) or “bullock” (44, …) to instances where this imagery is extended to his 
environment when, later on in the narrative, he settles down in Patusan. There, he feels that he has 
earned the trust of the people who consider him their protector and, while narrating this to Marlow, 
he surveys “the houses crowding along the wide shining sweep” which “were like a spectral herd 
of shapeless creatures pressing forward to drink in a spectral and lifeless stream. (151, emphasis 
mine). The motif of spectrality recurring here, and accompanied by the suggestion of ‘shapeless’ 
forms and a ‘lifeless stream’  educes the dreamlike nature of the Patusan universe. In this 
metonymic reference to the people of Patusan through a focus on their houses, it is worth noting 
that the house in which Jim lives is also among these settlements. Therefore, if, by inference, the 
people are like “a spectral herd”, then that herd – a term which invariably evokes the image of 
cattle – includes Jim, who is also captured in the spectral nature that qualifies them. Besides, with 
the extended meaning of herd also referent to a herdsman or a keeper of a herd it is interesting to 
remark that a few paragraphs later Marlow states that “[Jim] looked with an owner’s eye […] at 
the river, at the houses, at the […] forest […] but it was they that possessed him and made him 
their own…” (152). Thus, he is at once one of them as well as their keeper – a fact which Marlow 
stresses in his observation that “all [the] things that made him master had made him a captive, too” 
(152). In this sense he is portrayed as captured in a state of hybridity in which he is at once “one 
of us” but also one of them. 
 
MAPPING THE OTHER 
In thinking about Jim as an Other in relation to place and time, I defer to the assertion made by 
Alison Mountz (2009) that “[i]n geographical terms to other means to locate a person […] outside 
of the centre, on the margins” (328). On the premise of this notion, I further my argument that Jim 
is consistently represented as an Other by the evidence of his steady retreat from the maritime 
centre and into the margins. Moreover, I argue that as we go through Marlow’s narrative, we would 
realise that Jim is consistently placed in spaces or situations that suggest his marginalisation, and 
thereby also indicate his Othering through such marginalisation. Throughout my discussion, I have 
regularly made reference to Jim’s retreat to his out-of-the-way hide-out in Patusan. While this 
stands out as the most obvious indication of him gradually relocating into a marginal space, it only 
reflects one way in which he is Othered geographically. To demonstrate other ways in which he 
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undergoes this form of Othering, I point to the fact that in the other ports to which he flees from 
the shame of the Patna Affair, he is excluded (as per the verdict of his trial) from the very centre 
of maritime activity, meaning that he is unable to hold any position within the command of a ship. 
Rather, he is relegated to working in an obsequious position as a “ship-chandler’s water-clerk” (3) 
who is not required to “pass an examination in anything under the sun” (3). This suggestion of a 
base position requiring no professional qualifications casts Jim in the light of a servant. Besides, 
the fact that he is unable to go to sea and remains in the ports to render services to docking vessels 
consolidates the notion that he is marginalised from actual maritime activity. Therefore, in terms 
of the naval centre-stage, Jim is located on the margins (that is in the ports) outside of the maritime 
centre (the sea). These combined situations of servility and marginalisation, indicating a 
debasement of status, contribute to Jim’s construction as an Other. 
The fact that Marlow finds it necessary to specify details, (such as qualification and function), of 
Jim’s debased state draws the reader’s attention to the Othering act performed through Marlow’s 
narration. That this performance evokes a differentiation between central and marginal spaces 
suggests that space plays an essential role in such an act of Othering. Thus, with regard to Jim, we 
get a sense in which his Othering is mapped out through space as he literally wanders about in 
circles, moving from one seaport to another in an effort to run away from places tinged by the 
slightest knowledge of his shameful involvement with the Patna. Nevertheless, Marlow points out 
that, despite how far Jim retreated, “the fact followed him casually but inevitably” (3) and that he 
“became known as a rolling stone, because […] after a time [he had] become perfectly known, and 
even notorious, within the circle of his wanderings” (119). The motif of wandering flight implied 
here in Jim’s peripatetic movements extends from Marlow’s description, very early in the 
narrative, of the state of Jim’s mind as he testifies in court during the hearing of the Patna case. In 
relation to this, we learn that as he recounts the details of the case in court “his mind positively 
flew round and round the serried circle of facts that had surged up all about him to cut him off 
from the rest of his kind” (19). This early allusion to Jim’s agitated psychological state that 
threatens to exclude him from ‘his kind’, is further emphasised through the comparison of him to 
“a creature that, finding itself imprisoned within an enclosure of high stakes, dashes round and 
round, distracted in the night, trying to find a weak spot, a crevice, a place to scale, some opening 
through which it may squeeze itself and escape” (19). This comparison evokes images of 
entrapment within a confined space defined by ‘high stakes’ from which it is difficult to escape. 
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And, throughout the rest of Marlow’s narration, this metaphor of entrapment is constantly 
associated with Jim who remains trapped in his fantasies of himself as by the fact of his failure. 
As he flees in self-exile from this fact, he becomes ‘cut off’ from ‘his kind’. By ‘his kind’, it is 
evident that Marlow implies the astute European, who bears “an unobscured vision, a tenacity of 
purpose, [and] a touch of altruism” (160). Jim, however, has his vision obscured by his lofty 
fantasies and he bears “a sort of sublimated, idealised selfishness” (108) as a result of which he 
tries to prove himself to the world. 
Jim’s strife for fame linked to his fantasised conquests evokes the notion of imperial power 
over conquered territory. For, in many ways, this is what he achieves in the dreamlike Patusan 
where he becomes lord over the people through his demonstration of conquering might and 
superiority over belligerent tribal factions competing with one other for economic and political 
power. Aligning himself with the dominant tribe in Patusan, Jim quickly wins their affection 
because he succeeds in chasing the rival tribe out into the forests and, so, restores calm to the area. 
From Marlow’s narration, we get the impression that Jim seems to have achieved such success 
because as a “white man”, his “racial prestige and the reputation of invincible, supernatural power” 
(220) assure him of “unfailing victory” (220). It is also probably due to the fact that he can be 
racially identified through this whiteness that Marlow unwaveringly insists on his inclusion in the 
ranks of privilege which signifies the ‘us’ group as opposed to the natives in Patusan who are 
identified as brown and grouped as ‘them’. Such a correlation between whiteness and privilege, 
which Marlow subtly alludes to in the narrative, and which is also suggestive of racial superiority, 
is accentuated in the notion that Jim was “quite superior” (120) and also in the assertion that Dain 
Waris, the chief’s son and a native, “knew how to fight like a white man” (160). Such a comparison 
of Dain Waris’ martial skills to that of a white man sets Europeans as the standard against which 
others are evaluated, thereby resonating the master discourse of imperial narratives. Besides, the 
fact that, despite Dain Waris’ ability, Jim, a foreigner, should become the military leader of the 
people in Patusan reinforces the imperial notion of Western superiority. In effect, it becomes 
evident that, among his own kind, Jim is Othered as a result of his inability to live up to the 
expected standard of courage. However, when, through Marlow’s intervention, he relocates to 
Patusan, he excels among the natives due to his superiority as a European.  This reveals how, in 
Conrad’s text, the link between place and subjectivity is perpetuated through what Derek Gregory 
refers to as “geography’s complicity […] in the wider cultures of imperialism” (447). For, through 
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Marlow’s subtle undertones, we inadvertently become aware of the consolidation of Jim’s 
Otherness through his association to “the land, [and] the people” (160) of Patusan. As he exults in 
the realisation of his heroic fantasies in the dreamy land and among the natives who were “like 
people in a book” (159), he equally takes on a fictionalised identity that cuts him off from reality, 
casting him into a dream-like existence in that Patusan. Besides, the fact that this second half of 
the narrative, which presents Jim’s conquests in Patusan, is recounted through explicit references 
to darkness calls attention to his progressive obfuscation, leading to his mystification. This 
mystifying act is further reinforced by the story’s appeal to the imagination. 
It is interesting to note that while Conrad sets his narrative in imaginative places in the 
Pacific coast, he simultaneously attempts to credibly map these sites onto the real territory. In this 
manner, he succeeds in creating a factionalised geographical space which aligns very much with 
his own notions of geographical epochs as expounded in his essay ‘Geography and Some 
Explorers’. In this essay, he delineates three phases of geography that contribute to the 
establishment of imperialism. The first phase is that of Geography Fabulous which connotes the 
“phase of circumstantially extravagant speculation” (3). He states that during this period, ideas of 
existing territories were formed through a navigation of the seas. As Conrad points out, this phase, 
marked by fantasies of unexplored territories, gave rise to the imperial quest to discover 
geographical spaces that were at the time only imagined. This then led up to the second phase of 
Geography Militant which marks the exploration of imagined lands by such adventurers as Captain 
Cook. This second phase provided empirical knowledge about unexplored geographical regions. 
However, it also further fuelled the desire for more scientific knowledge about the farthest reaches 
of other continents. As knowledge increased and fantasy yielded to discovery, Geography Militant 
turned into Geography Triumphant, characterised by the total subjugation of explored territory to 
imperial conquest. As part of this conquest, the imperial agent, styled also as the explorer, 
invariably imposed on the new territory his ideas of other known geographical spaces. Thus, the 
description of the discovered spaces is always predicated upon the knowledge of earlier spaces, 
thereby resulting in an Othering of the new spaces with respect to those that are already known. In 
Lord Jim, Conrad appears to stage these phases of geographical exploits through the 
conceptualisation of space with regard to Jim. As he transposes the imagined territory of his 
narrative onto the real landscape, he transcends from the first epoch of Geography Fabulous to the 
second of Geography Militant, aiming at achieving the final epoch of Geography Triumphant 
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through an appeal to the fertile imaginations of his listeners/ readers. The materialisation of this 
last epoch is evidenced by the vraisemblance of the various settings in which Jim is located and 
by the fact that it is possible to imagine his story as occurring anywhere within the nautical reaches 
of the Eastern colonial empire. It is against such a notion of geographical conquest initiated from 
the Imperial centre and outwards to its margins that the duality of us and them, that Marlow often 
alludes to, is set. However, the possibility of interterritorial spaces located anywhere within the 
interstices of Conrad’s imagined world overthrows this duality, and fixes Jim as an Other captured 
within a third space. To further this argument, I draw on Steve Pile’s interpretation of Bhabha’s 
third space as a “space which avoids the politics of polarity and enables the construction of new 
radical allegiances” (271). Thus, in my conceptualisation of Jim as an Other with regard to space, 
I assert that, in Bhabha’s terms, he falls into “the hybridised spaces of shifting demographies 
produced by […] ‘wandering people who… are themselves the marks of shifting boundaries’” 
(Bhabha, 315). 
 In effect, from Marlow’s narration, we observe that Jim first imagines his heroic self as 
emerging through sea-faring adventures. He, however, comes to a quick realisation of the 
falsehood of such an imagination when he finds himself faced with a real-life challenge that causes 
him to remain on land where he explores other possibilities for self-affirmation. As that also proves 
futile, he retreats to Patusan where his achievements, short-lived as they may be, consolidate his 
imagined idea of himself. It is worth noting that Jim’s geographical trajectory runs parallel to his 
self-construction, thus drawing a correlation between the spaces of the narrative and the phases of 
Jim’s self-evolution. As we observe the real nature of Jim, we also identify him in ‘real’ places 
within the universe of the text. But as he withdraws into his imagined world to live out his heroic 
fantasies, we observe that the geographical location of Patusan is fantasised even in the text, so 
that we get the impression of it being a sort of dreamland. Through this stylistic technique of 
juxtaposing the geographical aspects of the text with the representation of his protagonist, Conrad 
ends up rendering Jim as more imaginary than real as he seems to have “passed away out of 
existence” as he finally dies in Patusan which Marlow describes as “one of the lost, forgotten, 
unknown places of the earth” that could easily “slip out of existence” (196). 
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CHAPTER THREE 
CONTESTING OTHERNESS: UNDER WESTERN EYES 
Joseph Conrad’s novel, Under Western Eyes, is arguably the work in which aspects of the author’s 
personal life are most camouflaged. These aspects comprise his historical heritage which 
encompasses a past marked by the duality of identity – as a Polish born under Russian occupation 
– and a present haunted by the emergence of his personality as a multiplicity of an incongruently 
fused subjecthood – Polish/ Russian/ British; sailor/writer – that he constantly strove to reconcile. 
Thus, the novel can be read as the author’s self-reflexive attempt to sift through such a multiplicity 
of identities in order to construct his own conscious sense of self. In this effort, I opine that the 
writer projects himself and those disquieting aspects of his history onto the character and the 
narrative of his novel in a manner that, panoramic in perspective, allows him, as well as his readers, 
a certain distance of critical objectivity. From this position, therefore, I propose that, in line with 
Conrad’s own words from his autobiographical treatise, A Personal Record, the writer, in an 
indirect way, “lives in his work” as “the only reality in an invented world, among imaginary things, 
happenings, and people” (4).  
Even though in alluding to the imaginary the author establishes the fictionality of his works, the 
fact that certain incidents in his text can be substantiated as corresponding to actual historical 
events lend weight to the argument that the invented world of his Under Western Eyes is, in context 
and form, a palimpsest of the real. Extending from this notion, the conscientious critic may well 
agree with Conrad that when he, as the author, constructs and scripts his invented world,  “he is 
only writing about himself” (A Personal Record 4). In a further reflection on this phenomenon of 
the writer’s presence in his work, Conrad affirms that he “stands confessed in his works” (Record 
155). However, to this admission of self-disclosure in his writing, he quickly contends that “the 
disclosure is not complete” (Record 4). As David Smith observes, a reading of his works, and 
especially of Under Western Eyes, reveals that he desperately tries to distance himself from the 
imaginary world of his text by attempting just such an “incomplete disclosure” (41). This attitude 
of standing only partly confessed, of offering to disclose or to show and then partly holding back, 
results in an ambivalence of perception that thematically colours his writing. It also marks the 
amount of distance that the author imposes between himself and his reader, a distance occupied by 
the tortuous nature of the invented world constructed in his text. Thus, in his deployment of this 
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ambivalent style of exposition, it then becomes obvious that the author’s efforts at self-detachment 
are staged to ensure that, in the novel, he “remains, to a certain extent, a figure behind a veil; a 
suspected rather than a seen presence – a movement and a voice behind the draperies of fiction” 
(Record 12).  
This certainly leaves the reader with the uncanny notion of a certain amount of inscrutability in his 
works, which, Smith affirms, “is a central element in Conrad’s voice” (Smith 41). Notwithstanding 
this inscrutability, critical scholarship by Smith, William Blackburn, Keith Carabine, Paul Eggert, 
and Josiane Paccaud-Huguet, among others, has shown that Conrad’s personal engagement with 
his writing inadvertently reveals more than he would probably ordinarily disclose. It is on the basis 
of such reasoning that Under Western Eyes has been cited as the most autobiographical of all his 
works because of the intensity with which he personally engages with the narrative and especially 
with the characterisation of his protagonist, Kyrilo Sidorovitch Razumov (Smith 40). It is, after 
all, the text on which he lingered the longest in its writing and has been recorded as the one after 
the writing of which he suffered a major “complete nervous breakdown” (Blackburn 192). Besides, 
his writing of this novel was plagued by intermittent hiatuses; and the text itself is replete with 
expressions of his personal views on issues from his past and his responses to criticism and 
pressure on him, associated with his writing (Carabine 6). 
Following from such propositions of Conrad’s presence in his text, even if only partly 
disclosed; and of his struggles at self-effacement by resorting to a strategy of representational 
ambivalence creating inscrutability, I examine, in this chapter, Conrad’s characteristic style of 
distancing through his use of techniques that I identify as Othering modes of representation. I 
propose that in Under Western Eyes, he depicts such Othering through the techniques of 
disembodiment and doubling, primarily enhanced by the overarching deployment of spectrality. 
For my exploration of these forms of Othering in this novel, I draw on Sigmund Freud’s notion of 
the uncanny, Jacques Derrida’s concept of hauntology and on Homi Bhabha’s discussion of the 
ambivalent and hybrid condition of the Other, among other theoretical approaches. In my analysis 
I aim to show that while Conrad captures his characters in terms of alterity through the manner in 
which he characterises them, the agentic qualities that he ascribes to them depicts a subtle 
resistance to their representation as Others under the oppressive system of imperialism into which 
they cast, both literally and in socio-political terms. 
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Much research literature on the novel draws intertextual links between Under Western Eyes 
(published in 1911) and the work of Russian writer Fyodor Dostoevsky (1821-1881). The notion 
that Conrad’s novel is in many ways a response to Dostoevsky’s Crime and Punishment is 
predominant in this critical tradition. However, Paul Kirschner argues beyond the influence of this 
single text and asserts that Dostoevsky’s A Raw Youth also strongly influences Conrad’s novel 
(Kirschner 178-179). Acknowledging the validity of this claim, Jeremy Hawthorn takes this 
argument even further and points out that, at the textual level, an even more compelling case for 
intertextuality could be drawn from Dostoevsky’s “The Double” (Hawthorn 44). In corroboration 
of Hawthorn’s claim, an example of “The Double” as intertext for Conrad’s novel is cited by 
Carola M. Kaplan in her discussion of “Conrad’s Narrative Occupation of/by Russia in Under 
Western Eyes”. Such persistent critical debate illuminates the fact that even though the similarities 
between Raskolnikov in Dostoevsky’s Crime and Punishment and Razumov in Conrad’s Under 
Western Eyes cannot be ignored, evidence put forth by other critical examinations of Conrad’s 
novel attest to the fact that combined influences from other works of Dostoevsky can equally be 
detected in Under Western Eyes, which among Conrad’s writings stands out exclusively as the 
only work in which he deals with his historical, and rather pained, connections to Russia. These 
parallels between Conrad and Dostoesvsky are significant because Conrad had declared himself 
opposed to Dostoevsky’s dogmatism on the necessity and value of suffering, through a Christian 
messianic model, which he (Dostoevsky) insisted, through his writings, was the very foundation 
of Russian nationalism. In this affirmation of a nationalism founded primarily on his claims to 
what Carabine has described as “the spiritual leadership of the Slav world” (Carabine, The Life 
and the Art, 80), Dostoevsky defended his ideology through a hateful segregationist caution against 
Poles whom he branded as threats to the Russian ‘soul’ due to their “‘typical exclusiveness’ and 
[…] ‘national and social aloofness’” (Waclaw Lednicki 277 cited in Carabine 77). As Richard 
Curle observes, such hateful sentiments expressed against the Polish resulted in the fact that 
“[t]here was no name in literature that Conrad detested more than that of Dostoevsky, and usually 
the mere mention of the name drove him into a fury” (14). Therefore, as earlier scholars have 
shown, Conrad expressed his hatred for Dostoevsky by attempting to distance himself from the 
great Russian nationalist writer (Carabine 80). In this distancing effort, he insists, in a letter to 
Robert Garnett, that Dostoevsky is “too Russian for me” (Conrad, Letters, 240). Much research 
has, however, revealed that his distancing efforts proved unsuccessful as many critics have 
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demonstrated an abiding literary and ideological entanglement between the two writers. In effect, 
the more Conrad claims a dislike for his Russian predecessor, the more tenable it is to detect 
Dostoevsky’s unshakeable influence over him; or, at least, to discern a somewhat indirect influence 
in the form of what Jeffrey Berman has called “Conrad’s intense unconscious identification with 
the hated Russian novelist” (Berman 6).  
In a further consideration of intertextuality in Under Western Eyes, research has shown that 
besides the compelling arguments of a strong, even if unconscious, influence of Dostoevsky on 
this novel, snippets from Conrad’s own writing, especially from his short story “The Secret 
Sharer”, are also present in the novel. As Carabine points out, this may be accounted for by the 
fact that during the writing of Under Western Eyes, Conrad paused to write “The Secret Sharer” 
from start to finish before continuing with the novel. As a result, the motif of doubling which he 
primarily deploys in the short story is repeated in the novel; and so also are the themes of murder, 
confession, and trust, albeit with different outcomes in the individual texts. In relation to this, 
Hawthorn, examining this intertextuality in Conrad’s novel, draws on Lévi-Strauss’s concept of 
bricolage and insists that “tracing sources is different from establishing functions”, and so 
borrowings from another writer or tradition can be used to achieve completely different roles in 
different texts (Hawthorn 39). It is in this way that, like many of his other writings, Under Western 
Eyes affirms Conrad’s genius in unifying all of the intertextual elements into a refreshingly 
different narrative. 
As a result of such intertextuality, even between his own works, I argue that Conrad, as in 
his other works, conforms to a formulaic pattern of Othering to phenomenologically explore the 
existentialism of his subjects. In line with this pattern, his main character in Under Western Eyes, 
Razumov is Othered through a form of disembodiment that is hinged on the haunting spectrality 
and phantomisation of Haldin, who is revealed to be Razumov’s double. This portentous 
combination of the haunt and the double evokes Sigmund Freud’s notion of the uncanny as “that 
class of the frightening which leads back to what is known of old and familiar” (220). In further 
exposition of this notion, Freud emphasises that “this uncanny is in reality nothing new or alien, 
but something which is familiar and old-established in the mind and which has become alienated 
only through the process of repression” (241). In his discourse on this ‘uncanny’ phenomenon, 
rendered from the original term unheimlich, Freud cites several examples that point to that which 
117 
 
is not only oddly familiar yet frightening but which also has a double effect upon the subject. In 
his discussion, he infers that this uncanniness can in actual fact create such a doubling effect in 
relation to “things, persons, impressions, events and situations” (226) that one is almost never 
entirely certain about the clear boundaries between reality and imagination. From this perspective 
of the double and its relation to the uncanny, a close reading of Conrad’s works will reveal a heavy 
reliance on this dual trope consisting of both the double/doppelganger and the uncanny, to varying 
degrees, across all of his writing.  
Thus, even though the motif of the double as in The Secret Agent (published in 1907) and 
then in “The Secret Sharer” (published in 1910) recurs here, albeit somewhat differently, Joseph 
Conrad’s Under Western Eyes is arguably the novel in which he most extensively combines this 
trope with the metaphor of the spectre throughout his writing to explore his ever-decisive theme 
of betrayal with its concomitant need for confession, justification or a striving to be understood. 
In this way, Conrad demonstrates a deep and persistent concern with the individual’s betrayal of 
what may be seen as universal human values, resulting in a violation of that subject’s humanity. 
Although my overarching argument in this project is to point out that in many of Conrad’s works 
it is possible to detect an Other (usually male) who is peculiarly characterised in specific ways that 
distinguish him from given social norms or standards suggested in the narrative, I demonstrate in 
this discussion that Under Western Eyes also depicts forms of subversion, expressed mainly 
through denial and self-assertion, that hint at a contestation of the epistemic violence that Othering 
inflicts on subaltern subjects.  
Very early in the narrative, we are introduced to Razumov, “a very promising student” (14) 
of St. Petersburg University who, by his intelligent, quiet and amiable nature, inspires trust in his 
colleagues. Living in Russia “in a period of mental and political unrest” (16), he has an acute sense 
of the “emotional tension of his time” (17) and tries to avoid getting entangled in it by concerning 
himself mainly with his personal development towards his future. However, his aspirations and 
diligent self-application are wrecked by Victor Haldin, a fellow student with revolutionary ideas. 
The main event around which the plot of Under Western Eyes revolves is the assassination of a 
much disliked Minister of State on a busy street in the city of St. Petersburg. Having commited 
this political crime as a “necessity” (27), Victor Haldin seeks refuge in the rooms of Razumov who 
he believes shares similar philosophical and revolutionary convictions and from whom he hopes 
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to receive sympathy and help. Out of trust, he confesses to Razumov his involvement in the 
assassination and solicits his help, requesting that Razumov find Ziemianitch, who would help him 
(Haldin) escape. Faced with the dread of becoming associated with Haldin and his crime, Razumov 
goes out to look for Ziemianitch, if only to get rid of Haldin. When he locates Ziemianitch, the 
latter is hopelessly drunk and Razumov beats him severely out of frustration. With a deep sense of 
the threat posed to him by Haldin’s imposition of his situation on him, Razumov becomes acutely 
aware of his social isolation and his lack of family relations. In an unconscious attempt towards 
self-preservation, he decides to betray Haldin to the authorities, and does so secretly, quite contrary 
to Haldin’s expectations. Consequently, Haldin is arrested, interrogated and executed. However, 
far from feeling relieved that he has done the right thing, Razumov is ridden with guilt and finds 
it difficult to get back to his normal life. Moreover, he is perceived as a possible accomplice who 
is secretly revered by the revolutionaries while being carefully watched by the authorities. 
As a result of his act of betrayal, Conrad’s embattled protagonist, is trapped, throughout 
the remainder of the novel, in a haunting narrative of guilt, introspection, remorse and the pressing 
desire to unburden himself of the cowardly act of living with falsehood. Through the reflective 
recounting of the narrator, Conrad affirms that Razumov’s struggle with the morality of his actions 
is representative of the “moral corruption of an oppressed society” (UWE, 14). It is from this 
analysis that I assert that, in keeping with his predominant style of launching an enquiry into the 
motives behind human actions through his characters, Conrad signals the ambiguity of his mission 
by typically resorting to the technique of distancing through the creation of an Other. In Under 
Western Eyes, this Other is captured predominantly but not entirely in the character of Razumov, 
through whom he critically examines the subject’s ability for personal and social integration. It is 
also through this Other that Conrad, doubling as the narrator, invites, prompts and even provokes 
his readers to assess and judge the actions, convictions and personalities of his characters. As I 
may have earlier implied, Conrad’s deployment of the Othering techniques of disembodiment and 
doubling enable him to establish a distance of critical objectivity between the reader and the text. 
In addition to this, his use of the technique of spectrality leads to the obfuscation of the Other, 
causing an ambivalence in the specificity of that Other. In effect, there occurs, in this novel, a 
constant shifting of the identity of the Other, a phenomenon which makes it almost impossible to 
pin the condition of Otherness on any one character, and especially not determinately on the 
protagonist, Razumov. Thus, although, to a large extent, the Other is often associated with 
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Razumov, directly as a primary subject and indirectly as the other half of a double construct 
consisting of himself and Haldin; at other times we identify the Other in relation to other 
characters, including Peter Ivanovitch, the “heroic fugitive” (110) and “a revolutionary feminist” 
(115) who is considered a “great man” (174) and the leader of the revolutionists in Geneva; 
Madame de S— known also as Eleanor Maximovna, the “Egeria of Peter Ivanovitch”; and Tekla, 
the maltreated and disillusioned servant of Madame de S—. A few more characters that we can 
identify as Others in the novel are Julius Laspara, the Geneva-based pamphleteer of the 
revolutionists; Sophia Antanovna, the “woman revolutionist” (207); Nikita, “surnamed Necator”, 
the “executioner of revolutionary verdicts” (223); and Mrs Haldin, Victor Haldin’s mother. 
In my overall discussion of Conrad’s works, such an exploration of the Other is important 
as it demonstrates that the writer’s portrayal of alterity is really a function of his preoccupation 
with identity and subjectivity and does not by any stretch of the imagination represent an 
intentional attempt to depict Otherness simply for the sake of establishing racial, political or 
cultural difference. From this perspective on Conrad’s construction of subjectivity, I anticipate that 
a consideration of the multiplicity and disparity of his Others may induce the reader to free his 
writings from what Haripersad Sewlall rightly describes as the “stranglehold of the Manichean 
paradigm in terms of which alterity or otherness is perceived” (Sewlall ii). Besides, my analysis 
of Under Western Eyes will demonstrate that Conrad’s often ambivalent identification and 
representation of the Other makes it untenable to frame his writing within the restrictions of a 
Manichean binary paradigm. 
 
ALMOST… BUT NOT QUITE 
Right from the onset of the narrative, Conrad’s ambivalence of representation can already be 
detected in the portrayal of his protagonist, Razumov. In the author’s description of the character, 
the reader will notice a progressive blurring of Razumov’s features, culminating in his being 
depicted as an Other. Focusing, from the start, on the character’s physical qualities, Conrad draws 
attention to the indistinct nature of Razumov’s appearance and reveals to us that he is different. 
Although he tardily states that he thinks that Razumov is “sufficiently good-looking” (13), his 
earlier description of Razumov as being “quite unusually dark for a Russian from the Central 
Provinces” (12) cannot escape the careful reader. Besides, he declares that:  
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[Razumov’s] good looks would have been unquestionable if it had not been for a 
peculiar lack of fineness in [his] features. […] as if a face modelled vigorously in 
wax (with some approach even to a classical correctness of type) had been held 
close to a fire till all sharpness of line had been lost in the softening of the material” 
(UWE 12-13). 
In these depictions of the main character, Conrad first sets him apart from what he considers the 
usual type by making reference to his complexion which, according to him, is “unusually dark”. 
Then, secondly he describes his features as bearing a “lack of fineness”, hinting at a sort of 
inadequacy or defect. From this depiction of Razumov as not quite conforming to a certain mould, 
Conrad proceeds to progressively depersonalise him, capturing him as “a face modelled vigorously 
in wax”. Yet still in this objectification, he states that “some approach even” is made at moulding 
the wax face according to “a classical correctness of type”, thus underscoring his earlier insinuation 
of a shortfall that implies that the mould does not quite meet the standard. Further expanding upon 
the metaphor of wax, he then totally dehumanises the character, referring to him finally as “the 
material” which, upon being held close to the fire, loses “all sharpness of line” as a result of its 
“softening”. In this subtle and almost imperceptible manner, Conrad already establishes Razumov 
as the Other who is close to the standard but does not quite make the mark; or from Homi Bhabha’s 
notion of the Other, he is “almost the same but not quite” (Bhabha 1994c: 86). Representing 
Razumov in this way as an Other by an initial focus on his complexion, and then on his features, 
which are captured within the boundaries of a face (used metonymically to stand for the character), 
right through to reducing him to an object by casting the face in a mould of wax, and then to an 
abstract material, Conrad transforms Razumov from human subject to material object, from self to 
Other. In thus breaking down the subject from whole to part, human to material, palpable to 
abstract, Conrad hints at a fragmentation of the subject which constitutes an incompleteness, 
capturing the subject in a state of Otherness that, in Lacanian terms, depicts “the […] subject [as] 
essentially and irrevocably fragmented and incapable of the full occupation of self” (Sexton, 621). 
In juxtaposition to the description of his physical features, in this early representation of 
Razumov, the reader is provided with a further critical description of his personality. Conrad 
reveals that 
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In discussion [Razumov] was easily swayed by argument and authority. With his 
younger compatriots he took the attitude of an inscrutable listener, a listener of the 
kind that hears you out intelligently and then – just changes the subject. 
This sort of trick, which may arise either from intellectual insufficiency or from an 
imperfect trust in one’s own convictions, procured for Mr. Razumov a reputation 
of profundity. (13) 
 
As an expansion upon the earlier description of him, Razumov’s psychological disposition is laid 
bare in a circuitous manner that foregrounds his susceptibility. In this description, the writer 
portrays the character as a rather impressionable individual who masks his mental vulnerability 
with affected discernibility. In further reference to this attitude as “some sort of trick”, Conrad 
moreover attributes Razumov’s covert nature to the suspicion of further possible deficiencies in 
the form of “intellectual insufficiency” or “an imperfect trust in one’s own convictions”. 
Suggestively stating that Razumov’s attitude, which bears hints of intellectual dearth, have 
ironically earned him “a reputation of profundity”, the writer is quick to point out in a follow-up 
statement that in the midst of “a lot of exuberant talkers, in the habit of exhausting themselves 
daily by ardent discussion, a comparatively taciturn personality is naturally credited with reserve 
power” (13). In effect, the reader is left in little doubt about the equivocal nature of Razumov’s 
intellectual capability. This equivocation encompasses a form of ambivalence that translates, in 
the persona of the character, into conflict. Summarising this correlation between his outer 
appearance and his inner capabilities, Carola Kaplan asserts that Razumov’s “blurry physiognomy 
symbolizes his inner formlessness” (109).  Drawing on this notion of the character’s formlessness, 
I suggest that such an interpretation is actually intended from the introductory description of the 
character, and it anticipates Razumov’s efforts at constructing his identity through the arduous task 
of firmly shaping his convictions. These convictions, however, are themselves dictated and 
controlled by the oppressive imperial system from which he cannot escape. 
In Michel Foucault’s formulation of the notion of subjecthood, he conceptualises the 
individual subject as an emergent entity that gains integration (on both social and political levels) 
on the condition of transformation determined by socio-political mechanisms and also by 
conformity to a specific pattern of meanings and conduct (Foucault, “Subject and Power”, 132; 
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138). Such a configuration (of meanings and behaviour) is shaped by the very society in which the 
subject finds himself/herself, and in his/her subjectivity, he/she becomes simultaneously a subject 
of, as he/she is subjected to the political economy of his/her particular society and time (Foucault, 
“Subject and Power”, 130). In such a conceptualisation of subjecthood, the individual is bound by 
expectation – socially, and politically – which gives rise to the philosophical problem of 
determining what one is at any particular moment (Foucault 134). In a further elaboration of this 
problem, Foucault points out that the method of redress is, perhaps, for the individual not to 
discover what he/she is but to refuse what he/she is so he/she can imagine and construct what 
he/she could be so as to get rid of and to liberate himself/herself from the political “‘double bind,’ 
which is the simultaneous individualization and totalization of [the] […] power structures” 
(Foucault 134).  
This seems to be the sort of political double bind that Razumov finds himself caught in, 
and against which he is finally forced to define himself relying on that supposed “profundity” that 
has earned him the reputation of a “thinker” (UWE 81), and that causes others, especially Haldin, 
to assume that he shares their ideas of revolution against the tyrannical political system. Upon 
becoming involved with Haldin, Razumov, whose ambiguous nature has already been hinted at, 
becomes conflicted within himself. His conflict is both ethical and psychological. On an ethical 
level, he is beset by the overriding concern with human nature in terms of the binaries of morality; 
whereas on a psychological level, he struggles with the positive and adverse forces of his 
emotionally-driven thoughts and his appeal to rationality.  
This internal conflict results in a dualism in him that smacks of hybridity. Additionally, it 
also results in the creation of his Otherness. In his conflicted state he needs to clarify for himself, 
on the one hand, what his personal convictions are and, therefore, where his true allegiances lie: 
with the autocrats or with the revolutionaries, the suppressive forces or the silenced majority. Yet, 
on the other hand, he also needs to work out his identity and heritage in terms of how he is related 
to the society around him and, therefore, how his experience of this state of being or belonging 
shapes his subjectivity within the social sphere. As he struggles through these existential issues 
after Haldin’s imposition on him, he is, on a subconscious level, simultaneously developing his 
own personality away and removed from all that is familiar to him and that he has learnt to conform 
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to within the oppressive system. These include his dreams and his desires, all that he thinks or 
believes he could be supported to become if he stays on the right side of the system. 
In his examination of how surveillance functions through a panopticon system to control 
behaviour and reinforce power, Foucault, in Discipline and Punish states that in the interest of 
maintaining discipline and order within any structure (prison, school, factory, etc) of society, a 
system of “hierarchized, continuous and functional surveillance” is operated by a governing body 
in order to ensure compliance from its subjects (Foucault, Discipline, 176). He further notes that 
under such surveillance, the subject becomes self-conscious of its conduct, so that even in the 
absence of active surveillance, the individual, having developed an “anxious awareness of being 
observed” (Foucault, Discipline, 202) is forced into compliance anyway as a result of a sense of 
passive surveillance. Thus, “real subjection is born mechanically from a fictitious relation” 
(Foucault, Discipline, 202); and the individual “who is subjected to a field of visibility, and who 
knows it, assumes responsibility for the constraints of power, he makes them play spontaneously 
upon himself; he inscribes in himself the power relation in which he simultaneously plays both 
roles; he becomes the principle of his own subjection” (Discipline, 202-203). Manipulated by a 
despotic political system into this kind of compliance, Razumov, attempts to live within the limits 
of a dynamic normalisation.  
He desires greatness, but only along the model of greatness prescribed by the system and 
sanctioned by ‘great’ personalities he has encountered such as Prince K. The requirement of this 
model is education, and we learn very early on in the narrative that Razumov’s “main concern” is 
“with his work, his studies, and with his own future” (17). He has diligently prepared for 
examinations and is preparing to write a prize essay with the aim of winning a coveted silver 
medal. This aspiration to be considered qualified evokes also the Foucauldian notion that 
“examination combines the technique of an observing hierarchy and those of a normalizing 
judgement. It is a normalizing gaze, a surveillance that makes it possible to qualify, to classify and 
to punish” (Discipline, 184). Guided by these formalities of the normalising gaze of such a 
“domination-observation” (Foucault, Discipline, 305) despotic government, Razumov is 
unconsciously cowed into submitting to the system and its prescribed modes for self-development. 
Thus, for him, the encounter with Haldin becomes an encounter with the dreaded Other, an 
encounter marked by repulsion and scorn. Razumov thus locates the Other as external to himself. 
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In effect, what he does is to enact a resistance performance through the externalisation of his 
Otherness, and thus to attempt a separation of that Otherness from himself.  
However, since he is himself irrevocably Other, his repudiation of identification with 
Haldin culminates in the effect that the representation of that Otherness manifests as an “internal 
and unchangeable condition” (Sexton, 621) of his existence. Further drawing on Sexton’s 
summation of alterity, I suggest that, resulting from his inability to separate the Other from himself, 
for Razumov, “the Other is thus basically a locus of forces which enables the emergence of the 
subject but, at the same time, leaves the subject permanently fragmented and in perpetual slavery 
to desire” (Sexton, 621). Following from Sexton’s analysis, we could infer that Haldin only 
becomes a correlative for Razumov’s lack and helps to affirm his lack of complete selfhood or 
subjectivity. In effect, Razumov is caught in a contorted performance of resistance and self-
assertion in which he repudiates and yet affirms the Other, which is at once himself and also outside 
of himself. From the general notion of the concept of resistance performance as a form of 
subversive representation, Marvin Carlson points out that such a form of expression functions as 
a mode of asserting one’s subjectivity. From this premise he states that in order to represent oneself 
differently from how one has been socially coded, it becomes necessary to use some “strategy 
suggested by de Certeau’s ‘tactics,’ which he sees as activities: that ‘belong to the other,’ outside 
the institutionalized space of ‘proper’ activity” (Carlson, 309). In effect, Carlson asserts that the 
“central concern of resistant performance arises from the dangerous game it plays as a double-
agent […] [as] complicity and subversion are inextricably intertwined” (310).  
In the analysis of Razumov’s ‘tactics’, we may perceive such a concern for precariousness. 
For, in his sustained effort to disconnect himself from Haldin, not only does he physically get 
caught in the dangerous role of a double-agent, but he is also both ethically and psychologically 
tormented in the performance of this role. This derives from the fact that at the level of the 
conscious as well as of the subconscious he struggles to deny the Other, which is also himself, 
even though he remains undeniably aware of its existence. As a result, in his doubling act, he 
becomes invariably complicit in the existence of the Other, enabling it, enacting it, and embodying 
it, even while he strives to subvert it. In other words, he is performing or ‘doing’ the Other while 
yet trying to ‘undo’ it. 
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Furthermore, the reader perceives in the encounter between Haldin and Razumov, the 
meeting of Razumov with his double. For Haldin is himself an Other, representing the suppressed 
subject and embodying the violent rage of the “disarticulated subaltern” (Parry, 45) against the 
repressive autocratic power apparatus. In relation to Razumov, Haldin represents the converse 
image of the same mould of the Other into which Razumov is cast. Where Razumov is the 
conforming Other of the system, Haldin is the militant Other. After he has learnt about Haldin’s 
crime and goes out ostensibly to help to arrange an escape plan for him, Razumov, even while 
trying to convince himself that the right thing to do is to give Haldin up to the authorities, still 
pairs himself with Haldin as he contemplates: “What is this Haldin? And what am I? Only two 
grains of sand. But a great mountain is made up of just such insignificant grains. […] Do I want 
his death? No! I would save him if I could – but no one can do that – he is the withered member 
which must be cut off” (37).  
Symbolising himself and Haldin as two insignificant grains of sand in the metaphorical 
mountain of the suppressed population, Razumov identifies himself on the same side of the power 
divide as Haldin. In a further metaphorical representation that conjures the biblical allusion of the 
pruning of the withered branches of a vine, he refers to Haldin as the “withered member” that 
“must be cut off”, with the implication that he is himself a healthy branch and must not be 
destroyed for Haldin’s crime. In connection to this he declares: “If I must perish through him, let 
me at least not perish with him, and associated against my will with his sombre folly that 
understands nothing either of men or things” (37). Consequently, upon persuading himself that he 
is doing the right thing, Razumov resolves to betray Haldin based on his belief in the system, on 
his personal convictions and in what he considers to be his “superior” ability to reason (37).  
In his rational assessment of this decision, he affirms that there are problems with the 
system: “Despotic bureaucracy… abuses… corruption” (37). However, he also asserts that, in spite 
of these, “absolute power should be preserved – the tool ready for the man – for the great autocrat 
of the future” (37). Therefore, to a large extent, it is this belief in the preservation of absolute 
power and in autocracy that pushes him to betray Haldin. In this respect, he is hardly very different 
from Haldin, or from the other revolutionaries, in his nationalistic expressions or aspirations, as it 
becomes evident that deeply ingrained in the national psyche of all the Russians presented in the 
novel is a political esteem for autocratic rule. In a similar observation of the prevalence of such 
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despotic sentiments among the Russians within the narrative, Kaplan states: “Russia’s 
revolutionaries cannot conceive of a true alternative to autocracy. Each cherishes a conception of 
Russia’s future that is in fact but a variant of a despotic regime. […]. Even Razumov, loyalist and 
anti-revolutionary, when threatened by the imminent loss of his freedom, longs for a despot” (109). 
Thus, even though he is as dogmatic in his thinking as is Haldin, in his contemplation, 
Razumov weighs the corruption of the system against the crime of the individual and decides to 
embrace the system rather than to be associated in any way with the oppressed radical. He also 
believes in upholding the system because he believes that with diligence he could himself someday 
become a part of that system as “a celebrated old professor, decorated, possibly a Privy Councillor, 
one of the glories of Russia” (19). Thus, in choosing the system over the individual, he submits to 
the system. He submits not because he supports the suppression of the poor masses that the 
domination of power prescribes. But rather, he submits because he unconsciously locates himself 
in an interstice between servant and despot where he finds that, for many others like himself, it is 
easier to assume the role/s scripted for him by the system than to attempt to sever himself from a 
structure, organised though oppressive, that has traditionally provided him with direction and 
value, and that feeds his future fantasies with promise.  
He, therefore, performs an enactment of compliance to the system through a mental 
deliberation with himself, a deliberation which approximates an act of orality which itself is 
overdetermined in the act of being remembered and recorded in the written account of his diary. 
Nonetheless, it becomes obvious that in his performativity as the compliant social being within a 
repressive social symbolic order, Razumov, in Lacanian terms, perceives himself “as a stable form 
but [he] does so only by means of an image which is not truly identical with [himself] but [is] other 
and alien” (Sexton 621). In this sense, he constructs a self-image that is “structured by 
misidentification” (Sexton 621). According to Lacan, all subjects are split as a result of 
misidentifications and illusions of an imaginary identity. From this perspective, Razumov, 
constructs an image of his future self through the desire to gain the admiration of Prince K—‘s 
legitimate family.  
However this desire is really the desire for legitimisation from Prince K—, his natural 
father, who has failed to acknowledge him as his son. Since his desire for future greatness is tied 
to his subconscious desire for legitimisation, what he constructs as that future self remains only an 
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illusion based on the fact that, on a social and biographical level, his relationship to his biological 
father is never legitimised. He constantly lives with the fact of being the verboten Other of his 
patrilineal line. Therefore, in identifying with the fantastic images of his potential future self, 
presented to him by the system through images such as those of his illegitimating father, turned 
benefactor, Prince K—; and in choosing the system over the individual, based on his fantasised 
possibilities for self-actualisation, Razumov also loses his own individuality through his 
submission to the system. 
Clearly, at the time of becoming implicated in Haldin’s problems, Razumov is aware that, 
socially, he is located on the same side of disadvantage as Haldin. He is conscious of the fact that 
his future depends indeterminately on a set of possibilities, or perhaps he is unconsciously aware 
of this. So, what motivates him to give Haldin up? It is not an overbearing moral sense of the 
viciousness of Haldin’s act of assassination: he does not appear to care much about that. But 
Razumov thinks of himself, of his self-preservation above all else. He is anxious to make sure that 
he is in no way associated with Haldin’s act. Nevertheless, however much he tries to disentangle 
himself from Haldin and his crime, he ends up only becoming more embedded and wrapped up in 
the intrigue of it. By giving Haldin up, Razumov thinks he may be able to resolve his conflict 
between allegiance and self-preservation, (and also, to a large extent, self-actualisation or even 
subjectivity). It is for this reason that the conflict he experiences takes on both ethical and 
psychological dimensions. Ethical because, in relation to the social bond he shares with Haldin, it 
expresses a dualism in terms of good and evil, right or wrong; and psychological in that it expresses 
a dualism in terms of reason and emotion of the conscious or unconscious. Thus, in his split self 
he is plagued by an ambivalence of identification resulting from antithetical principles. 
 
THE THINKING REED 
Razumov identifies Haldin as an Other especially because he perceives him as the non-conforming 
subject of autocratic rule. On the other hand, even though he is himself the non-legitimised subject 
of patriarchal order, in his own need to conform, he strives to identify more with the power 
apparatus and thus with his idea of the dominant self, constructed through his fantasised future 
self-image within the oppressive system. As a result, he fails to consciously see his own Otherness 
and projects this Otherness onto Victor Haldin who represents for him all that he repudiates and 
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wishes to dissociate from. Thus, the identity of the Other shifts onto Haldin who, for us, becomes 
twice Othered in this respect because he represents the Other of the Othered subject, Razumov. An 
essential element that contributes to his perception of Haldin as Other, is the fact that Razumov 
deems himself superior in intellect and in morality to Haldin and also to most of the other 
characters he encounters. Despite the narrator’s earlier description of him which hints at 
intellectual dearth, Razumov, until the very end when he confesses his betrayal to Natalia, Haldin’s 
sister, thinks of himself as “an intellectual worker” (291) and superior in his thinking. We gather 
from the narrator’s perspective that when, at his inquisition before Councillor Gregor Mikulin, 
Razumov felt terrified by the suspicion that he is being interrogated as a suspected accomplice to 
Haldin, the “renewed sense of his intellectual superiority sustained him in the hour of danger” (80).  
In his appeal against that “danger” of being yoked together with Haldin in the senseless crime of 
murder, he declares: “I know I am but a reed. But I beg you to allow me the superiority of the 
thinking reed over the unthinking forces that are about to crush him out of existence” (80). In this 
evocation of Blaise Pascal’s thoughts on the nobility of man as a thinking reed (347), Razumov 
insists that he be separated from the recklessness of “unthinking forces” by reason of his ability to 
engage in “[p]ractical thinking” (80). Besides, the evocation also alludes to the notions of social 
and biological determination which influence the actions of political or naturalist forces fashioned 
by the despotic nature of the system. In the character’s reference to himself as the ‘thinking reed’, 
it is clear that, in his estimation, he perceives of his purported thinking ability as a mark of his 
“inscrutable superiority” (234). In fact, as the reader will discover, Razumov’s notion of his own 
superiority is not only revealed through such instances of his perception of himself or the narrator’s 
depictions of him, but it is also indicated through his interactions with other characters. Right from 
the onset of the events that set the narrative in motion, Haldin, in his confession to Razumov about 
his involvement in the assassination of Mr. de P—, declares that he reverted to Razumov for help 
because he trusted him, and also because he was the “last person that could be suspected” (23) if 
he (Haldin) got caught.  
Yet the reader can quickly discern that an additional reason, perhaps unconscious though, for 
which Haldin seeks Razumov out is his need for mental catharsis, which he is invariably denied. 
In his subconscious appeal to Razumov to be heard out, he states: “speaking to a superior mind 
like yours I can well say all the truth” (23). On the one hand, this statement may arguably just be 
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a ruse of flattery to get Razumov to take him in – in which case it evidently worked. On the other 
hand, ingratiating as his statement may be, in his assertion of Razumov as bearing a “superior 
mind”, Haldin symmetrically distinguishes himself as one of the “inferior mortals” (258) who take 
quick recourse to revolt rather than to reason. From this rather sycophantic stance, he further 
asserts Razumov’s superiority as he declares: 
Some day you shall help to build. You suppose that I am a terrorist, now – a destructor of 
what is. But consider that the true destroyers are they who destroy the spirit of progress 
and truth, not the avengers who merely kill the bodies of the persecutors of human dignity. 
Men like me are necessary to make room for self-contained, thinking men like you. Well, 
we have made the sacrifice of our lives, but all the same I want to escape if it can be done. 
It is not my life I want to save, but my power to do. (24).  
In this unctuous analysis of their individual worth, Haldin, playing on the presumption of his 
relative inferiority, depicts himself in negative terms – ‘terrorist’, ‘destructor’, one who kills – as 
opposed to Razumov whom he constructs, through what may appear to be very calculated flattery, 
in positive terms as one who ‘shall help to build’, and who is a ‘self-contained’ and ‘thinking’ 
individual. Making it clear in this assessment that the one type needs the other, from the contrast 
that Haldin draws between himself and Razumov, he also hints at a complementarity between 
‘thinking men’ and men like himself who act, without much thought, exercising their ‘power to 
do’. Thus, he argues that this instinctive will to act is essential for creating the opportunity to build. 
Therefore, in his desire to get away it is this ‘power to do’ rather than his own life that he is eager 
to save. It is important to note that even while in his construction of the two seemingly different 
types of individuals, he highlights the dichotomy between the two, he, nonetheless, underscores 
the necessity of both types of men, thinking and doing, for the overall structure of power. 
However, despite Haldin’s rather fawning assessment of the relationship between them 
both, Razumov, on the other hand, rejects any such association as, in his contemplations leading 
to his betrayal of Haldin, he reflects: “What are the luridly smoky lucubrations of that fellow to 
the clear grasp of my intellect?” (36). As he considers how he may ensure no affinity whatsoever 
to Haldin, he is “inspired” by some “superior power” “with a flow of masterly argument” (36) and 
determinedly protests: “If I must suffer let me at least suffer for my convictions, not for a crime 
that my reason – my cool superior reason – rejects” (36-37). This assertion of possessing certain 
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convictions through reasoning elicits from him the notion that he must reject Haldin’s actions as 
an “attractive error” and rather embrace “the stern Russian truth” (37) of preserving autocratic 
rule. This, he believes, is “patriotism” (37). Thus, he is persuaded, through his “cool superior 
reason”, that his decision to betray Haldin is an expression of his patriotic and moral obligations. 
In these depictions of Razumov’s bloated sense of superiority, Conrad seems to be holding the 
character up to ridicule as he parodies him as a total fake who deludes himself here and elsewhere 
in the narrative with his self-important rational abilities.    
Apart from these attestations to his presumed superiority in relation to Haldin, Razumov 
further assumes this pose in his separate interactions with Ivanovitch and Sophia Antonovna. 
Ivanovitch tells Razumov in their meeting: “You are clearly a superior nature – that’s how I read 
you. Quite above the common […] susceptibilities” (177). And later during the lengthy interview 
that Razumov is subjected to by Sophia Antonovna, she senses his arrogant insensitivity to her 
claim that in the line of revolutionary activity one ends up losing their personality, and chides, 
“you dear superior creature. You don’t care” (206). The irony of the declarations by these 
characters is that, in their interactions with Razumov, they sense that Razumov has an exaggerated 
idea about his superiority and the other characters, realising this, use that knowledge to flatter and 
manipulate him for their own purposes. In this regard, the words of the narrator in reference to 
Antonovna’s judgement of Razumov, which would also apply to Ivanovitch’s earlier assessment, 
in actual fact expose Razumov as the undiscerning individual embodying the “notion of the 
invincible nature of human error” (235). For in is erroneous impression of his superiority, he fails 
to discern that these other characters are really just massaging his inflated ego. In such a state of 
error, he plunges and succumbs to “the utmost depths of self-deception” (235), blinded by and 
wallowing in his exaggerated notion of self as he becomes the unsuspecting prey of cunning 
manipulators. 
These suggestions of error, deception and poor discernment contribute to the theme of 
illusion that permeates the whole narrative. An early incident that lays the foundation for this theme 
of illusion is significantly demonstrated through Haldin who, in “an unwise display of confidence” 
(301), erroneously relies on support from Razumov, “of whose opinions he knew nothing but what 
his own illusions suggested to his generous heart” (301). Stating this about Haldin, Razumov 
indirectly implies his own ability to act wisely to preserve himself and uphold his convictions. 
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However, thanks to an underlying irony that pervades the entire narrative it is evident that this 
theme of illusion equally applies to Razumov, despite the fact that he thinks himself superior to 
the revolutionists who he considered “doomed by the folly and the illusion that was in them – they 
being themselves the slaves of lies” (297). Strongly suggesting that the theme of illusion “finds its 
chief focus in the character of Razumov” (24), Arnold Davidson makes the revealing observation 
that the character’s assumed name – Razumov – “relates to a Russian and Polish verb, razumet, 
meaning, in both languages, ‘to reason’” (24).  
In connection to this, he further points out that, in spite of this meaning that the name 
alludes to, Razumov, who is “ironically a student of philosophy… is continually misjudged and 
misjudging” (24). He is not a revolutionary as Haldin and, later, the other revolutionaries think. 
Neither is he really a patriot as he thinks himself to be, or portrays to the authorities, resulting in 
his recruitment as a double agent to help preserve the absolute power of an autocratic government. 
Besides, although all his strivings are really in the interest of self-preservation and the actualisation 
of his dreams of becoming a future professor or a celebrated statesman, even these ideas of himself 
are only illusions. Thus, whereas Razumov is depicted throughout the narrative as the character 
who is, more than any other, constantly engaged in an effort at reasoning things out – his historical, 
social and biographical situation, his association to Haldin, his role as a secret agent and the 
duplicity that that creates within himself – much of this reasoning is largely characterised by either 
cynicism, which “is the spirit of Russia” (63), or by mysticism, which Razumov detects in others 
and eventually starts to suspect of himself as well. Pairing these attributes that colour the 
character’s reasoning ability, the narrator, inadvertently disclosing Conrad’s pessimistic view on 
these sentiments, remarks that cynicism affects everything Russian as it “informs the declarations 
of her statesmen, the theories of her revolutionists, and the mystic vaticinations of prophets to the 
point of making freedom look like a form of debauch, and the Christian virtues themselves appear 
actually indecent” (63). In commensuration to this, mysticism, not pejorative but palliative in its 
propensity to stifle sustained rational thought and lift “every problem from the plane of the 
understandable” (93), accounts for the “Providential!” (255) manipulations of events and 
conjectures that place the character, both physically and psychologically, in a convoluted 
determination of his own subjectivity. 
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 From this assertion, I approach Razumov’s turmoil of thoughts from Tony Tanner’s 
perspective of Razumov’s story as “the compelling account of a man forced into wide-awakeness, 
a man unwillingly made intimate with the nightmare that hovers forever just under the 
complacencies of civilized existence” (Tanner 214). In line with this perspective, I posit then that, 
even in his perspective of himself as a thinking reed, Razumov is disillusioned and his notion of 
his thinking competencies is really no more than an ability to amass ideas and stack them one on 
top of another. Ample evidence of this is provided in the reverie notation of the “very remarkable 
document” (88) that might seem as a summary of his political ideas: 
Still-faced and his lips set hard, Razumov began to write. When he wrote a large 
hand his neat writing lost its character altogether – became unsteady, almost 
childish. He wrote five lines one under the other. 
   History not Theory. 
   Patriotism not Internationalism. 
Evolution not Revolution. 
Direction not Destruction. 
Unity not Disruption. 
He gazed at them dully. Then his eyes strayed to the bed and remained fixed there 
for a good many minutes, while his right hand groped all over the table for the 
penknife. 
He rose at last, and walking up with measured steps stabbed the paper with the 
penknife to the lath and plaster wall at the head of the bed. This done he stepped 
back a pace and flourished his hand with a glance round the room. (62). 
 
As suggested by Councillor Mikulin, these listed ideas constitute “a sort of political confession of 
faith” (88). However, in the very first line of this list, Razumov himself repudiates any suggestion 
of a thinking process in place as his declaration, which also evokes a traditionally Marxist move: 
History (and Action) over Theory, inadvertently endorses embracing the past and, perhaps, re-
enacting it over thoughtfully analysing that past in order to forge a new future. In his line-up 
therefore, it is possible to divulge Razumov’s personal notion of nationalism by vertically linking 
the ideas he affirms and juxtaposing these against those that he disapproves of. Thus, for him, 
identifying with a national history, albeit autocratic, breeds a spirit of patriotism which over the 
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passing of time (evolution) gives direction for the future and fosters unity, while admitting some 
other theory that contradicts with one’s history generates internationalism, which itself fosters 
hybridity, and gives way to revolution against, destruction and disruption of an established order. 
This sense of order and the maintenance of it is, undoubtedly, essential to Razumov. In fact, so 
important is it to him that when he returns to his rooms a few days after jotting down the ideas 
above and finds his books, papers and notes all muddled up into an untidy pile, the narrator states: 
This disorder affected him profoundly, unreasonably. He sat down and stared. He 
had a distinct sensation of his very existence being undermined in some mysterious 
manner, of his moral supports falling away from him one by one. He even 
experienced a slight physical giddiness and made a movement as if to reach for 
something to steady himself with. (70). 
The disordering of Razumov’s notes affects him to the point of making him giddy because, as 
suggested in the text, this disordering cuts deep to “his very existence”. This testifies to the fact 
that these notes, significantly epitomised by the document of his political confession, represent for 
Razumov a slow, and doubtless, tedious construction of an identity through a painful and rather 
“unsteady” process of accumulating ideas, starting with his personal history. That he feels this 
existence is “being undermined in some mysterious manner”, draws attention to the hint of some 
mystical attribution to his fate. Also, the fact that the sight of the disorder makes him feel that “his 
moral supports” are falling away “one by one” attests to this process of a cumulative piling up 
towards the formation of a unified self. Besides, the character of the “long scrawly letters” (61) in 
which he pens his ideas attest to the unsteady nature of his own identity which becomes “almost 
childish” (61), craving direction and purpose. 
In effect, Razumov is really in error to think of himself differently as a ‘thinking reed’ 
opposed to ‘unthinking forces’ when he is in actual fact very much like Haldin. This fallacy of 
presumption, stemming from his insistence on believing himself superior and from his failure to 
acknowledge his true nature, is highlighted by Kostia, a fellow student. However, Razumov 
persistently refuses to admit to the possibility of a similarity between himself and Haldin. After 
Haldin’s arrest, Razumov, upon resuming his classes at the university, meets Kostia, who tries to 
sympathise with him and demonstrate his allegiance to all forms of revolutionary action by 
claiming that he and a few others already know that Razumov is being monitored by the police.  
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In his desperation to shake him off, Razumov asks Kostia “what sort of man” he thinks he 
is. In response Kostia declares: “A man of ideas – and a man of action too” (74). Starting first with 
what he knows Razumov would like to hear, Kostia plays him by the flattery of his self-importance 
by describing him as a ‘man of ideas’. However, after a suggestively sarcastic pause, he lumps him 
together with Haldin in describing him as ‘a man of action too’. Analysing this response, I submit 
that, through the use of the connective ‘and’, and the intensifier ‘too’, Kostia equates Razumov 
with Haldin, achieving a fusion of the two in the process. In my assertion of such a fusion, 
Razumov may then be perceived as a duplication of Haldin, since for both men a strong conviction 
of ideas leads to action that ultimately results in political execution. Thus, Kostia’s equation could 
not be farther from the truth, for just as Haldin’s ideas lead him to carry out the act of assassination, 
Razumov’s ideas lead him to betrayal resulting in Haldin’s death. And in both cases, their actions 
rebound on them as they respectively become victims of their convictions.  
 
THE SHIFTING OTHER 
Although I have already identifed Razumov as the primary target of Othering in the text, the careful 
reader of Conrad’s novel may detect that this identification of Otherness shifts onto other 
characters as well, thus making it impossible to pin it solely on the main character. To demonstrate 
this, I proceed to discuss how the secondary Others are represented before I continue to extensively 
explore the more complex manifestation of Otherness in relation to Razumov. In relation to these 
secondary Others, I make the observation that all of these appear in the second half of the novel. 
This is significant for the fact that while, in the first half of the novel, the reader is already able to 
perceive Razumov, and his doppelgänger Haldin, as Othered; in the second half, we detect 
Razumov’s persistent effort to shed off this Othering, an effort marked by his relentless 
subconscious projection of the trait of Otherness onto these secondary Others upon his contact 
with them. 
The first of these secondary Others that I focus on is Peter Ivanovitch who is regarded as 
the leader of the diasporic revolutionists in Geneva. According to the narrator: 
He had one of those bearded Russian faces without shape, a mere appearance of 
flesh and hair with not a single feature having any sort of character. His eyes being 
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hidden by the dark glasses there was an utter absence of all expression. I knew him 
by sight. He was a Russian refugee of mark. All Geneva knew his burly black-
coated figure. At one time all Europe was aware of the story of his life written by 
himself and translated into seven or more languages. In his youth he had led an idle, 
dissolute life. Then a society girl he was about to marry died suddenly and 
thereupon he abandoned the world of fashion, and began to conspire in a spirit of 
repentance, and, after that, his native autocracy took good care that the usual things 
should happen to him. He was imprisoned in fortresses, beaten within an inch of 
his life, and condemned to work in the mines, with common criminals. (106). 
In this excerpt in which Ivanovitch is depicted as having a shapeless face which also lacks character 
or expression, he is reduced to “a mere appearance of flesh and hair” which evoke the notion of 
the grotesque. With regard to this, it is worth pointing out that the grotesque is a classic form of 
Othering which, as extensively reviewed by Sara Cohen Shabot, “mainly addresses bodies” (70), 
making alterity tangible by being located in the flesh (82). The description of Ivanovitch’s 
appearance through the combined notions of ‘flesh and hair’ evokes images of the raw, the exposed 
and the untidy which prompt a remote feeling of disgust because they carry a suggestion of the 
unpleasant. As I will show later, this tinge of revulsion is exacerbated through the narrator’s further 
depiction of the character as undeniably revolting. However, the narrator’s portrayal of 
Ivanovitch’s features in the description above already betrays a hint of repulsion for the character 
who is nonetheless referred to several times in the narrative as ‘great’, albeit often with a tinge of 
mockery.  
This derision derives from Ivanovitch’s sense of self-importance which is expressed through his 
writing of “the story of his life” in which he details his ordeal from being imprisoned, beaten and 
condemned to harsh work. In this story he further describes his ability to escape from prison 
through the help of a woman who had “selected him for the gift of liberty” (107) by giving him a 
file intended for her lover whom she had gone to visit in the same prison but who had died a week 
before her arrival. From the intervention of this first woman, and the help he receives from other 
women he encounters as he roams about the Siberian forests as a fugitive, he declares a faith in 
women, particularly in the “admirable Russian woman!” (105) who according to him is “so 
courageous, breathing such a noble ardour of service!” (105). This proclaimed faith in “woman’s 
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spiritual superiority […] confessed since in several volumes” (107) earned him the additional 
designation of a feminist.  
However, in the description of him captured in the excerpt above, the fact of his being associated 
with “common criminals” already casts a certain amount of doubt on his personality and his claims, 
which, despite being the narrator’s impression of him, is explored throughout the entire second 
half of the narrative. In one noteworthy instance which holds his claims to suspicion, it is revealed 
that in an “odious performance” in which he scolds Tekla, the servant of Madame de S—, in a 
“deprecatory” manner, “the great feminist allowed himself to be abusive to a woman” (142). From 
this suggestion of a dubious nature, Ivanovitch is progressively Othered through his character and 
his appearance to the point where he is ultimately referred to in animalistic terms.  
Apart from always appearing in dark glasses, he is also known for his “burly black-coated figure” 
which evokes the image of a bear. With reference to his story of political persecution, the narrator 
also describes how Ivanovitch turned into a fugitive who had become “very fierce” and “developed 
an unsuspected genius for the arts of a wild and hunted existence” (107) during which he stealthily 
crept into villages and broke into outhouses while he “lived on wild berries and hunted for honey” 
(107). This metaphor of the character’s steady descent into a brutish nature is reinforced as the 
narrator recounts how his “clothing dropped off him gradually” (107) and his “naked tawny figure 
glimpsed vaguely through the bushes with a cloud of mosquitoes and flies hovering about the 
shaggy heady” (107-108). In this depiction, the concept of the grotesque that has already been 
alluded to is extended and enhanced as the character is shown to evolve into a hybrid form which, 
drawing again on Shabot’s discussion of the grotesque, consists of “a mixture of animals, objects, 
plants and human beings” (Shabot 70). As though to already suggest to the reader that Ivanovitch’s 
hybrid nature yet persists and that he, therefore, retains the potential for animality, the narrator 
recalls from his story that: 
His temper grew savage as the days went by, and he was glad to discover that there 
was so much of a brute in him. He had nothing else to put his trust in. For it was as 
though there had been two human beings indissolubly joined in that enterprise. The 
civilized man, the enthusiast of advanced humanitarian ideals thirsting for the 
triumph of spiritual love and political liberty; and the stealthy, primeval savage, 
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pitilessly cunning in the preservation of his freedom from day to day, like a tracked 
wild beast. (108) 
From the use of the words ‘savage’ and ‘brute’, the animal metaphor is sustained. However, by 
indicating that ‘he was glad to discover that there was so much of a brute in him’, the narrator 
draws attention to the fact that the character is in some way complicit in his animalisation. Thus, 
having lost access to normal society as a result of his incrimination, he lives on the fringes of that 
society and, unable to trust anything else, depends on his primeval instincts for survival. In this 
elaboration of Ivanovitch’s condition as a fugitive, it is quite telling that the technique of doubling 
should also be applied here to suggest not only the ambiguity of the ostensible, hidden or even 
suppressed savagery of the character, but also the ambivalence in the narrative perspective which, 
typical of Conrad’s style, conceals several diegetic levels.  
Thus, even though this transformation of Ivanovitch is rendered through the narrator’s retelling of 
the character’s story, the reader cannot help but wonder how objective the account is, and remains 
uncertain as to the extent to which the narrator, who has unequivocally declared his dislike for the 
character, imposes his own impressions upon the retelling. Nevertheless, from Conrad’s use of the 
technique of doubling the ‘civilized man’ with the ‘primeval savage’ the reader is left with little 
more than to regard Ivanovitch with a fair amount of suspicion. This suspicion, that the character 
can easily slip into the beastly nature which appears to be his alter ego, is fuelled by the narrator’s 
reliance on the metaphor of savagery to indicate the primeval Other in Ivanovitch. Moreover, the 
fear of the character’s reversion is further reinforced by the character’s own claims, referenced 
from his story (albeit filtered through the narrator), of having slipped into the nature of a “wild 
beast” dominating over “the civilised humanitarian” who “watched the proceedings” of the beast 
“with awe” and “in fearful anxious dependence” (108). 
This story of Ivanovitch’s survival in his descent to an animal nature educes the concept of 
social Darwinism which associates humans with animals and is a common trait of naturalist fiction. 
However, as we move from this notion of naturalism to Conrad’s modernist text, what changes 
with the human-animal nexus is that Ivanovitch, portrayed as the human beast, does not suffer the 
tragedy of a social determinism over which he has no control. Rather, he suppresses the animal 
state and emerges above it. This suggests that in his role as a revolutionary leader whose ideas 
inspire other revolutionaries, he demonstrates, in the Foucauldian sense of an embodied subject, 
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his power to act and think against the political powers and the social forces that specifically invest 
his subjectivity. This notwithstanding, throughout the rest of the narrative, the insinuation of the 
enduring, though perhaps suppressed, presence of Ivanovitch’s savage bear-like double is 
sustained through such references to “his great paw” (114), and “his big hairy head” (179). In 
effect, he is persistently Othered in the narrative through sarcasm and the use of animal metaphors. 
When he encounters Razumov and takes him to see Madame de S—, the reader perceives that the 
character of Ivanovitch provokes the same sense of loathing in Razumov who, pursuing the 
imagery of brutishness, sceptically observes that as to “that hairy and obscene brute […] for all his 
cunning he too shall speak out some day” (185). Thus, Razumov, unlike the revolutionary Russians 
based in Geneva, is not deluded by Ivanovitch whom he describes as a “burly, bull-necked, 
deferential” to Madame de S—. As a result of his skepticism, he dissociates himself from the ideas 
and the character of Ivanovitch who is mockingly referred to by the narrator as “the ‘Russian 
Mazzini’” (181), a reference that politically and ideologically links him to the 19th century Italian 
revolutionary hardliner, Guiseppe Mazzini (1805-1872) who was often criticised for his religio-
mystical brand of nationalism.  
This allusion to ideological extremism captured in the politico-historical metaphor gives a clue as 
to the function of Ivanovitch in the narrative – as the leader of the revolutionaries – “the Archpatron 
of revolutionary parties” (148) – he represents, not in action but in creed, political radicalism 
against the autocracy of the system. While he does not himself actively carry out any radical acts, 
in promoting such through his ideas he instigates others like Haldin to rash and irrational 
extremism. In effect, as the advocate of grand revolutionary ideas, all the other revolutionary-
minded characters may be perceived as his pawns, the greatest of which is Haldin. From this 
vantage point, I argue that, from Foucault’s notion of the creation of the subject, he becomes for 
such characters as Haldin, the standard to which they submit and to which they become subject. 
Thus, the narrator’s choice to Other Ivanovitch portrays him and his ideas as spurious; and in 
depicting him as an Other, his pawns are doubly Othered. In a desperate effort to cast of his own 
Othering, of which he has become aware through his association with Haldin, Razumov attempts 
to escape this form of Othering under Ivanovitch. In this effort, he points out to him that, unlike 
others, he is not swayed by his grand ideas and emphatically states: “a mere blind tool I can never 
consent to be” (192).  
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At this declaration, Ivanovitch’s reaction which betrays his disconcertion provokes Razumov to 
muse: “I won’t move from here till he either speaks or turns away. This is a duel” (193). While at 
the level of the text this duel represents Ivanovitch’s attempts to make Razumov submit to his 
ideas and will, at the level of analysis it also symbolises a subjectification that Others Razumov to 
himself. As Tekla categorically states: “Peter Ivanovitch is an awful despot” (195) who “can’t bear 
thinking of anyone escaping him” (199). However, in the duel with Razumov, Ivanovitch loses 
when he finally speaks up. And Razumov, in silent contemplation, exalts in his triumph over the 
‘great man’ by condemning him to his Othered animalised nature in the summary opinion of his 
encounter with him as “Beastly!” (193). It is worth noting that his pronouncement of this verdict 
in actual fact relates to the uncanny sensation he has after the proceedings with Ivanovitch “as 
though another self, an independent sharer of his mind, had been able to view his whole person 
very distinctly indeed” (193). From my analysis so far, I would venture to argue that this other self 
is indeed his internalised double, Haldin, whose action has earlier subjected them both to 
Ivanovitch’s despotic control. Thus, in dissociating himself from Ivanovitch’s ideas, Razumov 
effects a severance of himself from that form of Othering through subjectification under 
Ivanovitch, a process that is subconsciously observed by his internalised double Haldin. 
The second character in the narrative that I discuss as Othered is Madame de S— of whom 
the narrator declares, “I had a positive abhorrence for the painted, bedizened, dead-faced, glassy-
eyed Egeria of Ivanovitch. I do not know what was her attitude to the unseen, but I know that in 
the affairs of this world she was avaricious, greedy, and unscrupulous” (139). In this description 
of Madame de S— (whose name depicts a typical feature of 19th century novels, particularly 
romans à clefs), the narrator sums up her appearance and her character for the reader. She is 
presented as often being in a “mystical state of mind” (184); and, to corroborate her alleged 
covetous nature, it is revealed that “she had been worsted in a sordid and desperate quarrel about 
money matters with the family of her late husband” (139). Known also as Eleanor Maximovna, 
she is often represented in morbid tones which evoke images of death and evil.  
With “an obviously painted face” (181) – which metaphorically connotes deception – and 
an “elegant stiffness” (181), the impression she makes on Razumov, upon his first encounter with 
her, is that she is a “witch in Parisian clothes”, a “portent” (181). Thus, when she entreats him to 
sit down and draw his chair closer to her, Razumov gravely reflects that he was “being received 
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graciously, with a smile which made him think of a grinning skull” (182). The persistent use of 
the imagery of death and the ominous suggestions that such imagery evokes in connection to this 
character is further accentuated by other references to her which liken her to “a galvanized corpse 
out of some Hoffman’s Tale” and an “ancient, painted mummy with unfathomable eyes” (182). 
Here, the intertextual allusion to Hoffman’s gothic fictions, and perhaps specifically to ‘The 
Sandman”, the Hoffman tale that Freud analyses in his theorisation of the uncanny, is explicitly 
indicated.  
Considering such intertextuality, it is possible to draw a parallel between Olympia, 
Hoffman’s wooden automated doll with fixed, staring eyes and Madame de S— who is described 
in equally mechanical and cold terms. Besides, the use of the name “Egeria” in reference to her 
alludes to the mythological nymph alleged to have been a counsellor to an ancient Roman ruler. 
These allusions, filtered through the funereal metaphors of “a galvanized corpse” and a “painted 
mummy”, combine to confer upon her a fetish and mystical quality which takes on an uncanny 
aspect due to her fascinating, yet morbid, appearance. Discussing this intertextuality between “The 
Sandman” and Under Western Eyes as a form of generic transformation, Hawthorn points out that 
the characterisation of Olympia converges with that of Madame de S— at multiple levels.  
The most striking similarities are the constant references to the ‘unfathomable’ or 
expressionless eyes of each of these characters; the use of the words “stiff” or “stiffness” in 
application to both characters; and the fact that, just as in Hoffman’s tale the main character is 
fascinated by Olympia, so also in Conrad’s narrative, is Razumov fascinated by Madame de S—. 
In being thus compared to an automated wooden doll; depicted in appearance as bearing ghoulish 
cadaverous features; and represented in overall morbid terms, Madame de S— is portrayed as the 
mystical monstrous Other who embodies all the “beings that are worse than ogres, ghouls, and 
vampires” (213) that, according to the revolutionist Sophia Antonovna, watch over Russia as it 
gets “lapped up in evils” (212-213). 
Directly linked to Madame de S— as an Other is Tekla, her designated “lady companion” 
(306) and, in reality, her “slave” (306). Even though she is also depicted as bearing the doll-like 
stiffness, and wide vacant stare of Hoffman’s Olympia, Tekla’s Otherness is essentially different 
from that of Madame de S— in that it is devoid of the evilness associated with the latter. Drawing 
again on Hawthorn’s analysis, I accede that in comparison to Madame de S—, Tekla is presented 
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in “overwhelmingly positive terms” (45). In the narrative, Miss Haldin refers to her as a “good 
soul” (308) and also describes her as “a good Samaritan by an irresistible vocation” (308) for her 
altruism. This biblical allusion to the Good Samaritan occurs throughout the narrative in only three 
instances, and all in reference to Tekla. Acquainted to being solicitous about the welfare of others, 
it is revealed that when Razumov becomes crippled and ill in the end, it is she who tends him 
“unweariedly with the pure joy of unselfish devotion” (312). Besides, she is also depicted as being 
subservient in nature to the extent that she is exploited by both Ivanovitch and Madame de S—.  
During the writing of his books, Ivanovitch makes Tekla act as his secretary and demands 
that she sit rigidly behind a desk to take dictation from him. While she waits for him to compose 
his thoughts, she is forbidden to stare out of the window or at him because, according to him, she 
stared “stupidly” and her “air of unintelligent expectation irritated him” (128). When Razumov 
goes with Ivanovitch to see Madame de S—, he notices that Tekla retreats “into a distant corner 
out of everybody’s sight” (183) after serving them tea and, from time to time, when Ivanovitch 
finished his tea, “he flourished his hand above his shoulder. At that signal the lady companion 
[Tekla], ensconced in her corner, with round eyes like a watchful animal, would dart out to the 
table and pour him another tumblerful” (184). Razumov further observes that in this servile state 
Tekla is “anxious and tremulous” even while she is totally ignored by Ivanovitch and Madame de 
S—. Thus, throughout the narrative, Tekla is represented in a state of abasement to the extent of 
even being compared to a slavish animal. It is in this way that she is cast as an Other, that is always 
prepared to expend herself and live in the shadow of others. 
With respect to these two characters, Madame de S— and Tekla, who appear to be on 
opposite extremes of the same spectrum, I point out that they subliminally bear a pendulum effect 
on Razumov who attempts an ontological construction of subjectivity free of epistemological 
influences. While Madame de S— through her devious mystical schemes attempts to sway 
Razumov into compliance with Ivanovitch’s authority and ideas, Tekla encourages him to actively 
resist such a submission of his subjectivity. Thus, in an extension of their representation as 
respectively symbolising good and evil, these characters ethically and psychologically represent 
the forces of good and evil that influence Razumov in his self-determination.  
His aversion to Madame de S— and her methods marks a repudiation of any mystical 
notions that may be attached to the construction of his identity within his socio-political space, 
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whereas his “humane manner” and “civility” (196) towards Tekla indicates an identification with 
her ordinary, and abused, humanity which recognises and respects the individuality of each person 
within a homogenising and obliterating autocratic system. When Razumov rejects the very 
tempting option to continue to live a lie and gain the acceptance of the revolutionaries by forever 
hiding his secret of betrayal, he is left with the painful option of confessing the truth about himself 
and thereby liberating himself from the double bind of totalitarian subjectivity which, to draw 
again on Foucault, binds him to the power structure and also allows him to define himself only in 
relation to that system of power. Once he chooses to release himself from this double bind, he 
suffers the consequence of being made invalid by Nikita, a secret agent who takes advantage of 
the despotism on both sides of the autocratic divide – government and revolutionary forces – to 
game the system. 
Another character who is depicted in Othering terms in the narrative is Julius Laspara, 
whose dwarfish stature differentiates him from a social standard of appearance and who is 
portrayed as living in sombre and unkempt quarters with his dishevelled daughters. Besides, there 
is also Sophia Antonovna whose inquiring gaze is set off against her constantly frowning “black 
eyebrows” (219) which bear a “quaint Mephistophelian character” (270) but are nonetheless 
“curiously evil-less” or “un-devilish” (271). She is also constantly associated with the Faustian 
demon, and described as “the true spirit of destructive revolution” (219), as she embodies “the 
very spirit of ruthless revolution” (219). In effect, the character is depicted as appearing to have 
certain tendencies – Mephistophelian – which she, in actual fact, does not have at all. However, in 
the notion that she embodies the essence of revolutionary ruthlessness and destructiveness, the 
character is captured in an inexplicable in-betweenness of being simultaneously ‘un-devilish’ 
while yet appearing Mephistophelian.  
From these depictions, Sophia Antonovna, “whose word had such a weight in the ‘active’ 
section of every party” (219), encompasses the whole revolutionary community in a state of alterity 
which is heavily marked by an ambivalence of identity that, while creating a duplicity of character, 
also results in a dichotomy between the traits and the actual appearance of these characters 
associated with the apparatus of revolutionary antagonism. Such an ambivalent identity, resulting 
in the individual being neither altogether one thing nor another, is precisely what Razumov tries 
to escape. However, the bane of his effort remains the fact that while, naturally, he notices these 
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discrepancies in others like Sophia Antonovna, he fails to recognise his own shortcoming 
significantly marked by his inflated opinion of his rational capabilities which consistently trips 
him up through his susceptibility to flattery.  
Thus, Sophia Antonovna’s Othering through an ambivalence of identity draws the reader’s 
attention to Razumov’s own liminality represented by the dichotomy of what he perceives or 
portrays himself to be, as well as what he denies being, as opposed to what he really is. In a meeting 
between the two, Antonovna hints at such an ambivalence in Razumov’s character when in her 
frustration at his frivolous interaction with her she chides him stating, “Or, perhaps, you are only 
playing a part” (210). When he, however, keeps up the facetious attitude, she simply gives up and 
indulgently yet anxiously concludes: “Shallow talk! I suppose one must pardon this weakness in 
you” (211). Yet, following on what appears to be her slight suspicion of duplicity in Razumov, she 
confronts him with information she has obtained about his role in the Haldin affair. During this 
confrontation, she, like others, plays Razumov by flattery leading him to reveal more than he 
intends to and leaving him with a sense of insecurity and uncertainty about himself and his current 
role among the revolutionaries as a secret agent. 
 This role that, marked by duplicity, reinforces Razumov’s ambivalence of identity, directly 
links him to Nikita who, represented at once as a revolutionary assassin as well as a police spy, is 
a typical example of such a duplicitous member of the revolutionary movements. In his 
characterisation as a double agent, Nikita is depicted in grotesque terms that render him repugnant 
even to the reader. He is fat and has a “heavy paunch” (303) “like a balloon” (223), and “enormous 
hands” (303). Moreover, it is revealed that he speaks in a piping voice which produces the effect 
of “an indescribable sound, a sort of feeble squeak, as of some angry small animal” (271). His 
function as a revolutionary assassin is ridiculed when the sound of his voice is elsewhere likened 
to the “falsetto of a circus clown beginning an elaborate joke” (222); and it astonishes as well as 
irritates Razumov who wonders how such a “creature, so grotesque as to set town dogs barking at 
its mere sight, [could] go about on those deadly errands [of assassination] and slip through the 
meshes of the police” (223).  
From this description of Nikita Necator, the “man with a sinister alliterative nickname” 
and the “executioner of revolutionary verdicts”, the reader cannot help but observe, in consistency 
with Razumov’s disdain, that his appearance largely contradicts his fame as the “terrifying N.N.” 
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(223). While this abbreviation may very well refer to his name Nikita Necator, it also evokes the 
Latin term nomen nescio, often abbreviated as N.N., which is used to signify an anonymous or 
unnamed person. Since, in the narrative, the name of this despicable two-faced character is 
indicated, the evocation of the anonymous term may, in actual fact, be in relation to his personality 
which reveals no outstanding or remarkable qualities, hence extending on the semantic connotation 
of the term anonymous. After he is introduced to Razumov by Sophia Antononva, Nikita 
resentfully draws away, protesting jealously about Razumov being greatly admired by the 
revolutionaries. As he retreats, the narrator indicates that his receding voice is “reduced to the 
proportions of a squeaking toy by the distance” (225). As with the intertext of Hoffman’s wooden 
doll to earlier characters, this metaphor of a “squeaking toy” drawing also on the imagery of an 
automated figure, objectifies the character. Further referred to as a “horrible, paunchy brute” (262) 
with a “bull neck” (303), it becomes evident that Nikita is Othered through persistent ridicule and 
animalisation, with specific references to his appearance and his voice. The effect of this is that he 
is made despicable even to the reader.  
Thus, to avoid being linked in function to such an odious character, Razumov, realising 
that his own role as a double agent reinforces this nature of duplicity that he would rather escape, 
is led to confess his betrayal of Haldin and relinquish his role as a secret agent. Through his 
confession and self-disclosure, Razumov attempts to dissociate himself from the complex of 
duplicity, thereby contesting his Othering through the ambivalence of representation. In all of these 
instances in which Razumov meets these Othered characters, he is “ready for battle” (214). For 
Razumov, this battle is two-fold in nature. On the one hand, he needs to be able to assert himself 
as superior to these Others and abandon them to their Otherness. On the other hand, he must avoid 
being contaminated by their Otherness and become like them rather of be his own person. His 
failure to stall such an Othering of himself would permanently cast him as a pushover, establishing 
him indelibly as the Other’s Other.  
Therefore, while these Othered characters attempt to identify themselves with him and, by 
so doing, make him equal to them; he rejects this identification and dissociates himself from them, 
thereby separating himself from their Othered selves. When Ivanovitch patronises him saying, 
“you, at any rate, are one of us” (176), Razumov sneeringly declares: “To be sure my name is not 
Gugenheimer. […]. I am not a democratic Jew” (176). He further protests, “I don’t want anyone 
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to claim me. But Russia can’t disown me. She cannot! […]. I am it!” (176). In this declaration, he 
sets himself above all of these other Russians by claiming to be Russia itself. In so doing, he 
establishes himself as the signifying self against whom all these Others may define themselves. 
And he is arguably right as he is captured as the main pivot in the events forming this narrative 
which he calls “a comedy of errors, phantoms, and suspicions” (88). Therefore, by raising himself 
above these Others, he rebuffs any efforts made by them to shift their Otherness onto him through 
any manner of identification and insists on the construction of his own identity through the slow 
and painful process of self-realisation. 
The last minor character that I discuss as othered is Mrs. Haldin, the mother of Victor 
Haldin. Throughout the second part of the text, the narrator reveals how she grieves over her son 
about whose disappearance and silence she yearns to get more information, and of whose political 
crime and death she learns later. As she sinks deeper into grief, she also develops a single-minded 
attitude of remaining, for most of the day, confined to a chair by the window and constantly looking 
out as if in expectation of someone. Regarding this state of “mad expectation” (264) and despair, 
the narrator declares: 
Poor Mrs. Haldin! I confess she frightened me a little. She was one of those natures, 
rare enough, luckily, in which one cannot help being interested, because they 
provoke both terror and pity. One dreads their contact for oneself, and still more for 
those one cares for, so clear it is that they are born to suffer and to make others 
suffer, too. (263) 
In this assertion of his fear of Mrs. Haldin, the narrator confesses several lines later in the narrative 
that this fear arises out of his concern for Natalia Haldin, Victor Haldin’s sister, who could be 
grimly impacted by the mother’s depression, resulting from the brother’s death. As she grieves 
over her son, she refuses “to abandon him quietly to the dumb unknown” (102). It is this that 
causes her to suffer and to make Natalia suffer as well. In confirmation of the fact that Mrs. Haldin 
does not suffer alone but projects her pain onto her daughter, Natalia explains to the teacher that 
Mrs. Haldin has begun to believe that her children doubt and mistrust her; and that she obstinately 
imputes her son’s death to this notion which, Natalia states, she holds on to “to torment herself and 
me, for all the years to come” (103). In his roundabout way of thinking about Natalia, the teacher 
states that Natalia’s mother is ‘one of those natures’ that ‘provoke both terror and pity’. In this 
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reflection on Mrs. Haldin’s tragedy, the teacher suggests that her sorrow through suffering is 
catching, and hence the dread of contact with her.  
Besides, the narrator’s dreaded terror of her arises from the insinuation of an intimacy 
between her depression and mania, foreshadowed by the historical and psychological intimacy 
fostered between mother and son. Through the unfolding of the narrative, it becomes evident to 
the reader that Mrs. Haldin’s propinquity to her son transcends the filial connection she has to him 
and comprises the consanguineous connection to “that enthusiast brother of hers – the officer they 
shot under Nicholas” (264), from whom Victor Haldin has “inherited a revolutionary inspiration 
together with a resemblance” (57). Thus, in an uncanny repetition of a family history of revolution 
leading to political execution, Mrs. Haldin emerges as a vital link, indeed the only one, between 
her son and her brother. To illuminate this connection, I draw on Derrida’s concept of hauntology 
which proposes that any attempt to evaluate an identity or event must be predicated on the 
assumption of an always-already existing antecedent. Based on this assumption, he claims that 
every situation is impacted by a lingering (read haunting) of the past in the present.  
Therefore, the present can only be fully understood when it is deconstructed through an 
assessment of its temporal, historical and ontological connection to the past. Closely relating this 
concept to his notion of deconstruction, Derrida coins the term from a combination of the word 
‘haunt’, which connotes ghostly manifestations, and the word ‘ontology’, a near-homonym of the 
coined term (Colin Davis 373). In an application of this concept to an analysis of musical evolution 
from the twentieth to the twenty-first century, Mark Fisher (2012) asserts that, not only the past 
but also, “the future is always experienced as a haunting” (16). Analysing Mrs. Haldin’s connector 
position from such a hauntological reading of the narrative, it becomes apparent that through her, 
and in her obstinate sense of futile expectation, the past (brother) exists as a virtuality that impinges 
on the present (son).  
However, drawing still on Fisher’s idea of the future existing as a haunt of the present, I 
posit that when Razumov finally goes to see Mrs. Haldin, he recognises in her despairing yet eager 
stare a “sense of yearning for a future that [he] feels cheated out of” (Mark Fisher, 16). By the 
point in the narrative at which this meeting between Razumov and Mrs. Haldin occurs, the reader 
has already perceived how, as a result of her despondency, Mrs. Haldin has gradually deteriorated 
in health as well as in sanity – she “has been so awfully silent: for weeks” (267); her “regular 
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features” that “testified to her past beauty” (91) have given way to a “poor, wasted face as calm as 
stone” (267); she has delusions (267); and Natalia states: “She is ill. Her very soul is” (267). In 
addition to her physical and mental deterioration she has also taken on an “awful aspect” (100) as 
she arguably symbolises the tragic present in whom the past (revolt and death), and the future 
(resignation and regression) have converged. As Razumov tells her about her son, he thinks to 
himself: “The phantom of Haldin had been indeed walked over, was left behind lying powerless 
and passive on the pavement covered with snow. And this was the phantom’s mother consumed 
with grief and white as a ghost” (281).  
It is important to point out that at the time he sees this “phantom” of Haldin in the snow 
and walks over him, Haldin is still alive. This apparition could then be a foreshadowing of Haldin’s 
execution in line with the political history of his mother’s brother, signifying a bleeding of the past 
into the present, transmitted over the sister/mother, Mrs Haldin. Thus, Haldin is placed as the 
present analogue of a past history. In juxtaposing Mrs. Haldin to this image of the phantom and 
comparing her to a ghost, Razumov does not only project onto her the spectral attribute of Haldin 
which has been plaguing him, but he, in fact, tries to detach himself from this quality and divest 
himself indefinitely of his spectral Other. However, even though Mrs. Haldin is Othered through 
her comparison to a ghost, she does not relieve Razumov of the plague of the Other. A disconcerted 
Razumov notes that Mrs. Haldin “had turned away her head while he was speaking. The silence 
that had fallen on his last words had lasted five minutes or more” (281). 
  As he wonders to himself what this could mean, he comes to the alarming discovery that, 
regarding his spectral Other, Haldin, it is “impossible to get rid of him” and that he cannot “shake 
him off” (282). Thus, as he literally flees from the mother, his spectral Other hangs onto him and 
he has lost the battle of shifting this Otherness onto her. Consequently, although Mrs. Haldin is, in 
her own right, captured as an Other through spectrality, she does not purge Razumov of this 
attribute, but rather consolidates it in him. In effect, Mrs Haldin may be perceived as a sort of 
doppelgänger of her son Haldin; and Razumov’s encounter with her represents a hauntological 
encounter with his internalised double. This encounter, while disconcerting enough to make 
Razumov flee, also intensifies his inner conflict as he is psychologically confronted with the 
falsehood of his existence and actions, a falsehood that Others him even to himself. In an anxious 
bid to shed off all pretences and falsehood, to emerge as a truer nature to replace the exaggerated 
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illusions he has so far held of himself, the encounter with Mrs Haldin, having produced a sort of 
self-reflective effect on him, triggers his confession to Natalie and later to the gathering of 
revolutionaries. While he suffers grievously following this confession, he is liberated from an 
identity constructed by and for others as he also frees himself of the anxiety for social acceptance 
by conforming to stifling totalitarian stipulations or giving in to despotic manipulations. 
 
THE SPECTRE IN THE TALE 
Extending from my discussion of the encounter between Razumov and Mrs. Haldin which is 
significantly impacted by the spectre of Haldin, I proceed to carry out a focused examination of 
Razumov’s Othering through spectrality. In preamble to this examination I point out that as 
shocking as it is violent, the first murder we encounter in the narrative is the “political murder” 
(83) committed by Haldin and his accomplice in the streets of St. Petersburg. However, as the plot 
unfolds we perceive that the notion of murder carried forth from the described evidence of this 
first incident slowly changes and takes on different meanings as it is interchanged and 
approximated with “war” (26), “execution” (254), “revolutionary tyranny” (75), “crushing the 
Infamy” (220) and even “betrayal” (38). In a narrative so centrally constructed on murder, it is 
little wonder that it should also be plagued by spectres. 
Set primarily in Russia, the first major part of the narrative, made up of the assassination 
of the government official Mr. de P— and the enquiry, arrest and execution that follow it, 
physically takes place in St. Petersburg. The second major part of the novel, which reveals 
Razumov’s life as a double agent and spy on the revolutionaries leading up to his confession, takes 
place in a quarter of Geneva called “La Petite Russie” (11). The name of this smaller setting links 
it to the larger geographical and political sphere of Russia, of which it is a synecdochical extension. 
Thus, on the whole, the narrative is set, geographically and through spatial transposition, in Russia. 
In reference, then, to this essentially Russian setting, the narrator states that it is a “land of spectral 
ideas and disembodied aspirations” (35). This symbolic reference to the setting of the narrative 
does not only stem from the fact of its political establishment upon “the principle of autocracy” 
(14) which asserts its rule over a people through acts of repression. It also underscores the fate of 
our main character, Razumov, whose encounter with Haldin alters him to the point of a radical 
Otherness, through which, in asserting his subjectivity, he eventually self-obliterates. 
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On the one hand, the metaphors of ‘spectral ideas and disembodied aspirations’ may well 
refer to the murmur of abstract ideas” (245) that, according to the narrator, is peculiar to the 
Russian nature, no matter how “strongly engaged in the drama of action” they may be (245). 
However, on the other hand, I argue that it largely denotes Razumov’s half-formed ideas which I 
have discussed above. Even at the end of the narrative when he is ill and dying, Antonovna states 
that some of the revolutionaries continue to pass through to see him every now and then because 
“He is intelligent. He has ideas… He talks well, too” (312). This revelation nevertheless only goes 
to confirm earlier suggestions that Razumov is full of ideas; and the mention that he talks well 
only evokes for us the narrator’s allusion, right at the beginning of the story, to man as “a mere 
talking animal not much more wonderful than a parrot” (11). That his ideas amount only to, if 
anything at all, “disembodied aspirations” is evidenced by the fact that his future aspirations to 
become a celebrated person in Russia remains a dream that will never be realised. The illusory 
representation of that greatness projected into the future as a professor or a Privy Councillor 
remains only  an illusions, underscored by the phrase, “nothing more!” (19) which follows 
immediately after Razumov’s conceptualisation of this future vision of himself. Thus, that 
unrealised and unattainable future self, symbolising the disembodied aspirations because it is only 
a mental image, remains a spectre that haunts him as much as Haldin does. 
When Conrad’s narrator, the teacher of languages, meets Razumov for the first time in 
Geneva, his initial impression of him is that he is “[s]tudious – robust – shy” (153). However, since 
this meeting is being mentioned late in the narrative, we, the readers, have already formed our 
impressions of the protagonist through the flashback related by the narrator who reconstructs the 
plot of the story through Razumov’s diary. Through that earlier exposition of the events 
surrounding Razumov’s departure to Geneva, it is revealed, for instance, that he is already a much 
antagonised individual. It is also revealed that from the events that have unexpectedly occurred in 
Razumov’s life, he has become embroiled in what Yael Levin (2011) describes as a “hauntological 
matrix” (23). Borrowing the notion of hauntology from Derrida’s Spectres of Marx (1994), Levin 
uses this term to launch an exploration into the “uncanny returns” made up of a combination of 
“spectres, words and compulsively repeated scenes [that] all conspire to unhinge [Razumov]” (23). 
This not only leaves his future plans irreversibly sabotaged, but also captures him in a duality of 
character that casts him in a mould of Otherness strongly impacted by the spectre of Haldin. 
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Described in certain ways that already reveal that he is considered different by other 
characters, Razumov is referred to by Haldin as a “regular Englishman” (25) with “frigid English 
manner[s]” (21). By this reference he is linked to the English narrator through whose translation 
of Razumov’s diary this “Russian story” (140) is revealed. Thus, on the one hand, the narrator 
insists that the events surrounding Razumov and affecting his life and plans are Russian in nature 
and obscure to a Western understanding which is “not attuned to certain tones of cynicism and 
cruelty [and] moral negation” (140). Nevertheless, on the other hand, this obscurantism is 
compromised by the fact that being symmetrically connected to the narrator, Razumov himself is 
not considered altogether Russian, and it is, as I will elaborate below, perhaps his eyes that the title 
refers to. However, owing to the fact that Kirylo Sidorovitch Razumov bears a Russian name and 
claims a Russian heritage and yet is labelled English by his compatriots, it is possible to view him 
as an extension of the narrator whose narration is drawn from Razumov’s diary and so is second-
told to us from “the document” (163). That our narrator is a “teacher of languages” is significant 
for the fact that he is able to recount the events recorded in Razumov’s diary for the benefit of his 
intended readers, who are pre-intended as English.  
Thus, it might be possible to extend this foreshadowing to Razumov, who arguably writes 
his diary with such a conscious conjecture of who might read it. In parcelling it off to Natalia who 
then hands it over to the teacher of languages, from whom she has received English lessons, 
Razumov may, perhaps, be the one who is indeed making an effort to explain these events to a 
projected English audience. The narrator attests that all that he brings to this “document” – 
Razumov’s diary – is his “knowledge of the Russian language” (11). In so stating, he distances 
himself from the narrative, thus indicating that whereas Razumov remains the original teller, he, 
on the other hand is simply the transmitter of the story already written by Razumov. Thus, behind 
his telling is Razumov’s diary written “in a narrative form” (11) and bearing the original story in 
Russian, which is largely translated for the benefit of the narrator’s readers. Consequently, the 
narrator is twice removed from the events described in Razumov’s record, thus making his readers 
at least thrice removed. If then his translation of the diary cannot be trusted, then one can only 
attempt to read in between the lines and make an effort to see through the eyes of the writer of the 
diary – Razumov. Therefore, referred to as an Englishman, Razumov’s eyes are really the Western 
eyes under which the plot develops, and under which the narration unfolds. 
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This reference to Razumov as an Englishman seems to ethnically preclude him from 
identifying as Russian, so that, in the scheme of things Russian, Razumov is depicted as an 
outsider, an Other. It is this ultimate Otherness, of non-belongingness and of feeling socially and 
racially excluded, that Razumov contests to the very end. Thus, a careful examination of most of 
his actions will reveal a desperate desire and effort to belong. He is, nevertheless, consistently 
marked as different. Highlighting this difference, Haldin alludes to the fact that as opposed to his 
own rash character which causes him to commit the act of murder without giving it much thought, 
Razumov is “[c]ollected – cool as a cucumber” (25). We also learn from the narrator that, even 
among other Russians, Razumov “looked foreign enough…. […] His features were more decided 
than in the generality of Russian faces” (153). This distinction of features sets him apart as alien 
to the vast majority, an alienation that is further accentuated by the fact that he is a loner who has 
no friends and is “[o]fficially and in fact without a family…. He [is] as lonely in the world as a 
man swimming in the deep sea.” (17).  
This comparison of the world to the deep sea produces a paradoxical effect in the sense 
that the idea of the world, though abstract in concept, evokes also a certain degree of solidity and 
firmness, whereas the sea, though it may be considered concrete in nature, evokes the notion of 
fluidity that insinuates instability and even tumult. So, for Razumov to be compared, in his 
loneliness, to a man swimming in the deep sea, he is removed from the solidity and firmness of 
the world and transposed onto the precarious fluidity and capriciousness of the sea where his 
condition of isolation is accentuated. Although this metaphor of alienation only marks the 
foreshadowing of a complex Otherness that is expanded in other ways that I will discuss shortly, 
it remains the predominant feature of Razumov’s life which seems to predispose him to his fate. 
As he slowly arrives at the decision to betray Haldin and once he has committed the deed, he 
suffers from conflicted emotions and a guilty conscience marked by nightmares of “walking 
through drifts of snow in a Russia where he was as completely alone as any betrayed autocrat could 
be” (62).  
In this figurative depiction of his “solitary individuality” (17), he is at once identified and 
associated with his act of betrayal. However, in his comparison to an ‘autocrat’, he is also 
associated with a “[f]idelity to menaced institutions” (46) within a “despotic Government” (29) 
whose practice of a harsh autocracy “represses ideas, guards its power, and defends its existence” 
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(28) all in the bid to uphold “the safety of a throne and of a people” (46). In this tormented state 
of uncertainty, Razumov questions the basis and symbolic importance of his allegiance: “What is 
a throne? A few pieces of wood upholstered in velvet. But a throne is a seat of power too” (36). 
His contemplation of a throne as not merely decorated wood but as ‘a seat of power’ demonstrates 
a process of rationalisation in which he fathoms that one sure way to gain acceptance, and to 
achieve the belongingness he desperately yearns for, is through allegiance to this seat of power the 
authority of which can sanction his identity as a result of being affiliated to it. In this semiotic 
analysis of the relationship between a throne, trite wood and legitimising power, Razumov affirms 
his love for his country through faith in “autocracy for the peace of [his] patriotic conscience” (35), 
and, hence, he decides to give Haldin up.      
Embracing simply the fact that, through his belief in autocracy, he is Russian and claiming 
that “immense parentage” (17) as his only heritage, Razumov’s fidelity to the “[d]espotic 
bureaucracy” (37) casts him at once as representative of the despot while at the same time, through 
his betrayal, he denounces the reactionary forces that kick against such despotism. In effect, he is 
both the betrayer and the betrayed. In his reflection upon the word and the action it connotes, he 
asserts that in order for betrayal to be enacted or fulfilled, “[t]here must be a moral bond first” (38-
39) to the object of betrayal. As he decides to betray Haldin, he denies sharing any such bond with 
him, declaring that all that “a man can betray is his conscience” (39), his own leaning towards 
patriotism. In his deliberations, he draws attention to morality, specifically to the notion of the 
ethical that is inextricably linked to his act of betrayal. Consequently, even though at the beginning 
he assures himself that he is not bound to Haldin by any “bond of common faith, [nor] of common 
conviction” (39) and that he is doing the right thing by turning him in; in the end when he confesses 
his treachery to Natalie Haldin, he attests that “[i]n giving Victor Haldin up, it was myself, after 
all, whom I have betrayed most basely” (298). For he comes to the realisation that in his self-
centred need to gain acceptance, he betrays the trust of a fellow human being; and in his attempt 
to contest his Otherness through such a betrayal and its ensuing deception, his actions end up as a 
total aberration of what may be considered ethical. Consequently, he becomes estranged, Othered 
even to himself. 
Further linked to Razumov’s alienating isolation is the undesired effect that his contact 
with Haldin’s crime has on his life and plans through the “fatal conjunction of events” (40) which 
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mark a tragic end to his hopes and aspirations. On the very day of Haldin’s assassination of the 
state official, Razumov was planning to prepare a “prize essay” for the award of a “silver medal” 
which was “offered by the Ministry of Education” and which held for him the promise of a bright 
future: “The mere fact of trying would be considered meritorious in the higher quarters; and the 
possessor of the prize would have a claim to an administrative appointment of the better sort after 
he had taken his degree” (17). With this view of the possibility of reaping huge future profits from 
diligent self-application, Razumov “hankered after the silver medal” (17) and “resolved to have a 
good try for [it]” (19). He had great plans for himself which thrived on his vision of someday 
transforming himself into “a somebody” (19), “one of the glories of Russia” (19), believing that 
his ability to win the medal would mark “a solid beginning” (20) to this future success. 
Unfortunately for him, all of these dreams and aspirations are tainted by Haldin’s decision to seek 
refuge with and help from him. This jeopardises his plans and dashes his hopes. He despondently 
remarks that all of his hard work and dreams have been thwarted: 
He thought with a sort of dry, unemotional melancholy; three years of good work 
gone, the course of forty more perhaps jeopardized – turned from hope to terror, 
because events started by human folly link themselves into a sequence which no 
sagacity can foresee and no courage can break through. Fatality enters your rooms 
while your landlady’s back is turned; you come home and find it in possession 
bearing a man’s name, clothed in flesh – wearing a brown cloth coat and long boots 
– lounging against the stove. It asks you, ‘Is the outer door closed?’ – and you don’t 
know to take it by the throat and fling it downstairs. You don’t know. You welcome 
the crazy fate. ‘Sit down,’ you say. And it is all over. You cannot shake it off any 
more. It will cling to you for ever. Neither halter nor bullet can give you back the 
freedom of your life and the sanity of your thought.” (76). 
In this succinct assessment of his fate Razumov views the impact of Haldin’s association with him 
from the point of view of his individuality. In his cogitations he captures Haldin as the embodiment 
of “fatality” which has suddenly stolen upon him unawares. He bemoans the fact that he was 
unable to make the right judgement or muster the courage to throw Haldin out of his rooms when 
he arrived and found him there. Personally reflecting upon his welcoming response to Haldin, he 
examines his own actions and decisions, and concludes that in his failure to have violently rejected 
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Haldin, the harbinger of a “crazy fate”, he made a poor judgement and it is this that marks the end 
of his freedom as well as of his hopes. He rightly recognises this moment when he finds Haldin in 
his rooms as the defining moment for his future plans and hopes. 
However, it is also, for us the readers, the defining moment of his convictions and of his 
character. For even though he does not yet know about Haldin’s crime until later, it is in that 
moment that he becomes indefinitely linked to Haldin’s actions, his personality and his 
revolutionary ideas. He realises that this ‘fatality’ which has subtly interpolated his progress and 
surreptitiously entered his rooms embodied in the person of Haldin, ‘will cling to [him] for ever’. 
This imagery of clinging evokes for us one of Conrad’s common tropes of the double – the secret 
sharer or the second self – which he uses more explicitly in other narratives such as in The Secret 
Sharer, but explores in more elusive ways in Under Western Eyes. Extending from this allusion of 
a duality of personality, it is already possible to see Razumov captured in the potential Otherness 
of doubling right from this early stage of the narrative. Following the realisation of his 
circumstances and later recognising the fact that, being linked to Haldin, he is thereafter marked 
as a suspect, Razumov considers the possibility of salvaging himself and contemplates if he may 
not redeem his hopes by “keep[ing] on as before” (251). Once again, in this decision to carry on 
as though nothing had happened, we identify another latent attempt by Razumov to contest this 
form of Othering through doubling with Haldin. 
Therefore, he decides that this is probably the best line of action to take: “Study. Advance. 
Work hard as if nothing had happened (and first of all win the Silver Medal), acquire distinction, 
become a great reforming servant of the greatest of States. Servant, too, of the mightiest 
homogenous mass of mankind (…) the Russian nation!” (251). Nevertheless, in this 
contemplation, we find that Razumov further emphasises his potential Otherness. For in his 
conceptualisation of his future self as transcending and rising above the status of a minion, 
Razumov persists in seeing that future glorious self as a servant, a mere tool of the mightier 
machine, the State. In this paradoxical self-imagination that depicts him as both great and yet 
subservient, he affirms the fact of belonging to the larger “homogenous mass” even while he yet 
negates his significance in that mass. If he becomes great, the State is the greatest and he is only 
its servant. 
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Thrust into uncertainty about the fate of his future, and contemplating that, in similar 
circumstances, others “had fathers, mothers, brothers, relations, connexions, to move heaven and 
earth on their behalf” whereas “he had no one” (25), Razumov laments: “Because I haven’t that, 
must everything else be taken away from me? (29). In an outburst against Haldin whom he 
considers to have ruined his future hopes “by forcing upon” him his “confidence” (296) of having 
committed the “reckless” act of assassination, “like a butcher …scattering death” (26), he states:  
“You are a son, a brother, a nephew, a cousin …to no end of people. I am just a 
man. Here I stand before you. A man with a mind. Did it ever occur to you how a 
man who had never heard a word of warm affection or praise in his life would think 
on matters on which you would think first with or against your class, your domestic 
tradition – your fireside prejudices?... Did you ever consider how a man like that 
would feel? I have no domestic tradition. I have nothing to think against. My 
tradition is historical. What have I to look back to but that national past from which 
you gentlemen want to wrench away your future? Am I to let my intelligence, my 
aspirations towards a better lot, be robbed of the only thing it has to go upon as the 
will of violent enthusiasts? You come from your province, but all this land is mine 
– or I have nothing.” (57-58) 
In this outburst, Razumov places Haldin in a continuum of social and filial relations that set him 
ad infinitum among a mass of ‘no end of people’. He, on the other hand, is ‘just a man’. In this 
comparison of himself as a single unit against an infinite mass he asserts his individuality and his 
total isolation while emphasising the fact of his difference as a direct result of his lack of parentage. 
This lack separates and in fact even distances him, casting upon him an otherness that is heavily 
hinged on the notion of separateness between the individual and the mass. Thus, when he declares, 
‘[h]ere I stand before you’, the ‘I’ represents the solitary unit (himself) which is disproportionately 
matched against a ‘you’ that is synecdochally plural in that it refers not only to Haldin but to the 
innumerable persons that populate his social ‘class’ and represent for him a ‘domestic tradition’ 
formed from ‘fireside prejudices’. The metaphorical reference to ‘fireside prejudices’ alludes to 
the notion of a functional home or hearth characterised by warmth, nurturing and security, which 
Razumov, unlike Haldin, essentially lacks. 
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Nevertheless, despite evoking this image of being caught in such a socio-cultural 
imbalance, Razumov, within the same breath, turns the scales of the balance against the mass and 
upsets the equation by pitting the presumed powerful ‘mind’ of the single man against the senseless 
might of the many. Against the ‘domestic tradition’ of the mass he states that his tradition is 
historical. Whereas the mass look back to their (local) ‘fireside prejudices’ to inspire their future, 
he looks back to a ‘national past’ to aspire ‘towards a better lot’. In replacing the domestic with 
the historical and the local with the national, and in looking back to the past as his means of 
achieving a better future, Razumov both anachronistically and diachronically transgresses the 
notions of space (fireside, domestic, national) and time (past, present, future) in his resentment 
against Haldin. At the end of this confrontation in which the man is pitted against the people, his 
mind against their might and his intelligence against their violence, Razumov speciously defeats 
the mass (made up of the people but represented by and personified in Haldin) by declaring, ‘[y]ou 
come from your province, but all this land is mine – or I have nothing’. 
Thus, he confines them to only a small place (the province) while he claims the whole land 
(encompassing and swallowing up the province). This is however a specious defeat because in 
claiming the whole land of which the province is a part, he claims also the part. So, he at once 
rejects Haldin and accepts him, distancing himself from him while yet internalising him. Thus, 
after he has secretly betrayed Haldin, Razumov is caught in a moral battle with his conscience, a 
battle in which Haldin, internalised, transforms into his (Razumov’s) alter ego, an extension of 
himself. With Haldin thus internalised and transformed, he is ever present in Razumov’s psyche. 
So even after Haldin is caught and hanged, he remains alive in Razumov’s mind as his double and 
also as the psychological force that gradually drives him to a confession of his moral guilt and to 
self-reconciliation. Very early in the narrative, Haldin himself forewarns his haunting doubling of 
Razumov when he eerily declares that his soul will continue to live and fight even after his death: 
“Look here, brother! Men like me leave no posterity, but their souls are not lost. No 
man’s soul is ever lost. It works for itself – or else where would be the sense of self-
sacrifice, of martyrdom, of conviction, of faith – the labours of the soul? What will 
become of my soul when I die in the way I must die – soon – very soon perhaps? It 
shall not perish. Don’t make a mistake, Razumov. This is not murder – it is war, 
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war. My spirit shall go on warring in some Russian body till all falsehood is swept 
out of the world.” (25-26). 
At the time of making this declaration Haldin does not know that Razumov will give him up, and 
he has in fact come to him to solicit his help for his (Haldin’s) elaborate escape plan. With this 
positive expectation of help and without any suspicion of Razumov’s repulsion at his act of murder, 
Haldin debunks the possibility of perceiving his act of assassination as murder and asserts that he 
is engaged in war. From this assertion, he hauntingly declares that even after he dies his spirit will 
prevail in this war by fighting through some Russian body. Full of dramatic irony, this wistful 
declaration foreshadows not only his imminent death following Razumov’s betrayal, but also his 
choice of Razumov as the ‘Russian body’ that the spirit embodies in order to continue in his war 
against falsehood. And this he does by remaining seared in Razumov’s mind even before and after 
his death. In so embodying Razumov, Haldin transcends the physical and, becoming no more than 
a ghost, he occupies a space of spectrality from which he has not only transformed permanently 
into Razumov’s double but has also become his conscience. In thus doubling Razumov with 
Haldin, Conrad projects unto Razumov an Otherness that is characterised by spectrality. 
Consequently, Razumov is constantly psychologically haunted by the image of Haldin. 
 
INTIMATIONS OF THIRD SIGHT 
In ‘The Missing Center’, Eloise Knapp Hay argues that in Under Western Eyes, the author leaves 
his overall meaning to be determined by the reader thus resulting in a constantly shifting centre of 
the narrative unity of the text (128). This additionally denies the reader the security of non-
complicitous observation as the narrative “obliquely examines [the] sickness of soul, yet finds it 
as much in the beholder, the ‘Western eyes’ of the narrator, as in the Russians under his 
observation” (128-129). While in her statement, she identifies the beholder as “the ‘Western eyes’ 
of the narrator” (128), I argue that the act of beholding certainly goes beyond the narrator and 
encompasses also the reader who has the advantage of observing not only the characters under the 
observation of the narrator but also the narrator himself. Throughout the narrative, the narrator 
affirms in various ways that his story is intended for “Western readers” (99), insisting that it is “a 
Russian story for Western ears” (140). Through his assertions, therefore, he aims at the sole 
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comprehension of the Western reader to whom he delivers a story of circumstances, words and 
actions that are “vague” to his own “Western mind and […] Western sentiment” (145). 
As a result of his admission that the story is ambiguous even to him, the effect of his 
narrative is that it “asserts the fallibility of all that it seems to assert” (Frank Kermode, 134). In 
effect, he confesses to his own unreliability, and just as the “Western mind and […] sentiment” of 
the narrator cannot be trusted neither can his “Western eyes”. Besides, the narrator’s perspective 
on the actions, events, thoughts and claims of his characters cannot be taken for granted and 
impressed upon the reader as the ultimate perspective since the narrator himself is rather unreliable 
(Carabine, 210; Nünning, 60). It is this unreliability that causes us to approach the narrative from 
other possible perspectives through “an interpretation of which [the narrator] is unconscious” 
(Carabine, 209). From this possibility one is able to view the narrative from other interpretations 
of what the narrator describes as “things Russian” (314). For, as readers, we have the benefit of a 
three-way vision – reader, narrator, character – into the details presented to us in the narrative. 
First of all, we are made to see things from the narrator’s perspective, a perspective which 
is itself sporadic at best. For the narrator tries to give the impression of his narrative as unfolding 
within a temporal parallel to the events he describes. However, we are not defrauded into that 
confusion as we follow the narrative, for the narration always comes to life anew with the reader, 
and we are able to perceive a temporal disjunction between the events surrounding the central 
character, the encounters these result in, and his overall experience of the culminating effect that 
these produce on him. Much of this results from the fact that right from the onset, the main 
character is presented to the reader through a blurring of the narrator’s professed unaffected 
perspective with the author’s strong political opinions. As Thomas Cousineau observes, the novel 
may be summed up as “an expression of Conrad’s political vision” (Cousineau 27), through which 
he deploys of the narrative’s “political elements” to dramatize “implicit psychological concerns” 
(Cousineau 27). Arguing that the novel lends itself equally to forms of interpretation that 
simultaneously draw on its political as well as its psychological aspects, Cousineau states that the 
layering of these two in the novel makes “the disentangling of political and psychological 
motivations extremely difficult” (28). This entangling of the political and the psychological 
legitimises a reading that vetoes a restriction of the narrative to ‘things Russian’ or even to 
‘Western’ scrutiny, thus opening it up to universal exploration. 
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Thus, from the perspective of the conscientious reader, it is possible to perceive how social 
and political developments cohere across geographical space and time as we connect this story of 
Russia to the narrator’s Western Europe where he confirms that “certain tones of cynicism and 
cruelty, of moral negation, and even of moral distress” have long since been “already silenced” 
(140). This similarity insinuated between the narrative’s depiction of an oppressive Russian 
imperialism and the historical past of Western Europe prefigures a post-colonial universality of 
the reality of constructing an identity through self-assertion, and free from social conformity. Such 
a universality is evidenced in Ngugi Wa Thiong’o’s novel, A Grain of Wheat, which, as Caminero-
Santangelo observes, is an adaptation of Conrad’s novel to a peculiarly African (Kenyan) context, 
thus “undermining, in the process, the notion of essential national character embedded in Under 
Western Eyes” (Caminero-Santangelo 144). 
Related to the reader’s universalist perspective is the perspective that the main character 
himself provides in his peculiarly individualistic struggle. In Avrom Fleishman’s opinion, the 
novel may be interpreted as an investigation into the proper relationship between an individual and 
his society (216). From the standpoint of such an analysis, Fleishman argues that in the end 
Razumov’s confession implies that “the extreme individualist becomes integrated with a group at 
last” (237). This conclusion may be contested on the basis that the grave consequences that 
Razumov suffers for that confession and his hermit-like isolation as he declines in health 
contravenes such an assertion of integration. However, the fact remains that the character, in all 
his manoeuvrings, constantly demonstrates a yearning to belong, to be recognised and to be 
accepted. Unfortunately, this yearning remains unfulfilled because, as Kaplan points out, in a 
system marked by social disorder and lawless oppression, the structures necessary for such a 
fulfilment simply do not exist (Kaplan 108). 
At the end of the novel, these three perspectives – narrator, reader, character – combined, 
provide the comprehensive critical perspective of a thirdsight through which we may conclude that 
even though Razumov consistently contests his Othering he ultimately remains permanently 
Othered. He is deaf, “crippled, ill, [and] getting weaker every day”. Cared for by Tekla, he lives 
“not ‘in the centre,’ but ‘in the south’” in a “little two-roomed wooden house, in the suburb of 
some very small town, hiding within the high plank-fence of a yard overgrown with nettles” (312). 
Apart from the obvious references to his debilitated condition, his ultimate Otherness is indicated 
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by the connotations accruing from the references to his living situation: not centre but south – 
alluding to marginality, little living quarters in small town. This reinforces the idea of marginality 
through an emphatic use of the diminutive adjectives ‘little’ and ‘very small’, which evoke the 
idea of a scale of comparison. Besides, the semantic properties of the verb ‘hide’ (‘hiding’) is 
highly suggestive of intentionality, a deliberate effort at concealment, an idea which is further 
consolidated by the mental picture painted of an overgrown yard surrounded by a high-plank fence. 
In this state of existence, Antonovna states that he has ideas and talks well. 
Considering that he is deaf, he can no longer hear and be influenced by what others think 
of him or expect of him. He, however, continues to talk, advancing his own ideas to whoever will 
care to listen. While his physical predicament traps him in the debilitating Otherness of disability, 
his mind seems to remain active in its ability to propound ideas. Yet, these only remain ideas as in 
his debility he cannot act on them even if he may have wanted to. This recalls the earlier allusion 
to ‘spectral ideas’ and ‘disembodied aspirations’. Thus, in his persistent mental activity translated 
into his presentation of ideas, he continues to contest the Otherness of physical incapacitation. 
Considering this final portrayal of Razumov from the perspective of my concept of thirdsight, 
which I expound in my chapter on Lord Jim, and which I define to constitute all the visual images 
and instances both presented to and evoked in our mind’s eye as we read a given text, I assert that 
the combined images we form of Razumov from the narrator’s description of his final condition is 
of an Othered individual who is frozen in the contestation of his Otherness. 
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CONCLUSION 
THE OTHER, THE ALIEN, THE EXILED 
 
This chapter wraps up my analysis of Conrad’s Others in the previous chapters by demonstrating 
how the motif of Otherness is further consolidated in his writing by being extended beyond the 
trope of difference to encompass a state of alienation and exile. For this final discussion, I, first of 
all, summarise salient aspects of Conrad’s own life that reveal his natural tendency towards, and 
his overall appreciation of the notions and states of alienation and exile that he then imputes to his 
Others. I then go further to briefly establish how the conditions of alienation and exile are enacted 
by his Othered characters in the three novels, The Nigger of the ‘Narcissus’, Lord Jim, and Under 
Western Eyes. I conclude by asserting that as James Wait, Jim, and Razumov gradually transform 
into complete Others, their states of Otherness become even further reinforced by the fact that they 
also gradually transform from potential social beings to undeniable social outcasts. I further 
emphasise that their final states of physical exile are only really the result of a psychological 
process of alienation that they personally engage in as they systematically break away from the 
established social structures in which they find themselves.   
 
I 
Identity counts for much in Joseph Conrad’s writing. Whether it be the identity of the Self or of 
the Other, who represents a deviation from the Self by dint of being different. This preoccupation 
with identity gives rise to Conrad’s abiding concern with difference, especially in relation to the 
Other through whom he always depicts the complex nuances intrinsic in the character of the 
subject. With an acute interest in representing the Other as bearing an essentially complex 
personality, Conrad demonstrates that human qualities progressively change as the subject is 
always in a state of becoming and so never determinedly fixed. This perception of the nature of 
the human subject was firmly rooted in the fact that Conrad himself was constantly plagued by the 
need to work out the specificity of his own subjectivity, having become the hapless victim of a 
turbulent history which “offered him only a stunted, incomplete legacy of national identity, 
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dissipated in an obscure and chaotic world” (Said 38). Throughout this study and focusing on a 
selection of his writing, I have suggested that Conrad constantly casts his protagonists as Others 
in relation to various subjects in his texts. Importantly, the subjects against whom his Othered 
characters are differentiated may themselves be Others. On the other hand, they may embody a 
dominant force that could very well be as abstract as an idea, such as a moral ideal or an expected 
mode of conduct. Conversely, that hegemonic force could also be precariously epitomised in some 
individual representing a group, a society or an established institution with its accepted norms and 
practices. Thus, in Conrad’s writing, even the very essence of the Self is ambivalent. However, 
with his keen interest in the subject that is different – Other – because it falls short of some 
preconceived standard, Conrad focuses on demonstrating the intricate nature of even this Other, 
whose personality is never a given but can be traced as it evolves through a concatenation of setting 
and events. I conclude this survey by indicating that Conrad’s fixity with the Other arises from the 
fact that he identifies with the Other precisely because the empirical author himself identifies as 
Other.   
Born to Polish parents in a historically contested geographical space that was a part of Poland, was 
later subsumed under the Russian Empire and is currently identified as Ukraine, Conrad’s young 
life was characterised by instability due to his family’s repeated relocation and eventual exile 
because of his father’s political activism. This theme of instability became a marked feature in his 
life after the death of his parents left him orphaned and in the care of relatives in his eleventh year. 
Having already moved around quite a bit, in his sixteenth year Conrad, with the blessing of his 
uncle whose ward he had become, left his native land and headed to Marseilles, France, from 
where he began to pursue a career at sea. Over the next two decades the would-be writer of 
intriguing narratives was to experience life at sea as a marine merchant. It is from this experience 
that he obtained most of the material that he later uses in his writing: character portraits, settings, 
descriptions of landscapes (or ‘spacescapes’, to be more precise), and much more. This is very 
similar to the trajectory of Herman Melville (1819-1891), who travelled extensively and negotiated 
various Others he encountered during his travels in his works such as Typee, Omoo, and Moby-
Dick. 
If Conrad’s early life in Russian-occupied Poland was unstable, his later life as a young 
adult at sea would probably have been even more so, judging from the countless descriptions in 
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his sea-narratives of the tumultuous and precarious nature of sea-life. However, in A Personal 
Record, his assertion that the “sea is strong medicine” (163), suggests that he found solace, 
stability, and, above all, meaning for his life by dedicating to a career at sea. Therefore, if the 
restive nature of his formative years left him with a feeling that he lacked what Said has termed “a 
solid sense of identity” (24), then his life at sea, initiated through France and ending up in England, 
offered him a transnational fluidity, mobility, and contingency that would prepare him for his later 
decision to permanently dock his marine career and substitute it for a life of writing. Thus, taken 
from Said’s largely cosmopolitan perspective, the notion that Conrad lacked such a solid sense of 
identity may be thought of as more liberating rather than as a lacuna in his character. From this 
multi-faceted background, it becomes clearly evident that by the time Conrad begins a career in 
writing, he embodies “in his persona the paradox of identity” (Sewlall,191), a condition that serves 
as an index to his persistent engagement in his writing with “the whole mechanism of existence” 
(Richard Curle 25). Even though he negotiates his concern with existence through the portrayal of 
his characters, the fact that this negotiation also invariably represents his own struggles has been 
argued out extensively in Said’s Joseph Conrad and the Fiction of Autobiography. Said also 
strongly indicates that through all his writing. Conrad draws on a “sense of vécu” (8) that 
demonstrates the experience of an “existential reality” (9) resulting from the development of “a 
partnership between himself and the external world” (9). Thus, his writing denotes a “dialectic” 
that constitutes the “full exposition of his soul to the vast panorama of existence it has discerned 
outside of itself” (9). By this, we certainly do not assume that Said implies that Conrad has literally 
lived out the experiences of every single character portrayed in his writing. Rather, we deduce that 
through a psychological engagement with the characters he creates, Conrad is able to depict “a 
conviction of [his] fellow-men’s existence strong enough to take upon itself a form of imagined 
life clearer than reality and whose accumulated verisimilitude of selected episodes puts to shame 
the pride of documentary history” (Conrad, A Personal Record 35). In his effort to create such 
imagined lives that are “clearer than reality” in his writing, Conrad draws out from within himself 
an Other that he can recognise in others, or put differently, he identifies in his Others traits and 
tendencies that he can readily recognise in himself.  
Thus, through his writing, Conrad formulates and makes sense of his own identity, which 
he attempts to rescue from the instability that has marked the greater half of his life and that 
persistently haunts him even in his later life. Nevertheless, he also demonstrates through the 
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symbolic fluidity of his representations the richness of his cosmopolitan experience over the 
precariousness of his earlier instability. Defined at once by this instability and by his 
cosmopolitanism, Conrad, while piecing together his own personality through the autobiographical 
scripting of his memories in A Personal Record, admits himself that he is a “haunted man” (25) 
whose hope is that from his writing “there may emerge at last the vision of a personality; the man 
behind the books […], a coherent, justifiable personality both in its origin and in its action” (16). 
On the evidence of this, I suggest that, singularly guided by this purpose, Conrad imbues his 
fictional characters with credible natures that however reflect his own struggle for a coherence and 
comprehension of personality. In effect, his writing bears the burden of existentialism, both on an 
intrapersonal and on a relational level. For through his writing, we observe that Conrad 
consistently grapples with the philosophical deliberation of any sets of conventions guided by a 
general notion of authenticity that provide a means to understand the human subject. So, from his 
existential view on the condition of the human subject, Conrad demonstrates that, valid as the 
perspectives of truth (encapsulated in the sciences such as psychology) and morality (determined 
by notions of what is good and right) may be, they are not enough to provide an insight into the 
nature or place of his subjects within different social contexts. 
In the vein of this existentialism, Conrad’s writing reveals a desperate need for his 
characters to situate themselves within, or in other words to find their place in their milieu through 
extreme exertion towards the assertion of their personal identities. With regard to this, Said 
emphasises that 
[Conrad’s writing] always had one end in view – the achievement of character – 
and his fiction is a vital reflection of his [own] developing character. The 
mechanisms of existence discernible in [his writing] are Conrad’s portrayal of 
himself in the process of living. They are sections of a long drama in which the 
arrangements of setting, act, and actor are Conrad’s consciousness of himself in the 
struggle toward the equilibrium of character. (13) 
While I agree with Said that Conrad’s writing was his way of finding himself and developing his 
own character, I also suggest that a further function of his writing was to enable him to work 
through a politics of identity which invariably beset his own sense of belonging and becoming 
throughout his life. By a 'politics of identity', I mean the different impressions made, politically 
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and culturally, on Conrad’s life and the various attachments that he later developed to his self-
identity influenced by his varied experiences while he remained unable to completely shake off 
the marks left upon him, both psychologically and culturally, by his early history. This is marked, 
first, by the fact that he grew up in a Poland that was partitioned by Austria, Prussia and Russia, 
and that subsequently struggled for independence from Russian occupation and domination. When 
he later left Poland, he developed a marine career under French influences and then much later 
decided to naturalise and build a career in writing as an Englishman. Secondly, the activism of his 
parents during his childhood years meant that Conrad experienced, quite early, the vagaries of 
exile, becoming himself permanently exiled, spiritually and physically, from Poland. These 
developments over the course of his life invariably left Conrad with the anxiety of a fluid identity 
that made him neither wholly one thing nor the other, and that he struggled to shape into a 
distinctive form. This anxiety is expressed by Conrad himself as he engages with his life, past and 
present, through his writing. However, as discussed by theorists such as Said and Bhabha, such a 
fluidity of identity also gives force to a liberating moment through which a completely radical 
identity may emerge. Conrad testifies to the effect of such a liberating moment in his author’s note 
to Under Western Eyes when he declares an effort to achieve a “detachment from all passions, 
prejudices, and even from personal memories” (UWE 7). In a further repudiation of the angst that 
may beset his identity, I find that, Conrad. in the totality of his writing depicts that his “greatest 
anxiety” is to be able to “strike and sustain the note of scrupulous impartiality” (UWE 7), 
especially, in the treatment of his characters. In connection with this need to observe such fairness, 
he further states that he feels thus obliged because it is “imposed on [him] historically and 
hereditarily, by the peculiar experience of race and family” (7). In relation to this, I read 
‘historically’ as referring to Conrad’s own experience of life under political domination and then 
later as a self-imposed exile. And I interpret ‘hereditarily’ as drawing attention to the fact of his 
parents’ exile and early deaths due to their active protest against political domination. To navigate 
through this personal history in order to arrive at a meaningful idea of personal identity, Conrad’s 
writing is as much a dialogue with himself as it is with others, and his concern for an ‘impartiality’ 
of representation, whether he successfully achieves it or not, indicates a guiding ethics that 
encompasses his efforts. This notion of dialoguing through his writing has been explored time and 
again in various critical works on Conrad: Said (2008) has examined this by reading Conrad’s 
fiction through his letters while Keith Carabine (1991), David Smith (1991), Yael Levin (2011) 
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and Jeremy Hawthorn (1990) among others have discussed this with specific reference to one or 
others of Conrad’s fictional works. 
Several critical essays have thus referred to Conrad as an exile expressing his inalienable 
eastern sentiments in the western language of his chosen country of exile. Moreover, from 
Conrad’s personal letters, sufficient evidence abounds that despite his effort to express himself as 
best he could in the most acceptable English structure, he was always reminded of his foreignness 
as he struggled with the constant awareness of being a “self-conscious foreigner writing of obscure 
experiences in an alien language” (Said, 4). This awareness was accentuated by his apparently very 
strong Polish accent when he spoke English, a trait that he shares with Nabokov who, like Conrad, 
would become another master stylist of written English despite his strong Russian accent.  Besides, 
Said further cites Conrad’s multi-layered identity as he points out that his stilted writing style is a 
reflection of the “difficulties of an overwhelmingly untidy existence as a French-speaking, self-
exiled, extremely articulate Pole, who had been a sailor and was now, […] a writer” (4). For 
Conrad, this plurality of identity and the fact that he is always considered foreign, no doubt, impose 
on him the greater need to better understand and represent others. In fact, he himself draws 
attention to his indistinct identity in his letter to his friend Edward Garnett where he states: “You 
always remember that I am a Slav (it’s your idée fixe) but you seem to forget that I am a Pole” 
(qtd. in Said 63). Besides, he also calls attention to his foreignness when he writes to his aunt 
Marguerite Poradowska: “English is … still a foreign language to me, requiring an immense effort 
to handle” (qtd. in Said, 63). Thus, while living in self-exile, it is evident that Conrad, throughout 
his writing life, is constantly aware of his foreignness, of the fact of being an alien, of not belonging 
in the social space in which he chooses to locate himself. In effect, he is invariably marked by the 
two permanent facts of his life – exile and alienation, which along with the haunts of his past and 
the challenges of his present, feature as prominent leitmotifs marking his represented Others. 
 
II 
Each of the texts included in this study reveal that Conrad’s protagonists, who are progressively 
Othered, are also depicted as experiencing varying forms of exile and alienation in diverse yet 
similar ways. In the Nigger of the Narcissus, James Wait, whose antithetical nature vacillates 
between victim and demon, remains enigmatic to his fellow shipmates to the very end. In effect, 
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they are unable to really accept him as one of them and so they alienate him as a result. If we take 
a final look at the novel through the lenses of ‘exile’ and ‘alienation,’ what becomes even clearer 
through the portrayal of Wait’s character is Conrad’s subtle argument that the dreadful isolation 
of the individual soul is central to the notion of man, and to the idea of what it means to be 
identified as socially belonging. Thus, we become more keenly aware of that which Wait loses 
sight of: that what is most vital to one’s existence is the achievement of solidarity with other men, 
and that self-identification and knowledge are attained through fellowship with others. The 
realisation of this fundamental truth, producing discernment and humility in the individual, is the 
first step to overcoming the threat of exclusion associated with the insinuations of exile and 
alienation adduced in the text. In effect, Wait’s failure to achieve such communion results in his 
ostracization to the extent that he is depicted as an Other within his universe. In this state, he loses 
touch with the rest of mankind in his microcosmic world because, in failing to identify with them, 
he also fails to identify his place amongst them, developing a more malevolent character as he fails 
to obtain social acceptance.  
A similar craving for social acceptance is replicated in Lord Jim where we observe the 
protagonist striving to achieve an imagined moral ideal through social approval. As he consistently 
fails in this enterprise due to his inability to take timeous actions or decisions, he ends up 
permanently living in the shadow of his failures and regrets. As we look at the novel from the 
perspective of ‘exile’ and ‘alienation,’ it becomes evident that this state of an eclipsed existence 
predicates Jim’s gradual withdrawal from a needful social communion with others to a 
psychological existence in which his sole frame of reference is his heroic ideal fed by his heroic 
fantasies. Thus, we already perceive his exclusion from society as he takes on, in essence and in 
reality, a virtual existence that alienates him from the rest of mankind. Ultimately, in his desire to 
disprove his failure, mostly to himself but also to Marlow whose unrelenting interest in him gives 
him the benefit of the doubt and makes him eager to show himself capable, Jim gradually retreats 
into a remote and unknown territory. By withdrawing in this way, it is evident that his mental state 
of exile manifests physically through his relocation into obscurity. In effect, Jim’s self-exile to 
Patusan also implies that he becomes ostracised, as Patusan assumes the aspect of a dream world 
where he is able to accomplish his heroic fantasies. However, stark reality hits him with the return 
of his fears and a repeat, and reminder, of his failure when his dream-world collides with the real 
world through the interception of the rogue pirate, Gentleman Brown. This collision causes his 
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world, his dreams and his achievements to collapse around him, resulting in his death which marks 
his permanent elimination from a much-craved idealistic social existence. In effect, it becomes 
evident that, in his progressive exile and alienation, Jim does not only retreat into an other-worldly 
space, but that, in his death, his alienation becomes reinforced by the fact that he also unites with 
this other-worldliness as he transforms in nature into a spectral image. By the end of the narrative, 
even his actual earlier existence is perpetually called into doubt, and he remains some legendary 
figure existing only in the imagination of Marlow’s readers/ -listeners. 
Razumov in Under Western Eyes similarly transforms into a legendary figure existing on 
the fringes of his society. Reduced by his incapacitation to an invalid and resigned to his fate as a 
dying recluse, he survives in a liminal space between life and death, between presence and absence. 
For even though he is still alive by the end of the narrative, his state of debilitation and his inactivity 
have ensured that for all his talk, he is nothing more than “a mere talking animal not much more 
wonderful than a parrot” (11). And even though he seems present, he is absent from the centre of 
social activity and of philosophical thought that he so yearned to become a part of by aspiring to 
greatness as a professor. Thus, his marginalised existence reinforces the depiction of him as an 
exile, and it harks back to the consistent portrayal of him as different throughout the narrative. 
Those persistent references to his difference confer upon him an alien status which gains in 
intensity as, in his strife to belong to his society, he ends up being depicted as a misfit whose 
violent expulsion from that society simultaneously renders him debilitated and impeded. 
Consequently, in each of the three novels, it is revealed that the main characters, 
represented by Conrad as Others, are consolidated in their Otherness by the fact of their exile or 
alienation. In relation to this, I further argue that a close examination of these characters as exiled 
subjects also brings to the fore the notion of displacement which allows us to see them as 
positioned outside, or on the margins, of ‘organised’ society. In effect, since Wait, Jim and 
Razumov are unable to fit into or comply with the structures of their organised societies which 
comprise rules and expectations, they are cast out of them, psychologically and physically. Thus, 
they experience exile in two phases. In the first phase, they experience psychological exile marked 
by a complete disconnection between their ideas and expectations of themselves and their 
societies’ ideas of them. In this regard, what the characters think of themselves, and the images 
they would like to give, or to believe, of themselves are all in their heads while their societies see 
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them differently. As a result of their illusionary mental self-images that do not match with their 
real social identities, the characters are unable to properly integrate into their societies and remain 
estranged. Eventually, as this psychological exile steadily impacts on their real lives it manifests 
as physical exile characterised by a marginal form of existence or by outright death. 
 
III 
From my foregoing argument, I conclude that a reading of Conrad’s texts from the perspectives of 
‘alienation’ and ‘exile’ elucidates that the constructed Otherness of his characters is further 
underscored by the notion of isolation. As he represents his Others, Conrad stages his subjects as 
constantly caught in an ambivalent state of fitting or not fitting into a society into which they may 
gain admittance or from which they may face expulsion based on their ability or failure to construct 
an identity within the framework of the accepted norms of that society. To the extent that such an 
ambivalence evokes a paradox of existence faced by these Othered characters, it also draws 
attention to the substance that forms the major theme of Conrad’s writing: the internal and 
emotional conflicts of the individual in his effort to identify himself within a social structure. 
Because such inner conflicts are personal in nature, the individual’s experience of them becomes 
an isolating factor as he tragically struggles to resolve the dissonance between himself as an 
individual and society as a domineering force. 
This focus on the lone individual whose inner crises toss him into an ambiguous social 
existence of solitude fraught with despair is certainly not unique to Conrad as it is quite common 
in modern fiction. Nevertheless, I highlight it in my closing comments because it harks back to my 
suggestion of a politics of identity through which a subject would negotiate and come to terms 
with the varying influences – political, cultural, economic or social – that contribute to the shaping 
of his character. While these influences may not always be predetermined, anticipated or 
controlled, they contribute substantially to the formation, indefinite and illimitable, of the subject 
who, as Conrad demonstrates, has no fixed identity but vacillates between Self and Other and is 
often caught in an ambivalent, in-between space of both and neither. In addition to this perspective 
that Conrad’s Othered subjects are characterised by ambivalence, I contend that they also bear a 
universality that inverts the specificity of setting as, in the radicality of their Otherness, they are 
positioned, whether by choice or circumstantially, outside the realms of structured existence. Thus, 
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in this study of Conrad’s representation of Otherness conducted through an examination of three 
of his works – The Nigger of the Narcissus, Lord Jim, and Under Western Eyes – I have 
demonstrated that Conrad does not specifically pin Otherness to any particular race or subject to 
the exclusion of some presumably ‘superior’ race or subject. Rather, he uses the same techniques 
of Othering to indicate such individuals whose emergence of a notion of self clashes with an 
established system of rules prescribed by a society that necessarily guided by tacit values and is 
defined by the very power dynamics that construct them as Others. 
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